This paper studies the effects of labor adjustment costs on corporate risk management. Labor adjustment costs attenuate the correlation between the internal funds of a firm and its investment opportunity, and create more incentives for the firm to smooth internal funds. Using a state border discontinuity approach, I find that state-level labor protection laws significantly impact a firm’s use of foreign currency derivative contracts. I further find that a firm holds more cash when labor adjustment costs are larger, and such an effect concentrates on firms that do not engage in derivative hedging.

This paper examines cash management bill announcements in an event study framework and finds that segmentation in the Treasury bill market is widespread and not limited to bills maturing across month-ends. Announcements of cash management bills, which represent unexpected additional supplies of outstanding Treasury bills, cause the yields on these bills to rise significantly relative to yields on adjacent maturity bills. This paper also finds, consistent with other studies, that segmentation is greater at the short end of the bill market.

Banks have much more leverage than nonbanks. In this article, we use a joint sample of banks and nonbanks between 1965 and 2013 to analyze the determinants of this leverage difference. We find that a single factor, asset risk, is able to explain up to 90% of this difference. Banks’ assets consist of a diversified portfolio of nonbank debt. Therefore, banks have much lower asset risk than do nonbanks. Because asset risk is a major determinant of capital structure choice, this factor is able to explain a large fraction of the difference between bank and nonbank leverage.

A simple moment-ordering condition is shown to be necessary for stochastic dominance. Closely related results on generalizations of the geometric and harmonic means are also provided. An ordering of the moment-generating functions is shown to be necessary and sufficient for stochastic dominance. The results have a straightforward and useful interpretation in terms of constant relative and absolute risk aversion utility functions. These results are used to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality of distributions on an important class of utility functions.

The magnitude and determinants of credit and currency risks are topics of considerable importance. This paper uses data on peso- and dollar-denominated debt issued by the Mexican government to identify currency and country risk premia. We show that shocks in equity and debt market returns translate into long-term increases in the premium demanded by investors with respect to currency and country factors. Country and currency premia help explain equity returns and closed-end fund discounts. Additional evidence is provided showing that investors did not anticipate the magnitude or timing of the currency devaluation of December 1994 and the subsequent financial crisis.

The Sharpe model of capital asset pricing under conditions of risk has received wide theoretical acclaim and empirical support. This paper presents an econometric study of the model with the following objectives: (a) to show the effect of measuring the model's independent variables incorrectly; (b) to derive and use a new procedure for empirically testing the adequacy of the model as it is currently formulated.

This paper analyzes the characteristics and impact of loans made to executives for stock purchase, option exercise, and relocation. We find that loans made to assist executives in purchasing stock or exercising options are larger and have higher interest rates than relocation loans. All types of loans, however, are issued at below-market interest rates, on average. We also find that while stock purchase loans are given to managers with low existing ownership, option exercise loans are given to managers with high existing ownership and high cash compensation. Finally, our results indicate that executive stock ownership increases following stock purchase and option exercise loans. For managers as a whole, a loan that enables a manager to buy 100 shares of stock results in only an eight share increase in ownership. However, the relation between ownership changes and stock purchase loans is much stronger for low ownership managers.

Using mergers as shocks to fund size, I analyze the return-to-scale property of mutual funds. I find that acquiring funds’ performance deteriorates after experiencing a positive shock in size resulting from mergers, and liquidity plays an important role in the negative relationship between size and performance. I also find that the decline in performance is not due to higher performance prior to the merger, nor driven by higher integration costs after the event. These findings are consistent with mutual funds having decreasing returns to scale and thus provide empirical evidence that supports the theoretical model of Berk and Green (2004).

This article explores the price behavior of a sample of corporate securities in which trading was temporarily suspended by the SEC. Suspensions are found to coincide with substantial devaluations of the suspended securities. Further, significant and prolonged negative abnormal returns are observed in the postsuspension period, an apparent violation of semistrong form market efficiency.

This article provides a comprehensive examination of the time-series behavior of relationship banks around and during borrower distress. Relationship and outside loans have similar interest rates during distress and even 2 years prior to distress. Relative to outside loans in distress, relationship loans in distress have lower maturity. The fraction of bank lending given by relationship banks reduces during borrower distress. Overall, borrowers in distress do not derive benefits from relationship banks. These findings are inconsistent with models that suggest banks have an implicit commitment to help their borrowers in distress due to reputation concerns.

Factor models yield an R2 insignificantly different from 0 for one-third of hedge funds in a broad sample. These funds illustrate the concept of market neutrality and feature lower volatilities, higher Sharpe ratios, and higher alphas than other funds, indicating that they provide a successful alternative investment. However, large portfolios of zero-R2 funds contain fully half the volatility of portfolios of other funds, suggesting that they feature substantial systematic risk. Furthermore, these funds display an increased probability of failure even after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility. These results indicate the presence of an omitted factor that exposes investors to significant downside risk.

A popular hypothesis to explain the anomalous January returns of common stocks is based on the argument that there is considerable tax-loss selling by investors toward the end of the year. The purpose of this study is to test the tax-loss-selling hypothesis with data on Canadian stocks. Although the introduction of capital gains tax in Canada seems to have affected the behavior of stock returns, the findings do not support the proposition that taxinduced trading is the sole cause of the seasonality in stock returns in Canada.

In a credit market characterized by a priori asymmetric information, collateral not only can identify credit applicants but also can result in moral hazard involving the borrower's use of pledged assets. The borrower's other alternatives are to apply for unsecured bank credit and be priced as “average,” or to acquire financing by selling an asset and subsequently renting it for continued use. The optimal secured loan contract for higher quality firms is shown to involve overcollateralization. There is underinvestment relative to first best in maintenance of the pledged assets but overinvestment relative to the level that would be chosen without bank monitoring. Self-financing and unsecured credit are chosen by the intermediate and lowest quality groups, respectively.

In this paper, we determine whether each bid (ask) quote reflects the trading interest of the specialist, limit order traders, or both for a sample of NYSE stocks in 1991. We then compare Nasdaq spreads with NYSE spreads that reflect the trading interest of the specialist. Our empirical results show that the average Nasdaq spread is significantly larger than the average NYSE specialist spread. We find that, on average, 49% of the difference between Nasdaq and specialist spreads is due to the differential use of even-eighth quotes between Nasdaq dealers and NYSE specialists. We also find that the NYSE specialist spread is significantly larger than the limit order spread, although NYSE specialists and limit order traders are similiar in their use of even-eighth quotes.

Common stock portfolios of large, heavily traded firms exhibit daily first-order serial correlation in excess of what would be expected, given the individual security coefficients. Further, this correlation rises as the number of securities in the portfolio increases. The direct implication of this finding is that nonsynchronous trading is not the only cause of correlation in daily market indices. Related implications are also discussed.

We test whether the conversion price (ratio) is viewed by the stock market as a credible signal of the firm's future earnings prospects (Kim (1990)) and, subsequently, whether convertible debt serves as backdoor equity financing (Stein (1992)). Examining the conversion price in relation to current stock prices and a priori growth expectations produces an average expected time of less than 1.5 years for convertible bonds to be at-the-money. Thus, as Stein suggests, convertibles appear to be a method of drawing equity into a firm's capital structure. We also find that the size of the firm's announcement period abnormal returns is positively related to the expected time for the convertible to become at-the-money. Given these relationships, we conclude that convertible debt issue announcements, on average, send an equity-like signal to the market.

Starting from the reward-risk model for portfolio selection introduced in De Giorgi (2005), we derive the reward-risk Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) analogously to the classical mean-variance CAPM. In contrast to the mean-variance model, reward-risk portfolio selection arises from an axiomatic definition of reward and risk measures based on a few basic principles, including consistency with second-order stochastic dominance. With complete markets, we show that at any financial market equilibrium, reward-risk investors' optimal allocations are comonotonic and, therefore, our model reduces to a representative investor model. Moreover, the pricing kernel is an explicitly given, non-increasing function of the market portfolio return, reflecting the representative investor's risk attitude. Finally, an empirical application shows that the reward-risk CAPM captures the cross section of U.S. stock returns better than the mean-variance CAPM does.

We measure market reactions to announcements concerning liquidity regulation, a key innovation in the Basel framework. Our initial results show that liquidity regulation attracts negative abnormal returns. However, the price responses are less pronounced when coinciding announcements concerning capital regulation are backed out, suggesting that markets do not consider liquidity regulation to be binding. Bank- and country-specific characteristics also matter. Liquid balance sheets and high charter values increase abnormal returns whereas smaller long-term funding mismatches reduce abnormal returns. Banks located in countries with large government debt and tight interbank conditions or with prior domestic liquidity regulation display lower abnormal returns.

The properties of variance ratio tests across trading and non-trading periods are examined using the generalized method of moments. For the case of opening and closing return variances, the joint tests indicate that the null hypothesis that the variance of opening returns equals the variance of closing returns cannot be rejected for a sample of New York Stock Exchange stocks. This example demonstrates the importance of accounting for overlapping observations and cross correlation in such frameworks. The conventional average (across assets) variance ratio test is shown to be biased against the null in small samples. Specifically, when non-zero correlations are ignored, previous tests have the wrong asymptotic size. This bias persists in other frameworks as well: although this study confirms earlier findings that the return variance during non-trading periods is significantly lower than during trading periods, test statistics that ignore correlations are shown to be inflated.

New measures of stock return volatility are developed to increase the precision of stock option price estimates. With Bayesian statistical methods, volatility estimates for a given stock are developed using prior information on the cross-sectional patterns in return volatilities for groups of stocks sorted on size, financial leverage, and trading volume. Call option values computed with the Bayesian procedure generally improve prediction accuracy for market prices of call options relative to those computed using implied volatility, standard historical volatility, or even the actual ex post volatility that occurred during each option's life. Although the Bayesian methods produce biased call price estimators, they do reduce the systematic tendency of standard pricing approaches to overprice (underprice) options on high (low) volatility stocks. Little bias improvement is observed with respect to the time to maturity and moneyness of the call options.