This paper provided a pure financial explanation for the existence of trade credit and for the values of the credit terms offered to customers. Two motives for extending trade credit were identified. The pure operating flexibility motive arises because the opportunity to change credit policy provides the seller an efficient way to respond to fluctuations in demand. This motive was eliminated from consideration in this paper by assuming constant demand. The seller must hold a liquid reserve when the financial markets are imperfect and the desire to earn an excess rate of return on this reserve explains the pure financial intermediary motive for trade credit.

The pure financial incentive to lend this liquid reserve to customers was examined by viewing a market borrowing rate of interest that exceeds the market lending rate of interest as a hindrance to trade or, equivalently, as a financial market tariff. This tariff imposes a wedge between the market prices paid and received for the product plus a loan and thereby inflicts a loss of surplus on the seller and buyers. Trade credit lending enables the seller and/or the buyers to recapture at least part of this loss when the source of the tariff does not apply to direct loans to customers. Financial market tariffs caused by transactions costs fulfill this requirement because the trade credit lender's familiarity with its customers and product provide it with information and collection cost advantages over financial intermediaries. Tariffs caused by financial intermediary rents fulfill this requirement as well because the parties to a trade credit loan do not employ the services of a financial intermediary.

Increasing opportunity costs and financial market imperfections in addition to the ones described above establish the limits of credit policy. The optimal amount of accounts receivable is derived from the condition that the marginal revenue of trade credit lending is equal to the marginal cost. This condition combined with factoring costs produces a unique, finite optimal credit period. Accrual accounting for income tax purposes imposes an additional restriction because the firm is taxed on the recovery of its opportunity costs. These limitations on credit policy were examined separately in this paper for clarity but they are in effect simultaneously in practice.

Fama and French (1992) report that size and the book-to-market ratio capture the cross-sectional variation of average stock returns for the universe of NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq securities. This paper, in providing an exhaustive exploration of book-to-market across the dimensions of firm size, exchange listing, and calendar seasonally, reports that Fama and French's empirical findings are driven by two features of the data: a January seasonal in the book-to-market effect, and exceptionally low returns on small, young, growth stocks. In the largest size quintile of all firms (accounting for 73% of the total market value of all publicly traded firms), book-to-market has no significant explanatory power on the cross-section of realized returns during the 1963–1995 period. Thus, book-to-market as such would have less importance to money managers than the literature would have led us to believe.

We investigate the claim that hedge funds offer investors a superior risk-return tradeoff. We do so using a continuous-time version of Dybvig's (1988a), (1988b) payoff distribution pricing model. The evaluation model, which does not require any assumptions with regard to the return distribution of the funds to be evaluated, is applied to the monthly returns of 77 hedge funds and 13 hedge fund indices from May 1990–April 2000. The results show that, as a stand-alone investment, hedge funds do not offer a superior risk-return profile. We find 12 indices and 72 individual funds to be inefficient, with the average efficiency loss amounting to 2.76% per annum for indices and 6.42% for individual funds. Part of the inefficiency cost of individual funds can be diversified away. Funds of funds, however, are not the preferred vehicle for this as their performance appears to suffer badly from their double fee structure. Looking at hedge funds in a portfolio context results in a marked improvement in the evaluation outcomes. Seven of the 12 hedge fund indices and 58 of the 72 individual funds classified as inefficient on a stand-alone basis are capable of producing an efficient payoff profile when mixed with the S&P 500. The best results are obtained when 10%–20% of the portfolio value is invested in hedge funds.

Agency theory recognizes that the interests of managers and shareholders may conflict and that, left on their own, managers may make major financial policy decisions, such as the choice of a capital structure, that are suboptimal from the shareholders' standpoint. The theory also suggests, however, that compensation contracts, managerial equity investment, and monitoring by the board of directors and major shareholders can reduce conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. This research investigates the relationship between the firm's capital structure and 1) executive incentive plans, 2) managerial equity investment, and 3) monitoring by the board of directors and major shareholders. This paper finds a positive relationship between the firm's leverage ratio and 1) percentage of executives' total compensation in incentive plans, 2) percentage of equity owned by managers, 3) percentage of investment bankers on the board of directors, and 4) percentage of equity owned by large individual investors. These findings are consistent with the predictions of agency theory, suggesting, in turn, that capital structure models that ignore agency costs are incomplete.

This paper tests whether information advantages help explain why some individual investors concentrate their stock portfolios in a few stocks. Stock investments made by households that choose to concentrate their brokerage accounts in a few stocks outperform those made by households with more diversified accounts (especially among those with large portfolios). Excess returns of concentrated relative to diversified portfolios are stronger for stocks not included in the S&P 500 index and local stocks, potentially reflecting concentracted investors' successful exploitation of information asymmetries. Controlling for households' average investment abilities, their trades and holdings perform better when their portfolios include fewer stocks.

A fundamental function of any portfolio selection model is the identification of inefficient portfolios and the consequent reduction of the set of alternative investments that the decision maker must evaluate. In the absence of a specific utility function, the establishment of criteria for the identification of inefficient portfolios must strike a compromise in terms of convenience and effectiveness. Of the myriad possibilities, models employing a criterion based on two parameters have been found most convenient for reasons of simplicity of interpretation and computational feasibility. Certainly, the most popular of the two parameter models has been the expected value-variance (E-V) formulation first proposed by Markowitz [7]. The basic E-V model developed for individual decision making has been extended by Sharpe, Lintner, and others [1, 4, 3, 9] to set forth an extensive theory which seeks to explain the equilibrium price of risky assets. The purpose of the present paper is to review and extend some of the implications of an alternative two-parameter portfolio selection model, called the expected value-semivariance model (E-S). In particular, the discussion focuses on certain contrasts and similarities between the E-V and the E-S models.

The Black-Scholes [4] call option model is a member of the class of constant elasticity of variance call option models proposed by Cox [6]. While the Black-Scholes model assumes that the volatility or instantaneous variance of return is constant through time, the other members of the class allow the volatility to change with the stock price. This property is of interest because empirical evidence suggests that returns to common stock are heteroscedastic and also that volatilities, implied from the Black-Scholes model and market prices of call options, are not constant.

In this paper, we examine the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity and the impact of agency problems from free cash flow (FCF) on this effect. We find that firms with strong shareholder rights have a significantly lower implied cost of equity after controlling for risk factors, price momentum, analysts’ forecast biases, and industry and year effects than do firms with weak shareholder rights. Further analysis shows that the effect of shareholder rights on reducing the cost of equity is significantly stronger for firms with more severe agency problems from FCFs.

DeMiguel, Garlappi, and Uppal (2009) report that naïve diversification dominates mean-variance optimization in out-of-sample asset allocation tests. Our analysis suggests that this is largely due to their research design, which focuses on portfolios that are subject to high estimation risk and extreme turnover. We find that mean-variance optimization often outperforms naïve diversification, but turnover can erode its advantage in the presence of transaction costs. To address this issue, we develop 2 new methods of mean-variance portfolio selection (volatility timing and reward-to-risk timing) that deliver portfolios characterized by low turnover. These timing strategies outperform naïve diversification even in the presence of high transaction costs.

Recent research finds that the prior period's worst stock return performers (losers) outperform the prior period's best return performers (winners) in the subsequent period. This potential violation of the efficient markets hypothesis is labeled the “overreaction” phenomenon. This paper shows that the tendency for losers to outperform winners is not due to investor overreaction, but to the tendency for losers to be smaller-sized firms than winners. When losers are compared to winners of equal size, there is little evidence of any return discrepancy, and in periods when winners are smaller than losers, winners outperform losers.

Using an intuitive approach that also provides new intuition concerning the Black and Scholes equation, this paper extends the results of Johnson and Stulz to the pricing of options on the minimum or the maximum of several risky assets.

If shareholders own diversified portfolios, and if companies impose externalities on one another, shareholders do not want value maximization to be corporate policy. Instead, shareholders want companies to maximize portfolio values. This occurs when firms internalize between-firm externalities. Any kind of externality, pecuniary or nonpecuniary, vertical or horizontal, suffices. What matters is simply that one company's actions affect another's value. Thus, besides the traditional benefit of risk reduction, portfolio diversification offers additional benefits to shareholders through helping internalize externalities. This paper documents the extent of diversification and cross-ownership of stocks among companies where these externalities are likely to be large and provides a capital market test of how merger offers vary with the extent of cross-ownership.

This paper examines the intertemporal relation between downside risk and expected stock returns. Value at Risk (VaR), expected shortfall, and tail risk are used as measures of downside risk to determine the existence and significance of a risk-return tradeoff. We find a positive and significant relation between downside risk and the portfolio returns on NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks. VaR remains a superior measure of risk when compared with the traditional risk measures. These results are robust across different stock market indices, different measures of downside risk, loss probability levels, and after controlling for macroeconomic variables and volatility over different holding periods as originally proposed by Harrison and Zhang (1999).

This paper examines the influence of risk aversion on the pricing policies of a market maker for securities. It is shown that a market maker's bid-ask spread can be decomposed into a portion for the known limit orders, a risk-neutral adjustment for expected market orders, and a risk adjustment for market order and inventory value uncertainty. It is demonstrated that a risk-averse market maker may set a smaller spread than a risk-neutral specialist. Finally, this paper demonstrates the pervasive role of inventory in affecting both the placement and size of the spread.

If stocks were severely undervalued in the late 1970s and early 1980s, then the bull market starting in 1982 was partly just a correction to more normal valuation levels. This paper tests the hypothesis that investors suffer from inflation illusion, resulting in the undervaluation of equities in the presence of inflation, with levered firms being undervalued the most. Using firm level data and a residual income/EVA model, we find evidence that errors in the valuation of levered firms during inflationary times result in depressed stock prices. Our misvaluation measure can be used with expected inflation to make statistically reliable predictions for real returns on the Dow during the subsequent year. Our model suggests that stocks were overvalued at the end of the 1990s.

The recent split share structure reform in China involves the nontradable shareholders proposing a compensation package to the tradable shareholders in exchange for the listing rights of their shares. We find that state ownership (the major owners of nontradable shares) has a positive effect on the final compensation ratio. In contrast, mutual fund ownership (the major institutional owner of tradable shares) has a negative effect on the compensation ratio and especially in state-owned firms. The evidence is consistent with our predictions that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and exert political pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight.

Segmentation of capital markets produces incentives for firms to adopt countermeasures, one of which is dually listing their stocks on foreign capital markets. In this paper, the behavior of stock returns surrounding such international listings is examined for a sample of firms. Assuming that the capital markets are either completely or “mildly” segmented beforehand, it is hypothesized that the international listing of a security should, in general, accompany a reduction in its expected return. The sample reveals evidence consistent with this hypothesis.

This paper develops a corporate bond valuation model that takes into account both early default and interest rate risk. It corrects a defect of recent contributions where pricing equations do not assure that the payment to bondholders upon bankruptcy is no greater than firm value. The bankruptcy-triggering mechanism is directly related to the payoff received by bondholders when early bankruptcy is forced upon the firm. More specifically, the default barrier is defined simply as a fixed quantity discounted at the riskless rate up to the maturity date of the risky corporate bond. As soon as this threshold is crossed, bondholders receive an exogenously specified fraction of the remaining assets. Deviations from the absolute priority rule also are captured. Because it accounts for Gaussian interest rate uncertainty, default risk, and deviations from the absolute priority rule, this model is capable of producing quite diverse shapes for the term structure of yield spreads.

The ability to identify which factors best capture systematic return covariation is central to applications of multifactor pricing models. This paper uses a common data set to evaluate the performance of various proposed factors in capturing return comovements. Factors associated with the market, size, past return, book-to-market, and dividend yield help explain return comovement on an out-of-sample basis (although they are not necessarily associated with large premiums in average returns). Except for the default premium and the term premium, macroeconomic factors perform poorly. We document regularities in the behavior of the more important factors, and confirm their influence in the Japanese and U.K. markets as well.

We examine whether the industry expertise of independent directors affects board monitoring effectiveness. We find that the presence of independent directors with industry experience on a firm’s audit committee significantly curtails firms’ earnings management. In addition, a greater representation of independent directors with industry expertise on a firm’s compensation committee reduces chief executive officer (CEO) excess compensation, and a greater presence of such directors on the full board increases the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and improves acquirer returns from diversifying acquisitions. Overall, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that having relevant industry expertise enhances independent directors’ ability to perform their monitoring function.