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Psychological and actual group formation: Conflict is neither necessary nor sufficient
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2022
Abstract
Conflict is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of groups. First, the existence of mutually supporting, rather than antagonistic, interactants is sufficient to constitute a “social group.” Second, conflict does not necessarily mark group boundaries but can also exist within an ingroup. Third, psychological representations of social groups do not only trace, but also perpetuate the existence of groups.
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Target article
Toward a computational theory of social groups: A finite set of cognitive primitives for representing any and all social groups in the context of conflict
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Author response
More “us,” less “them”: An appeal for pluralism – and stand-alone computational theorizing – in our science of social groups