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Shadow banning, astroturfing, catfishing, and other online conflicts where beliefs about group membership diverge
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2022
Abstract
Drawing from conflicts observed in online communities (e.g., astroturfing and shadow banning), I extend Pietraszewski's theory to accommodate phenomena dependent on the intersubjectivity of groups, where representations of group membership (or beliefs about group membership) diverge. Doing so requires enriching representations to include other agents and their beliefs in a process of recursive mentalizing.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
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Target article
Toward a computational theory of social groups: A finite set of cognitive primitives for representing any and all social groups in the context of conflict
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Author response
More “us,” less “them”: An appeal for pluralism – and stand-alone computational theorizing – in our science of social groups