No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Group? What group? A computational model of the group needs a psychology of “us” (not “them”)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2022
Abstract
Groups are only real, and only serve as a basis for collective action, when their members perceive them to be real. For a computational model to have analytic fidelity and predictive validity it, therefore, needs to engage with the psychological reality of groups, their internal structure, and their structuring by (and of) the social context in which they function.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Fiske, A. P. (1992). The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified theory of social relations. Psychological Review, 99, 689.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Haslam, S. A. (2004). Psychology in organizations: The social identity approach. Sage.Google Scholar
Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & Turner, J. C. (1994). Stereotyping and social reality. Blackwell.Google Scholar
Turner, J. C. (1982). Towards a cognitive redefinition of the social group. In Tajfel, H. (Ed.), Social identity and intergroup relations (pp. 15–40). Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Turner, J. C., Oakes, P. J., Haslam, S. A., & McGarty, C. (1994). Self and collective: Cognition and social context. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 454–463. doi: 10.1177/0146167294205002.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Target article
Toward a computational theory of social groups: A finite set of cognitive primitives for representing any and all social groups in the context of conflict
Related commentaries (29)
A neuroscientific perspective on the computational theory of social groups
Advantages and limitations of representing groups in terms of recursive utilities
Are we there yet? Every computational theory needs a few black boxes, including theories about groups
Beyond folk-sociology: Extending Pietraszewski's model to large-group dynamics
Can group representations based on relational cues warrant the rich inferences typically drawn from group membership?
Coalitionary psychology and group dynamics on social media
Compassion within conflict: Toward a computational theory of social groups informed by maternal brain physiology
Conciliation and meta-contrast are important for understanding how people assign group memberships during conflict situations
Developmental antecedents of representing “group” behavior: A commentary on Pietraszewski's theory of groups
Group? What group? A computational model of the group needs a psychology of “us” (not “them”)
How do we know who may replace each other in triadic conflict roles?
Interacting with others while reacting to the environment
Internal versus external group conflicts
Latent structure learning as an alternative computation for group inference
Learning agents that acquire representations of social groups
More than one way to skin a cat: Addressing the arbitration problem in developmental science
On vagueness and parochialism in psychological research on groups
Paranoia reveals the complexity in assigning individuals to groups on the basis of inferred intentions
Private versus public: A dual model for resource-constrained conflict representations
Psychological and actual group formation: Conflict is neither necessary nor sufficient
Shadow banning, astroturfing, catfishing, and other online conflicts where beliefs about group membership diverge
Shared intentionality and the representation of groups; or, how to build a socially adept robot
Signals and cues of social groups
Social groups and the computational conundrums of delays, proximity, and loyalty
Societies and other kinds of social groups
The labelled container: Conceptual development of social group representations
Towards a computational network theory of social groups
Triadic conflict “primitives” can be reduced to welfare trade-off ratios
Using laboratory intergroup conflict and riots as a “stress test”
Author response
More “us,” less “them”: An appeal for pluralism – and stand-alone computational theorizing – in our science of social groups