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An interoceptive neuroanatomical perspective on feelings, energy, and effort

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 December 2013

A. D. Craig*
Affiliation:
Atkinson Research Laboratory, Barrow Neurological Institute, Phoenix, AZ 85013. Bud.Craig@DignityHealth.org

Abstract

A homeostatic energy model of awareness proposes that the anterior insular cortex engenders feelings that provide an amodal valuation of homeostatic energy utilization in an opponent, bivalent emotional control system. Feelings are the “common currency” which enable optimal utilization in the physical and mental behavior of a highly social primate. This model offers a different perspective.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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