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Private versus public: A dual model for resource-constrained conflict representations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2022
Abstract
Pietraszewski's representation scheme is parsimonious and intuitive. However, internal mental representations may be subject to resource constraints that prefer more unusual systems such as sparse coding or compressed sensing. Pietraszewski's scheme may be most useful for understanding how agents communicate. Conflict may be driven in part by the complex interplay between parsimonious public representations and more resource-efficient internal ones.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Toward a computational theory of social groups: A finite set of cognitive primitives for representing any and all social groups in the context of conflict
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Author response
More “us,” less “them”: An appeal for pluralism – and stand-alone computational theorizing – in our science of social groups