Why have states created international laws to regulate internal armed conflicts? This article is the first to theorize the emergence and design of these international rules, focusing on Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Drawing on original multicountry archival research, I develop the mechanism of forum isolation to explain the origins of Common Article 3, demonstrating the importance of social opprobrium pressure to explain why Britain and France switched from staunch opposition to support and leadership in 1949. Specifically, forum isolation pressured these European empires to concede and to react strategically behind the scenes, saving face and safeguarding their security interests by deliberately inserting ambiguous language in the text of Common Article 3. This move later facilitated states' avoidance of this rule in many conflict cases.

We present a two-stage approach to civil conflict analysis. Unlike conventional approaches that focus only on armed conflict and treat all other cases as “at peace,” we first distinguish cases with and without contested incompatibilities (Stage 1) and then whether or not contested incompatibilities escalate to armed conflict (Stage 2). This allows us to analyze factors that relate to conflict origination (onset of incompatibilities) and factors that predict conflict militarization (onset of armed violence). Using new data on incompatibilities and armed conflict, we replicate and extend three prior studies of violent civil conflict, reformulated as a two-stage process, considering different estimation procedures and potential selection problems. We find that the group-based horizontal political inequalities highlighted in research on violent civil conflict clearly relate to conflict origination but have no clear association with militarization, whereas other features emphasized as shaping the risk of civil war, such as refugee flows and soft state power, predict militarization but not incompatibilities. A two-stage approach to conflict analysis can help advance theories of civil conflict, assess alternative mechanisms through which explanatory variables are thought to influence conflict, and guide new data-collection efforts.

While extensive scholarship has shown that it is possible to maintain global economic openness after hegemony, economic liberalization is still thought to be unlikely prior to hegemonic ascent. This assumption is based on the conventional narrative that Great Britain began lowering its trade barriers in the 1820s as it began its hegemonic ascent. This article shows that Britain began pursuing an open trading structure in the 1780s—in precisely the multipolar world that hegemonic stability theorists claimed would be least likely to initiate the shift. This change in commercial strategy depended crucially on the intellectual conversion of a key policymaker—the Earl of Shelburne—from mercantilist foreign economic policy to Adam Smith's revolutionary laissez-faire liberalism. Using the case of “the world's most important trading state” in the nineteenth century, this article highlights the importance of intellectuals—as well as their ideas—in shaping states' foreign policy strategies. It also provides further evidence of key individuals' significance and their decisions at “critical junctures.”

How do states come to select norms? I contend that, given a number of conditions are present, states select norms in three ideal-typical stages: innovative argumentation, persuasive argumentation, and compromise. This norm selection mechanism departs from the existing literature in two important ways. First, my research elaborates on the literature on advocacy networks. I explain why agents engage in an advocacy for a normative idea in the first place; I add the epistemic dimension of reasoning to argumentation theory; and I show in detail the pathways through which persuasive argumentation links an advocated idea and already-established sets of meaning. Second, synthesizing rationalist and constructivist selection mechanisms, I contend that successful argumentation makes recalcitrant actors eager to reach a compromise with the advocates as long as this does not violate their most cherished beliefs. The Republic of Ireland's eventual selection of the territorial status quo norm in the late 1990s lends empirical evidence to this norm selection mechanism.I would like to thank Michael Barnett, Steven Bernstein, Corneliu Bjola, Ian Cooper, Ted Hopf, Sandy Irvine, Jennifer Mitzen, Daniel Nexon, Nisha Shah, Janice Gross Stein, Susan Gross Solomon, Allona Sund, Vincent Pouliot, Alexander Wendt, Ruben Zaiotti, and, most of all, Emanuel Adler for very helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. I am also greatly indebted to the anonymous reviewers and the editors of IO for their detailed and insightful comments. Funding for this research was generously provided by an Ontario Graduate Fellowship, the Joint Initiative for German and European Studies at the University of Toronto, and the Mershon Center at the Ohio State University.

A specter haunts the world's bureaucrats: the specter of small government. Skepticism about the expanding role of government in most industrial nations has encouraged political economists to go back to some fundamental questions about what we really need government to do for us, whether it be for reasons of efficiency or equity. The aim of this paper is to suggest that some of the theories attacking “big” government are equally applicable in the realm of international organization (IO).

Two theories explain changes in the international regimes for major economic sectors. A theory of hegemonic stability explains sectoral change as a consequence of ebbing hegemony; a theory of surplus capacity attributes regime shifts to a serious global problem with excess production capacity in the sector. The history of the world automobile industry shows that surplus capacity offers the better prediction and explanation for the timing of regime changes. However, a synthesis of the two theories is even more satisfactory. Hegemonic decline is a necessary but not sufficient condition for change. Surplus capacity, in the absence of a hegemon, creates the conditions necessary for change.

Selection effects in crisis bargaining make it difficult to directly measure audience costs because state leaders have an incentive to avoid incurring audience costs. We overcome this inferential problem of selection bias by using a structural statistical model. This approach allows us to estimate the size of audience costs, both incurred and not incurred, in international crises. We show that although audience costs exist for state leaders of various regime types, democratic leaders face larger audience costs than nondemocratic leaders do. Audience costs can be so large that war might be preferable to concessions, especially for leaders of highly democratic states. Audience costs also increase a state's bargaining leverage in crises because the target state is more likely to acquiesce if the challenge carries larger audience costs. We also find evidence that audience costs generate selection effects.

The relationship between foreign control and national development is a central concern of the Latin American “dependency school” of analysis, which focuses on the impact of investment by multinational corporations (MNCs) in the Third World. In the MNC-dominated steroid hormone industry in Mexico, foreign control has led to two major consequences which characterize it as “dependent”: first, there has been an unequal distribution of benefits from its growth, favoring the central capitalist economies and the MNCs more than Mexico; and secondly, at the level of domestic policy formulation, there has been a restriction of choice among local development options, since these conflicted with “global” priorities implied by the dependent situation. As an alternative to MNCs, national firms in Mexico would very likely have performed better in terms of Mexican national welfare (defined as local industry growth) and global consumer welfare (defined as identical products at lower prices). The attempt made by the Mexican State during the last two years of the Echeverria administration (1975–1976) to increase its autonomy vis-à-vis the MNCs by restructuring the industry with a new state-owned firm met with only limited success. Reasons for this include Mexico's declining prominence in the world industry due to the availability of substitutes for its raw material, and the ability of the MNCs to build a strong defense using local political allies. Yet despite the difficulties, Third World countries will need to develop strong states which can deal effectively with multinational corporations if they are to successfully establish their own development priorities.

The governments of the Schuman Plan countries – Belgium, France, west Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – are now examining plans for a European Political Community. The basis of the present discussions is a draft constitution which would consolidate the institutions of the Coal-Steel Community and the European Defense Community, once the latter is ratified, and would provide a framework within which further unification might take place. Its major innovations would be a provision – already approved in principle by the governments – for popular elections to a European Assembly, and a more controversial proposal looking toward gradual extension of the common market.

The voting behavior of the Third World states in the United Nations shows that the Third World unity increased in the 1980s. Systemic theory reveals that changes in the power of the Third World could partly account for the increased unity. For a more complete explanation, I examine three models of the Group of 77—the communityof- interest model, the leadership model, and the reciprocal coordination model—and find that the data support the reciprocal coordination model most consistently.

A large literature has established that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is heavily politicized. We argue that this politicization has important consequences for international reserve accumulation and financial crises. The IMF generates moral hazard asymmetrically, reducing the expected costs of risky lending and policies for states that are politically influential vis-à-vis the institution. Using a panel data set covering 1980 to 2010, we show that proxies for political influence over the IMF are associated with outcomes indicative of moral hazard: lower international reserves and more frequent financial crises. We support our causal claims by applying the synthetic control method to Taiwan, which was expelled from the IMF in 1980. Consistent with our predictions, Taiwan's expulsion led to a sharp increase in precautionary international reserves and exceptionally conservative financial policies.

As competition between newly industrializing and advanced industrialized countries has increased, trade protection has become a key issue. In textile and apparel trade, international regimes to regulate trade intervention have existed since the early 1960s. The 1981 renewal of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement poses two puzzles. First, why did countries choose to continue to manage conflict through an international regime rather than through some other arrangement? Second, why did the regime become weaker and more protectionist than in the past? An international structure approach suggests that regimes are wanted to prevent arrangements in larger systems from being undermined, to control the behavior of other countries, and to reduce information costs. Variation in regime strength can be explained by asymmetry in the distribution of capabilities in various systems. The nature of the regime is influenced by changes in international competition and by nesting. A domestic structure approach, on the other hand, focuses on the relationships between state and societal groups (the Commission and member states in the case of the EEC). The relative strength of groups affects national policies and the development and characteristics of regimes. A “processtracing” examination of international textile negotiations, emphasizing the response of decision makers to structural constraints and incentives, allows us to ascertain the relative influence of international and domestic structures on the negotiations and outcomes.

Greater theoretical consensus and cohesion could offer critical insights for the broader community of international relations scholars into the role that gender plays in spawning and sustaining processes of violence. This review essay examines the role of gender in generating and perpetuating violence and aggression, both in theory and practice. I make four central claims. First, in many studies involving the role of sex and gender in violence, specific causal models tend to remain underspecified. Second, a divergence in fundamental assumptions regarding the ontological basis of sex differences implicitly permeates and shatters this literature. Third, arguments that men and women are more or less likely to fight appear too simplistic; rather, it is worth considering that men and women may possess different motivations for fighting, and fight under different circumstances and for different reasons. Finally, systematic differences in the variant psychologies of men and women regarding the relative merit of offense and defense exert predictable consequences for public opinion surrounding the conduct of war in particular.

Over the past decade, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States has grown dramatically, changing the composition of many U.S. industries and bringing foreignowned firms into the domestic political process. Presumably, FDI also has affected the politics of protection, by both altering the domestic coalitions around protectionist demands and shifting the potential benefits that protectionism is likely to bring. To understand this process, we create and test a model that examines the level of inward investment and the extent to which this investment either complements or substitutes for existing import levels. Import-complementing investment, we suggest, will cause a split in protectionist demands, with local producers favoring protectionism and foreign investors pushing for free trade. Import-substituting investment, by contrast, will create convergent interests between local and foreign producers. In both cases, inward FDI reshuffles traditional alliances and demands for protection, challenging many prevailing views about protectionism in the United States.

This paper falls into two main parts. In Part I an attempt is made to develop a simple framework which can be used for analyzing the role of sanctions, with special reference to international sanctions.1 In Part II this framework is used to investigate the status of the United Nations as a sanctioning body and, in particular, the relationship between the UN and Southern Africa where Rhodesia has been subjected to international economic sanctions since 1965 and South Africa has been under threat of similar measures since the early 1960s.2

What explains differential rates of ethnic violence in postcolonial Africa? I argue that ethnic groups organized as a precolonial state (PCS) exacerbated interethnic tensions in their postcolonial country. Insecure leaders in these countries traded off between inclusive coalitions that risked insider coups and excluding other ethnic groups at the possible expense of outsider rebellions. My main hypotheses posit that PCS groups should associate with coups because their historically rooted advantages often enabled accessing power at the center, whereas other ethnic groups in their countries—given strategic incentives for ethnopolitical exclusion—should fight civil wars more frequently than ethnic groups in countries without a PCS group. Analyzing originally compiled data on precolonial African states provides statistical evidence for these implications about civil wars and coups between independence and 2013 across various model specifications. Strikingly, through 1989, thirty of thirty-two ethnic group-level major civil war onsets occurred in countries with a PCS group.

The notion of the Roman Catholic church as a transnational actor is both intriguing and elusive. Its global empire, and thus its transnationality, ties it to many situations, no two of which are exactly alike. Its center in Rome coordinates and shapes the actions of the subsidiary field units by supplying them with general norms, symbolic leadership, and authoritative decisions. Each of the field units possesses, in turn, a certain autonomy vis-a-vis the center; the field units make demands on the center, may provide it with new ideas, and often generate key resources for the center, for example, loyalties, money, and skills.

Given frequent leadership turnover and leaders' need to appeal to voters, democracies should face difficulties in maintaining their alliance commitments. Yet the empirical evidence predominantly shows that they do make reliable allies. Democratic governments can increase reliability by binding future administrations through the choice of alliance commitment. While defense pacts precommit future leaders to close military cooperation with an ally, consultation pacts leave more room for discretion. This research note examines when precommitment through a defense pact is likely to occur. A government should be more likely to conclude a defense pact if potential successors have different preferences regarding the alliance, if the government believes that it will lose power soon, and if the costs of precommitment are not too high. I test the theoretical expectations using the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data between 1945 and 2003. The findings support the argument and suggest an answer to the puzzle of why states sometimes conclude whole-hearted commitments and other times seemingly half-hearted ones.

Environmental problems are currently a matter of international interest and concern for a wide variety of reasons ranging from those which are rather general and even vague to others which are concrete and sometimes very pressing.1 There are, hopefully, more than a few people who are concerned about the welfare of their fellow man wherever he may be; moreover, there is an evident feeling of “one-worldness” resulting from an increasing degree of interdependence in several spheres, including the economic and the cultural. Further, the developed countries feel that they can learn useful lessons from one another about how to cope with environmental problems which are quite similar from country to country. These problems usually result from high population densities combined with large and rapidly growing per capita production and consumption which are often brought about by the use of technologies that generate large amounts of destructive residual materials. There is also an almost universal absence of satisfactory institutions for collective management of a number of “common property resources” including the air mantle, watercourses, and other large ecological systems.