This note examines the positive implications of the Latané-Tuttle [5, 6] geometric mean portfolio selection criteria for the determination of stock prices. Recently, Mossin [9] and Lintner [10] have derived the market prices of equities under the respective assumptions that investors have quadratic and exponential utility functions. While it would be presumptuous to suggest that all investors are “long-run wealth” maximizers, this criterion has a certain amount of intuitive appeal. The geometric mean criterion is equivalent to the maximization of a Bernoulli or logarithmic utility function and displays the desirable characteristic of decreasing absolute (i.e., as the investor's wealth increases, he becomes less averse to risk). This contrasts with the exponential utility function which displays constant absolute risk aversion and the quadratic utility function which displays the undesirable characteristic of increasing absolute risk aversion. Another suggested desirable characteristic of the geometric mean criterion is that it emphasizes the avoidance of bankruptcy while maximizing the asymptotic rate of growth of wealth [4, 5] and maximizing the probability of exceeding a given wealth level within a fixed time [3]. This note analyzes the aggregate effect on stock prices of investors using the geometric mean portfolio selection criterion.

In a recent paper in this Journal Francis [3] has examined the intertemporal systematic cross dependence between the monthly returns of securities and those of a market index. Based on the monthly price behavior of a sample of 770 common stocks listed continuously on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from 1958 to 1967 he concludes that, relative to the general market movement, there is no consistent pattern of leads or lags for securities' monthly returns. In other words, the monthlyreturns of securities do not precede or follow the monthly returns on the market index.

Among the many financial problems facing managers of firms, capital budgeting problems are often the most important. Over the years these problems have received considerable attention from financial economists with more recent work emphasizing two separate approaches. One currently popular approach to capital budgeting is based on the simple linear relationship between risk and return from the intertemporal capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Merton [20]. Papers in this category include Brennan [7], Bogue and Roll [4], Treynor and Black [26], Myers and Turnbull [21], Fama [15], Bhattacharya [2], and Constantinides [9].

When borrowers are delinquent, senior debtholders prefer liquidation, whereas junior debtholders prefer to maintain their option value by delaying resolution or modifying the loan. In the mortgage market, a conflict of interest (“holdup”) arises when servicers of securitized senior liens are also the owners of the junior liens on the same property. We show that holdup servicers are able to delay action on the first-lien mortgage. When they do act, servicers are more likely to choose resolutions that maintain their option value, favoring modification and soft foreclosures over outright foreclosures. Holdup behavior is more likely to result in borrower self-curing.

We study the quoting activity of market makers in relation to trading, liquidity, and expected returns. Empirically, we find larger quote-to-trade (QT) ratios in small, illiquid, or neglected firms, yet large QT ratios are associated with low expected returns. The last result is driven by quotes, not by trades. We propose a model of quoting activity consistent with these facts. In equilibrium, market makers monitor the market faster (and thus increase the QT ratio) in neglected, difficult-to-understand stocks. They also monitor faster when their clients are more precisely informed, which reduces mispricing and lowers expected returns.

The role of underwriters is altered in new seasoned equity offering deal types in which the offering follows quickly after its announcement. Controlling for the endogenous matching between issuing firms and underwriters, we find increased underwriter reputation mitigates the immediate price impact of announcing an accelerated bookbuilt offering, exacerbates the price impact of announcing a bought offering, and has no immediate price impact for fully marketed deals. In contrast, underwriter reputation positively affects price outcomes for fully marketed deals around the offer date. Reputation effects are not apparent in the absence of controlling for the endogenous matching.

We examine the effects of implementing a U.S. approach to the enforcement of mandatory disclosure in China. Using a hand-collected sample of comment letters (CLs) issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange over the period of 2013 to 2018, we show that stock price reactions to CL receipts and replies are negative and significant. Using textual analysis to match issues raised by regulators to targeted firms’ changes in disclosure, we show that these firms do address CL issues point by point, but do not experience significant improvements in their information environments. Our article highlights the importance of incentives rather than regulation/enforcement in reducing information asymmetry.

I examine the impact of the opioid epidemic on subprime auto lending. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that county-level increases in opioid abuse cause an increase in loan defaults. Moreover, I find that traditional credit scoring attributes (e.g., FICO score) fail to predict loan performance deterioration associated with opioid addiction. The weak predictive performance of traditional credit measures and the resulting higher default rates generate a negative externality for borrowers in opioid-afflicted areas, as evidenced by 5.7% higher loan costs for subprime borrowers.

U.S. equity exchanges have experienced a dramatic increase in competition from new entrants, resulting in the fragmentation of trading across venues. While market quality has generally improved over this period, we show most of the improvements have accrued to the largest stocks. We then show this bifurcation in market quality is related to the fragmentation of trading. Theoretically, more exchange competition should reduce trading costs, yet it may also increase adverse selection for liquidity providers, leading to higher spreads. We document evidence of both effects (fragmentation improves market quality for large stocks while small stocks experience relatively worse quality).

The pivotal role of earnings expectations in equity valuation and therefore in certain areas of business finance is widely recognized, yet there is little theoretical or empirical evidence as to the manner in which investors and other groups actually formulate their estimates of future earnings. The resulting necessity to utilize proxy or indirect measures of expected earnings specified largely according to the predispositions of the investigator has led to numerous difficulties in the testing of cost of capital propositions and models of equity valuation.1 This study is intended to supply a preliminary response to the question of how earnings expectations are determined by appraising the extrapolative component of a limited sample of short-term estimates of earnings per common share. More specifically, the issues are the extent to which the earnings estimates (1) are extrapolative in nature and (2) may be approximated by familiar, naive, extrapolative techniques. In this context, “extrapolative” simply means determined by application of a specified weighting scheme to prior observations in the time series.

To assure that the commercial banking industry's performance serves the “convenience and needs” of the public, bank supervisory authorities have been vested with broad powers to alter the competitive environment in bank markets. While several criteria have been used to evaluate the effects of entry, merger, branching, and other changes in the allocation of bank resources, the results have been largely inconclusive. Since the regulatory authorities have pursued somewhat conflicting objectives in seeking a “failure-proof” system that is also “efficient,” there may be no single criterion for evaluation of bank behavior that is wholly consistent with the behavior predicted by the neoclassical theory of the firm.

Recently, several researchers, including Evans, Archer [1], Latané, and Young [2], have performed empirical analyses of the relationship between the number of securities in a portfolio and the reduction in portfolio dispersion. In this note, an exact mathematical relationship between these two factors is presented.

Previous analyses of market structures characterized by gradual information dissemination presume the equilibrium price existing after all market participants are informed is independent of the order of information dissemination. In these papers, final market clearing price, given the investors' posterior beliefs, is known a priori and is assumed to equal the price that would exist if data were disseminated simultaneously. We demonstrate that final equilibrium price is dependent, in general, on the order of information dissemination. This implies that, if the dissemination sequence is stochastic, price is unknown prior to the complete dissemination of information, even if the investors' posterior beliefs given the information event are known. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium price to be independent of the dissemination sequence in our economy. Our analysis highlights the importance of the wealth redistribution dynamics inherent in the information dissemination process.

We document a substantial customer complaint gap between stock and mutual financial firms. To assess whether this 21% per year complaint gap stems from complaint-prone customers in stock insurers, we examine state-adjudicated complaint success. To further delineate between customer selection or treatment explanations, we exploit within insurer complaints around random claims (natural disasters) and attention shocks (media scrutiny). Further tests reveal the complaint gap widens with greater competition, near insolvency thresholds, and with more price regulation. Overall, the results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that mutual financial firms exhibit low customer satisfaction, suggesting customers find this a beneficial organizational structure.

We propose a novel model-free approach to obtain the joint risk-neutral distribution among several assets that is consistent with options on these assets and their weighted index. We implement this approach for the nine industry sectors comprising the S&P 500 index and find that their option-implied dependence is highly asymmetric and time-varying. We then study two conditional correlations: when the market moves down or up. The risk premium is strongly negative for the down correlation but positive for the up correlation. Intuitively, investors dislike the loss of diversification when markets fall, but they actually prefer high correlation when markets rally.

Upon the revelation of corporate misconduct by firms in their portfolios, institutional investors experience a significant discount in the market value of their portfolios, excluding misconduct firms, creating a short-term spillover that averages $92.7 billion losses per year. We examine an expansive set of channels under which this spillover to nontarget firms can occur, and find that it reflects the loss of the embedded value of monitoring by a common institutional owner, enforcement wave activity, and industry peer and business relationships. Institutional investors also experience a significant abnormal outflow of funds in the year following the misconduct event.

This study introduces a new measure of ex ante litigation risk using scrutiny of SEC filings by the source of securities litigation (plaintiffs’ lawyers) to reduce measurement error, relative to existing measures. We show that plaintiff-lawyer views proxy for the largely unobservable factors that make firms more likely to face litigation risk. Lagged views precede the public bad news revelation that triggers litigation and predicts future realized litigation risk (i.e., securities class actions filings and plaintiff-lawyer investigations) and stock market outcomes. Finally, we provide new insights into the plaintiff-lawyer case selection process that otherwise cannot be observed.

Insiders must disclose indirect trades made through accounts they control, including family, trust, retirement, and foundation accounts. Indirect trades through these accounts are more profitable than direct trades in the insider’s own account. They are also more likely to be made by “opportunistic” insiders who make nonroutine trades, or who trade profitably before earnings announcements, or who have a short investment horizon. These trades contain more predictive information about earnings surprises and large price changes, and they tend to be made by insiders at firms with high information asymmetry. Insiders also make fewer indirect trades following periods of intense regulatory scrutiny.

This paper investigates hedge funds’ ability to time industry-specific returns and shows that funds’ timing ability in the manufacturing industry improves their future performance, probability of survival, and ability to attract more capital. The results indicate that the best industry-timing hedge funds in the manufacturing sector have the highest return exposure to earnings surprises. This, together with persistently sticky earnings surprises, transparent information environment in regards to earnings releases, and large post-earnings-announcement drift in the manufacturing industry, explain to a great extent why best-timing hedge funds can generate significantly larger future returns compared to worst-timing hedge funds.

We have formulated the mean-variance models of portfolio selection with stochastic cash demand. The results of the general model have indicated that the characteristic of the investor's stochastic cash demand, the liquidity risks of assets (measured by the covariance between an asset's return and the cash demand), and the structure of transfer costs also play important roles in the determination of the investor's optimal portfolio. We have also shown that the model of portfolio selection with stochastic cash demand can be greatly simplified if the assumption of symmetric transfer costs is invoked. Furthermore, it has been shown that the simplified model can be reformulated and solved by the LP techniques. Thus, LP formulation of portfolio selection with stochastic cash demand should have practical usefulness.

Finally, along the line of works by Chen, Jen and Zionts [3, 4], Pogue [14, 15] and Stone and Reback [20], one can extend the analysis in this paper to the problem of dynamic portfolio management with stochastic cash demand and transfer costs.