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Advantages and limitations of representing groups in terms of recursive utilities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2022

Setayesh Radkani Open the ORCID record for Setayesh Radkani [Opens in a new window] ,
Ashley J. Thomas Open the ORCID record for Ashley J. Thomas [Opens in a new window]  and
Rebecca Saxe
Setayesh Radkani
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USAradkani@mit.edu; ajthomas@mit.edu; saxe@mit.edusaxelab.mit.edu
Ashley J. Thomas
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USAradkani@mit.edu; ajthomas@mit.edu; saxe@mit.edusaxelab.mit.edu
Rebecca Saxe
Affiliation:
Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139, USAradkani@mit.edu; ajthomas@mit.edu; saxe@mit.edusaxelab.mit.edu
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Abstract

Group representations based on recursive utilities can be used to derive the same predictions as Pietraszewski in conflict situations. Additionally, these representations generalize to non-conflict situations, asymmetric relationships, and represent the stakes in a conflict. However, both proposals fail to represent asymmetries of power and responsibility and to account for generalizations from specific observed individuals to collections of non-observed individuals.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e118
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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