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The costs of giving up: Action versus inaction asymmetries in regret

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 December 2013

Antoinette Nicolle  and
Kevin Riggs
Antoinette Nicolle
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Hull, Hull HU6 7RX, United Kingdom. a.nicolle@hull.ac.ukk.riggs@hull.ac.uk
Kevin Riggs
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Hull, Hull HU6 7RX, United Kingdom. a.nicolle@hull.ac.ukk.riggs@hull.ac.uk
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Abstract

Kurzban et al.'s opportunity cost model of mental effort relies heavily on counterfactual thinking. We suggest that a closer inspection of the role of counterfactual emotions, and particularly of action/inaction asymmetries in anticipated regret, may be important in understanding the role of opportunity costs in decisions to persist with a current task.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 6 , December 2013 , pp. 702
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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