Do U.S. senators adjust their policy positions or voting behavior—engage in “strategic moderation”—in their quest for reelection? In the June 1986 issue of this Review, Gerald Wright and Michael Berkman sought to demonstrate that Senate incumbents moderate their ideological positions as elections near. This endeavor was part of their larger effort to show the importance of policy issues in the selection of members of Congress. Robert Bernstein takes the view that the claims about strategic moderation rest on methodological flaws. But Wright and Berkman argue that most investigators agree on the general direction of senatorial candidate behavior. The controversy turns on conception and interpretation of analytical results.

Implicit in Dahrendorf's Society and Democracy in Germany and explicit in Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy are respectively a liberal and a radical model of democratic development. Neither of these models adequately accounts for the experience of Sweden, a remarkably successful “late developer.” Although Swedish industrialization proceeded with little public ownership of the means of production, with limited welfare programs until the 1930s, and above all with restricted military expenditure—all factors Dahrendorf implies are crucial for democratic development—it did not produce the traditional liberal infrastructure of bourgeois entrepreneurs nor a vigorous open market society. Similarly only three of Moore's five preconditions for democracy obtained in Sweden: a balance between monarchy and aristocracy, the weakening of the landed aristocracy, and the prevention of an aristocratic-bourgeois coalition against the workers and peasants. There was no thorough shift toward commercial agriculture and, most important, there was no revolutionary break with the past. Consequently, one has to evolve a radical liberal model of development which states the conditions for the emergence of democracy in Sweden without revolution. This model contains implications for the further modernization of American politics.

Before 1945 Japan was the epitome of a nation whose political regime was based on the presence of a “benevolent leader,” the Emperor. The postwar democratic regime, however, was founded in explicit repudiation of this central role of the Emperor in the political life of the nation. This study, based on two surveys of Japanese children and adolescents, investigates their images of political authority figures and the consequences of those images on support for the institutions of the present regime. The first part of the paper focuses on younger children's images of possible contenders for the role of benevolent leader. The data reveal indifference toward the emperor and strong negative affect toward the prime minister. Comparison of the images of prime minister and local leader suggests that the leader's personality and leadership style, characteristics of the institutional structure of politics, and children's conceptions of the meaning of “politics” combine to the detriment of the prime minister's image. The second part of the paper centers around the question of whether there occurs in later years a spill-over of negative affect from the prime minister's image onto the other major institutions of the regime. The data indicate that a selective political cynicism emerges in adolescence, in which negative feelings toward the authoritative, output institutions of government are coupled with support for those institutions which mediate popular participation in politics. The paper concludes with a consideration of the significance that the historical origins of a political regime have for popular images of national leaders.

In the climate of ethnic insecurity present in Nigeria in 1964, workers tended to support ethnic over labor parties. A small fraction of workers who were cross-pressured between their ethnic and their labor loyalties however, tended to report that they supported both ethnic and labor parties. These are called the “incon-sistent.” Looking more closely at this group, it was possible to distinguish between those who were descriptively inconsistent (they would describe themselves as supporting an ethnic and a labor party at the same time); and those who were prescriptively inconsistent (they would prescribe support for a labor party while actually supporting an ethnic party). Though descriptive inconsistency varied inversely with political information, prescriptive inconsistency varied directly with it. The immediate political significance of the inconsistents lay in their confusing the predictions of labor leaders who were counting on their support. Beyond that, however, it may be suggested that the inconsistents added to the felt unpredictability of rapidly changing, plural societies such as Nigeria.

In the decline of his life, a disappointed man might well ask himself what destiny would have held in store for him if at some crucial juncture of his maturity he had accepted the earnest advice of a solicitous friend or even of a keen-sighted foe. Today liberalism is confronted with a similar question. It is on the defensive in all parts of the Western world except in the United States. Even there its position is deceptive. Perhaps it survives tenuously under the artificial protective canvas of postwar inflation. Today one can hardly question this threatened eclipse of liberalism. Because of this foreboding, disturbing questions haunt the liberal. What deficiency in liberalism is leading to the abandonment of its tenets throughout Europe? Was there counsel offered and ignored in the past which might have retarded the infirmities of age?

The answer to the first question has long been apparent. Yet in practice contemporary liberalism, both of the progressive and nineteenth-century varieties, has never assimilated its essential meaning. Following the French Revolution and the English Reform Act, liberalism began its long history of divorcing theory from practice. In the splendor of Victorian industrial success, this separation was not driven into the consciousness either of the intellectual leaders or of the people. But with the tension, domestic and international, of the eighties, liberals themselves, like T. H. Green and then Hobhouse, undertook the task of correcting some of the glaring discrepancies between the doctrine and the reality. In the light of the basically abstract character of liberalism, these collectivist renovations now appear like amateurish tinkering with a vastly complex apparatus.

Liberal doctrine had indeed long been suffering from a negative attitude toward the state. But this was simply a diagnostic symptom of an even deeper defect: liberalism's unconscionable indifference to the material conditions of society, and its ensuing failure to put its theories to the test of the social reality.

The presidential campaigns of 1928 and 1932 are a study in contrasts. In 1928, the United States was at the peak of the boom period; the incumbent Republicans were confident of victory; and the result was a Republican victory which “broke” the Solid South and swept all but two states outside that section into the Republican column. The 1932 campaign was fought in the midst of depression and disaster; confidence was with the Democrats for the first time in many years; and the result was a Democratic victory which put the party securely in control of both houses of Congress, as well as of the presidency. What effect did the changed economic and political outlook have upon the financing of the campaign?

Analysis of data from a 1988 survey of presidential parties demonstrates that campaign leaders are better understood as true believers than as either representatives or vote maximizers. Analysis of leaders' attitudes reveals four issue groups in both the Republican and Democratic parties. The dominant coalition in the Republican party is slightly more conservative, and that in the Democratic party is slightly more liberal, than the party median. Comparison with similar 1972 data shows stable patterns of issue advocacy and intraparty cohesion over this time period but somewhat increased issue distance between the parties in 1988.

The political systems of American states have remained, until recent years, a neglected field of study. Students of state government have found it easier to make meaningful comparisons of administration or legislative organization than to capture on paper the dynamic political forces which appear to be unique in each state and often are completely transformed by each group of personalities that wander on and off the political stage. V. O. Key's excellent study of the political forces in Southern states pointed up the lack of similar surveys of Northern states.

In particular, the role of political parties in state legislatures has been largely ignored. The report of the American Political Science Association Committee on American Legislatures points out this problem and also notes that “it has been generally assumed that partisanship counts for less in most state legislatures than it does in Congress.” Professor Lowell's famous study in 1901, which showed a comparatively low level of party voting in all of the five states he studied except New York, provided the empirical evidence for a conclusion that has been widely shared by later writers.

This paper investigates how counterterrorism targeting terrorist leaders affects terrorist attacks. This effect is theoretically ambiguous and depends on whether terrorist groups are modeled as unitary actors or not. The paper exploits a natural experiment provided by strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) “hitting” and “missing” terrorist leaders in Pakistan. Results suggest that terrorist groups increase the number of attacks they commit after a drone “hit” on their leader compared with after a “miss.” This increase is statistically significant for 3 out of 6 months after a hit, when it ranges between 47.7% and 70.3%. Additional analysis of heterogenous effects across groups and leaders, and the impact of drone hits on the type of attack, terrorist group infighting, and splintering, suggest that principal-agent problems—(new) terrorist leaders struggling to control and discipline their operatives—account for these results better than alternative theoretical explanations.

In their article in the February 2010 issue of APSR, Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox (2010) asserted that they had “conducted a unique survey experiment that, for the first time, explicitly and separately examine[d] individuals’ attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigrants.” That claim was in error. A prior survey experiment, also published in the American Political Science Review, in February 2004, examined attitudes toward highly skilled and low-skilled immigrants in the Netherlands and assigned respondents randomly to alternative questions (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004).

Any attempt to understand the legislative process, or to reckon how well it fulfills its purported functions, calls for a careful consideration of the relationships among congressmen. The beginning weeks of the first session of every congress are dominated by the internal politics of one phase of those relationships, the assignment of members to committees. Since congressmen devote most of their energies—constituents' errands apart—to the committees on which they serve, the political stakes in securing a suitable assignment are high. Competition for the more coveted posts is intense in both houses; compromises and adjustments are necessary. Members contest with each other over particularly desirable assignments; less frequently, one member challenges the entire body, as when Senator Wayne Morse fought for his committee assignments in 1953.

The processes and patterns of committee assignments have been only generally discussed by political scientists and journalists. Perhaps the reason for this is too ready an acceptance of the supposition that these assignments are made primarily on the basis of seniority. Continuous service, it is true, insures a member of his place on a committee once he is assigned, but seniority may have very little to do with transfers to other committees, and it has virtually nothing to do with the assignment of freshman members. On what basis, then, are assignments made? Surely, not on the basis of simple random selection.

A recent student sees the committee assignment process as analogous to working out a “giant jig saw puzzle” in which the committees-on-committees observe certain limitations.

We contend that some people of color express anti-Black prejudice to cope with their own marginalization. Individuals stationed along an in-group’s periphery are often motivated to exclude others to bolster their own belonging in a community. Yet this process is sometimes triggered when individuals feel they are losing their marginal position. We examine these dynamics in the context of Latino prejudice toward Black individuals, with American as the in-group. Study 1 shows stronger American identity among Latinos is associated with anti-Black racism, which then correlates with weaker support for Black-centered policies. Studies 2 and 3 induce Latinos to feel more American, which sometimes increases anti-Black prejudice and decreases support for pro-Black policies. Study 4 causes Latinos to feel less American, which powerfully heightens anti-Black racism and drastically undercuts support for Black-centered policies. These patterns are generally conditioned by ideology, with liberal Latinos exhibiting more sensitivity to their rank as American.

This paper, part of a larger study, is a comparative analysis of five Soviet elites—the central Party apparatchicki, and four specialist elites: the central economic bureaucrats, the military, the literary intelligentsia, and the legal profession. By content analyzing representative periodicals for each elite, data are collected on elite attitudes toward participation in the political system. The overall goal is to gain a measure of the direction and scope of Soviet elite attitudinal change since Stalin; more specifically, (1) to measure the extent to which the elites perceive themselves as participants in the policy-making process, (2) to determine whether the elites perceive their participatory role as expanding over time, and (3) to demark changing patterns of Partyspecialist elite relations from 1952–65.

To ground this study in a theoretical framework, analytical categories and hypotheses—derived in part from Brzezinski and Huntington's Political Power: USA/USSR—are formulated to test the perceived extent of elite participation in the Soviet political process. Synoptically, models of political systems may be built by reducing to essentials the mode of interaction between the regime and society. A key variable in analyzing this interaction between superstructure and base is the role and efficacy of societal groups in influencing policy formation and implementation. Following this tack a descriptive continuum may be set up for classifying political systems. At one end of the continuum are ideological systems (e.g., the USSR), at the other “instrumental” systems (e.g., the United States). In instrumental systems the relationship between the political and social system is characterized by “access and interaction.”

Despite increased interest in public sector collective bargaining, a survey of recent attempts to build theory about the dynamics and outcomes of union-management negotiations in public organizations reveals that little progress has been made. One approach that appears fruitful is interorganizational analysis. In an interorganizational context, organizations interact with other autonomous organizations to make joint decisions that have implications for both parties and for the larger system. This study focuses on five interorganizational variables that are useful for understanding the collective bargaining process in the public sector: (1) goal divergence; (2) stability of the relationship; (3) organizational dependence; (4) conflictual behavior; (5) contractual change.

From these theoretical concepts, five propositions are derived which serve as the basis for the research hypotheses. The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 60 cases drawn from a population of 535 collective bargaining negotiations in New York City from 1968 through 1972. The test of the research hypotheses resulted in these conclusions: (1) a substantial amount of the conflictual behavior in public sector collective bargaining is explained by goal divergence, stability of the relationship, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations; and (2) contractual change is explained by goal divergence, conflictual behavior, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations.

A ratification referendum is a procedure in which framers submit a constitution to the people for binding approval before implementation. It is widespread, recommended, and affects the contents and reception of constitutions, yet remains unstudied. Moreover, the reasons or justification for using the procedure remain unexplored. This is troubling because ratification referenda are optional, and thus should only be implemented for good reasons that, today, are no longer given. This article begins correcting this oversight by identifying those that brought about the first ratification referendum and explaining why they did so. I demonstrate that the Berkshire Constitutionalists called for the procedure during the events leading up to the creation of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, and that they justified their actions by asserting that the people have an unalienable right to ratify their constitution through a referendum, for this provided needed protection against potentially corrupt elites. This argument remains the most fully developed justification for the procedure to date. My analysis not only reveals ratification referenda to be another product of early American political thought, but also points the way forward for future evaluation of the procedure, and forces reflection upon the importance of having solid grounds for the choices involved in structuring a constitution-making process.

Spatial analyses of party systems typically construe the dimensions of party configurations in terms of policy-defined issues and ideologies such as the left-right framework. But as far as the mass public is concerned, perceptions and evaluations of parties in those terms require a degree of political sophistication beyond the grasp of the average voter. That is why this article explores the impact of alternative criteria. Its main thesis is that in multiparty systems with coalition governments the party alignments in government–and possibly in opposition–provide a cue to the public of great consequence for its preferential choice. Party preference orders of the West German electorate are examined by way of unfolding analysis. The data come from a series of surveys collected during the period 1961–1976. The results of the analysis reveal traces of the two dominant cleavages of German politics, namely social class and religion, but fail to show any significant influence of the left-right framework. What is most conspicuous is the susceptibility of preferential choice to cues emanating from the coalition behavior of party leaders. Given a context of changing coalition alignments among parties in government, that susceptibility prevents any fixed configuration of parties from governing voters' preferential choice.

In introducing the subject of this paper, it is held that we have failed, on the whole, to develop the public service as a well-recognized professional calling in this country, although it is not denied that preliminary steps toward this goal have been taken here and there, and particularly during the past few years. The position is probably tenable that more progress has been made in this direction in the last decade than in any preceding period since Jackson, not excepting the decade from 1883 to 1893 when civil service commissions were first installed. Jackson's famous statement: “The duties of all public officers are, or at least should be, made so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance, and I cannot but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience,” has apparently been perennially accepted by the general public.

Because the codes, rules and ideology of mass, single-party systems reach the village areas more slowly than do the tangible personalizations of party authority, a situation of potential misuse of power exists where rural party organizations operate. Peasants are aware of face-to-face confrontations by a familiar figure who has gained a party position; they are unaware of the precepts and regulations that the national party has laid down for the village level functionaries. Consequently, political victimization is most prounced at the very grass-root level that national leaders are attempting to integrate politically. Moreover, by its nature the rural party is a multi-faceted organization that is acceptable to the peasants because its leaders provide services that in more structured societies are carried out by specific agencies and contracts. Functions such as family arbitration, police investigation and criminal adjudication are mixed with the more classical party activities of representation and the dispensing of patronage.

Taken together, the above two characteristics of a rural party—potential abuse, and the multi-faceted nature—significantly influence the extent and form of political participation in the areas they serve. This article attempts to analyze these characteristics in Tanzania, and thereafter to assess rural party participation, and more broadly to suggest the theoretical dimensions of political participation in a new nation.

Participation, it may be argued, is the problem par excellence for leaders of the new nations. The building of a state, both in terms of economic development and in the creation of a national consciousness, depends upon some type of participation by the citizens.

Confusion reigns almost supreme in the field of political science, particularly when the meaning of terms is involved. Some of our most commonly used words have so many meanings, shades of meaning, and connotations that hearers and readers are frequently at a loss as to the meaning and significance of terms used unless the speaker or writer defines them as he uses them. A cursory examination of the term “state” brought to light no fewer than one hundred forty-five different definitions, even though only a few writers were included who might be classed as radical. Less than half of the definitions were in general agreement. Even this statement is based on the assumption that when the same words were used by two writers they were used to mean the same thing; and I doubt whether the assumption is entirely justifiable. Furthermore, “state” is not the only term in political science which is defined in multifold ways. A similar situation was found when others, especially “law,” “government,” “political,” “administration,” were investigated.

The process of communication between political scientists, as well as between these scientists and laymen or between laymen and laymen, comes to be a guessing game. Consciously or unconsciously, it is suggested, we are spending much of our time guessing what the sender means when he uses even technical words.