The valuation of the firm in the context of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe [22] and Lintner [18] brings into a new focus the product ion-investment decisions of the firm faced with demand and cost uncertainty. The market value of the firm and the level of systematic risk which arise from its product ion-investment decisions become items of primary importance. Although there are earlier treatments of the real determinants of valuation and risk in a dynamic context (e.g., Thomadakis [24] and Myers and Turnbull [20]), the case of a firm which experiments for the acquisition of information can furnish new insights.

This paper presents a new explanation for the use of debt financing, particularly private debt, in addition to equity without relying on the existence of taxes or bankruptcy costs. The paper assumes that information about returns on investment projects is costly and subject to efficient specialization, so that managers of firms develop inside information not possessed by the market. Suppose the manager of a firm possesses such inside information about a new investment project and his objective is to act in the best interests of existing equity owners. If the information can be disclosed to the market without impairing the value of the project, he will do so. However, much information will be of a strategic nature where the value of the project depends upon confidentiality. Public financing of such projects without disclosing the information will mean that the excess value or surprise monopoly profits in the new project will be split between new and old owners.

Despite their claimed advantages, toehold strategies have rarely been adopted in recent corporate takeovers and do not seem to increase acquirer returns. Are toeholds ineffective and becoming obsolete? We show that this is not the case. We find that toeholds are preferred for executing difficult takeovers. After controlling for such endogeneity in toehold-based acquisitions, toeholds do increase returns to acquirers. Moreover, the performance of toehold strategies improves over time due to more selective and more effective acquisition of toeholds. We find that this time trend is in part explained by learning from past toehold acquisitions.

For decision makers, we emphasize that it is feasible to consider multiple subjective criteria in a capital budgeting problem. The applicability of the procedures outlined is enhanced by the limited data base necessary to obtain subjective rankings, remembering that here we are only concerned with side criteria.

In this paper, we have formulated the capital investment problem in a graph theoretic framework. We characterized the problem as being composed of a set of finite alternatives, a set of subjective criteria, and a set of resource constraints. This formulation leads to an integer programming problem in which the rankings of sets of alternatives on the multiple subjective criteria are aggregated into a single index. It is stressed that we used a single budgetary constraint in the example but that the procedure can accommodate additional constraints. We also assumed that management has specific side criteria and that it is possible for the decision makers to rank all alternatives for each of those criteria.

The application of the above procedure to any problem involves three steps:

1) From the decision maker, or groups of decision makers,

the agreement matrix π is developed. This involves:

a) defining the alternatives,

b) defining the side criteria,

c) asking management to rank each alternative under each criterion, and

d) if appropriate, asking management to weigh the relative importance of each of the side criteria.

2) From the technical considerations of the problem, determine the resource constraints. In our example, this included the investment requirements of each alternative and the total resources available.

3) Solve the problem as posed above as a group of m integer programming problems.

In recent financial literature a large volume of the articles dealt with asset leasing. This author and his colleagues [6] and others [7] developed the conditions under which asset leasing cannot increase the overall firm's value over normal debt leverage. Many others [2, 3, 11] analyzed the “lease-buy” decision using a variety of models and assumptions. None, however, considered the effect of asset leasing on the firm's capitalization rate. While asset leasing per se would not affect the firm's unlevered cost of capital, it should affect its estimation. This paper developed the adjustment factor to obtain the firm's corresponding unlevered cost of capital with leasing leverage. Basically, Modigliani and Miller's methodology [9] was adjusted for the different tax situation with asset leasing. The effective benefit of leasing on the firm's average cost of funds was shown to be not nearly as effective as an equivalent amount of ordinary debt.

In equilibrium, each new capital asset must be priced properly relative to other assets. If an investor can also buy and sell assets in his portfolio costlessly and quickly, then the new asset will be accepted immediately and fully into the market and it will immediately behave as though it were a seasoned or previously available asset. However, it is often argued that recently issued bonds and seasoned or fully distributed bonds behave differently due to the frictions and risks associated with distributing a new security in the market. And it is also argued that recently issued bonds undergo a behavioral transformation as they become seasoned bonds. According to this argument there are significant empirical behavioral differences between recently issued bonds and seasoned bonds [4,5,7,9,13]. These differences disappear as the market gradually absorbs the new bond issue and the bond becomes “seasoned.”

In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the random walk theory of stock price behavior. This theory, as applied to the stock market, implies that past stock-price movements cannot be used to predict future market prices in such a way as to “profit” from the predictions. By not “profiting,” we mean that a trader using the past history of stock prices cannot apply mechanical decision rules that result in a consistently better performance than a simple buy and hold strategy. If stock price movements were to become systematic so that a “profit” were possible, proponents of the random walk theory argue that a sufficient number of market participants would quickly recognize the recurring pattern and exploit it. In exploiting it, they would drive out the opportunity for “profit,” causing the price series to approximate a random walk.

This paper corrects the bond option formula presented by R. Rabinovitch ((1989), Equation (10)). With just one state variable driving the economy, the formula should be the same as the ones presented by Jamshidian (1989) and Chaplin (1987).

The thoughts presented in this paper were developed during the first stage of an ongoing research project. This project is designed to shed light on the management of the size and exchange composition of financial assets and liabilities in the U.S. multinational companies (MNCs). The study also intends to analyze the impact of these policies on the international and national financial markets.

In 1952, Harry M. Markowitz [6] described a theory on the selection of assets in forming a portfolio. Assuming asset returns are stochastic, his theory postulated that rational investors should select a portfolio from the set of all portfolios which offered minimum risk (measured by variance) for varying levels of expected return. This set was named the efficient set by Markowitz.

The Sharpe or diagonal portfolio model has been accepted by a large segment of both academic and practical researchers in portfolio theory. The model is tractable, requires a relatively small set of inputs, and is viewed by many to present “reasonable” assumptions regarding the workings of the security market.

We provide the first examination of hedge fund boards and their directors. The majority of directorships are held by extremely busy independent directors. These directors are sought by funds because they have more reputational capital at stake, making them independent and credible monitors whose presence can certify fund quality to investors. Busy independent directors are more likely to be hired by high-quality funds, and their departure from the board is associated with investor withdrawals. Moreover, funds with busy independent directors are less likely to commit fraud, abuse discretionary liquidity restrictions, or engage in performance-based risk shifting.

We study 6,083 European firms that were acquired between 1999 and 2015. Soon after the acquisition, the acquired firms promptly and substantially close the gap between their actual leverage ratios and their target (optimal) ratios. Firms that were over- (under-) leveraged at the start of their acquisition year move their debt-to-assets ratio from 34.1% to 20% (10% to 18.5%) by the end of the following year. Under-leveraged firms expand their assets rapidly following acquisition, as they gain improved access to investable resources. Our results are consistent with the trade-off theory of capital structure and with the existence of firm-specific target leverage ratios.

We use the introduction of satellite coverage of major retailers to study the capital market implications of unequal access to big data. Satellite data enabled sophisticated investors with access to such data to formulate profitable trading strategies, especially by targeting the upcoming reports of retailers with bad news for the quarter. The introduction of satellite data led to more informed short-selling activity, less informed individual buying activity, and lower stock liquidity around the reports of retailers with satellite coverage. We conclude that unequal access to big data can increase information asymmetry among market participants without immediately enhancing price discovery.

Firms strategically borrow in different locations. Approximately one-quarter of Peruvian companies with operations in multiple areas source their financing from more than one province. Mining windfalls generate finance supply shocks, leading to the provision of more credit at lower average rates, and we show that firms exploit geographic financial flexibility by concentrating their borrowing in booming locations. Firms are less likely to initiate borrowing in new markets when their current borrowing provinces are thriving. The pursuit of flexibility in borrowing markets, however, degrades a firm’s relationships with its existing lenders, thereby heightening its risk of future financial distress.

The average maturity of newly issued corporate bonds has declined substantially over the past 40 years, and the traditional determinants of debt maturity fail to explain this decline fully. We show that the changing composition of investors in the corporate bond market influences bond maturities. The results of a Granger causality test, an instrumental variable approach, and a natural experiment suggest that a decline in the insurance companies’ – which prefer long-term bonds – ownership share in the corporate bond market explains a significant part of the unexplained maturity decline. These findings illustrate how investor preferences can have real effects on corporations.

Using unique real estate data that allow for accurately measured capital gains, we examine whether sell propensities depend on the magnitude of a seller’s capital gain. We find that short-term sell propensities are flat over losses and increasing in gains. Consistent with their higher sell propensities, selling prices are lower for properties with larger gains. Large-sized short-term stock investments also have sell propensities that are flat over losses and increasing in gains, although the sell propensities of typical-sized short-term stock investments are V-shaped. Our findings provide empirical support for theories of realization utility.

In their recent paper Porter, Wart, and Ferguson (PWF) [6] discuss the factors which they allege to be responsible for “the time-consuming nature of empirical tests of” stochastic dominance (SD) efficiency relative to Markowitz (EV) efficiency. Based upon their analysis, a number of algorithms for improving computational efficiency are offered. The “tricks” upon which applications would be based are of no concern here. Our concern is with the logical inconsistency of any attempt to compare and contrast SD and EV efficiency criteria on empirical grounds.

The bank financial management process involves assets, liabilities, and factors external to the bank and thus is multivariate. Because variables such as deposits, loans, or interest rates are often related with a time lag to another variable such as investments, the process is also dynamic. Although the research work of Aigner [1], Aigner and Bryan [2], Anderson and Burger [3], Bryan [6], Bryan and Carleton [7], Fraser and Rose [10], Hester and Pierce [13], and Melnik [14] has dealt with the multivariate aspect of the process, the consideration of dynamic properties in empirical work has been limited.

We study private funds available to retail investors of modest wealth. Our sample covers unlisted real estate investment trusts (REITs) for superior cash flow and fee data. Fee structures are skewed toward performance-insensitive components of the compensation contract, particularly front-end loads. The average unlisted REIT underperforms the listed benchmark by 6.5% per year, 5% of which is attributable to fees. Unlisted REITs underperform institutional-grade private equity real estate funds. Fees paid to investment advisors also explain fundraising success, while past performance does not. The underperformance is consistent with the consequences of managerial conflicts of interest, inadequate governance mechanisms, opaque disclosure, and poor investment advice.