We compare major factor models and find that the Stambaugh and Yuan (2016) 4-factor model is the overall winner in the time-series domain. The Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015) q-factor model takes second place and the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor model and the Barillas and Shanken (2018) 6-factor model jointly take third place. The pairwise cross-sectional R2 and the multiple model comparison tests show that the Hou et al. (2015) q-factor model, the Fama and French (2015) 5-factor and 4-factor models, and the Barillas and Shanken (2018) 6-factor model take equal first place in the horse race.

Venture capital companies can be likened to mutual funds that make investments in small, new businesses. However, investments made by venture capitalists are unique in several ways [2]: (1) usually five or more years are required for a new firm to become well enough established that a venture capitalist can liquidate an investment; (2) during the early years of an investment, there is no organized secondary market for its shares; (3) the new firm characteristically faces a high risk of failure; and (4) several infusions of capital are usually required before the new enterprise becomes a going concern. Consequently, the investments made by the venture capital firm have long been considered to carry high risks as well as the potential for high returns. For this reason, venture capital firms actively diversify, investing in a portfolio of individual projects. Thus, the risk and return attributes of the venture capitalist's diversified portfolio will not totally mirror those of its individual investments.

Using Internet search volume for lottery to capture gambling sentiment shifts, we show that when the overall gambling sentiment is strong, investor demand for lottery stocks increases, these stocks earn positive short-run abnormal returns, managers are more likely to split stocks to cater to the increased demand for low-priced lottery stocks, and initial public offerings (IPOs) earn higher first day returns. Further, the sentiment-return relation is stronger among low institutional ownership firms, headquartered in regions where gambling is more acceptable and local bias is stronger. These results suggest that gambling sentiment has a spillover effect on the stock market.

In 12 sessions conducted in a typical bubble-generating experimental environment, we design a pair of assets that can detect both irrationality and speculative behavior. The specific form of irrationality we investigate is the probability judgment error associated with low-probability, high-payoff outcomes. Independently, we test for speculation by comparing prices of identically paying assets in multiperiod versus single-period markets. We establish that aggregate irrationality measured in one dimension (probability judgment error) is associated with aggregate irrationality measured in another (bubble formation).

Does option-based compensation affect payout policy? To address this question, we examine the adoption of mandatory expensing of stock options. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that the reduction in option-based compensation after the accounting change varies with the firm-specific expected accounting impact. Across a battery of tests, we do not find that (accounting-driven) reductions in option-based pay cause dividends to increase or repurchases to decrease. Our results contrast with the widely held belief that option-based pay has a significant causal influence on payout policy and cast doubts on its role in the shift from dividends to repurchases.

This paper investigates the timing and source of anomalous positive long-run abnormal returns following repurchase authorizations. Returns between program authorization and completion announcements are indistinguishable from 0. Abnormal returns occur only after completion announcements. Long-run returns are largely attributable to announcement returns at subsequent authorizations and takeover attempts; that is, anomalous post-authorization returns are not persistent drifts but rather step functions. These findings have important implications for prior papers examining this most persistent and widespread anomaly. Further, our results serve to refocus the search for a rational explanation for the anomaly on subsequent repurchase announcements and takeover bids.

Academic attention has increasingly been focused on the operation of security markets. This is largely due to the impetus provided by the Institutional Investor Study (see U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [35]), by the Securities Act Amendments of 1975 whereby Congress mandated the development of a national market system (NMS), and by the expanding computer technology of the 1970s. Not surprisingly, much of the attention has focused on the role of dealers and stock exchange specialists as market makers. The literature has generally viewed these market makers as suppliers of immediacy to ordinary traders, and has taken the bid-ask spread to be the price they impose for the provision of this service.

In their article, “Beta as a Random Coefficient,” Fabozzi and Francis [1] present evidence which suggests that beta is a random coefficient for a “significant minority” of NYSE stocks. They obtained their evidence first, by characterizing the market model as a random coefficient model of the type described by Theil and Mennes [7], and second, by estimating its parameters for a sample of NYSE stocks over the period December 1965 through December 1971. This paper describes weaknesses in Fabozzi and Francis' implementation of the estimation procedures of Theil and Mennes [7] and Hildreth and Houck [3]. Improvements are suggested and utilized in an analysis of the returns of 683 NYSE stocks over the period January I960 through December 1971. The results of the analysis indicate that Fabozzi and Francis have overstated the case for beta being a random coefficient of the form described by Theil and Mennes.

Current attempts to reform financial markets presume that shareholder empowerment benefits shareholders. We investigate the wealth effects associated with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s rule to facilitate director nominations by shareholders. Our results are not in line with shareholder empowerment creating value: The average daily abnormal returns surrounding events that increase (decrease) the probability of the proposal’s passage are significantly negative (positive). Furthermore, given an increase in the probability of the proposal’s passage, firms whose shareholders are more likely to use the rule to nominate directors experience more negative abnormal returns.

Since the appearance in 1969 of Kadar and Russell's paper [1] and in 1970 of Whitmore's paper [4] extending stochastic dominance to the second and third degrees, a considerable interest has developed in stochastic dominance methods as an alternative to moment methods in investment ranking models. The particular attraction of stochastic dominance is that its results are consistent with the expected utility hypothesis without depending on a particular mathematical form of utility function or on a specific type of distribution of investment returns. Although both stochastic dominance ranking models and moment ranking models are based on probability distributions of investment returns, it has been difficult to relate the two types of models mathematically for a complete comparison of results. In this paper the common moments are expressed in terms of successive integrals of a probability density function to allow a systematic comparison of the two methods.

This paper examines diversification as a source of value creation and destruction in private equity (PE) funds. Previous literature has focused on the “diversification discount” in corporations. However, in PE funds, diversification might increase returns by ameliorating managerial risk aversion and facilitating knowledge sharing. I examine a sample of 1,505 PE funds and show that industry and geographic diversification can increasePE fund returns. This is likely due to knowledge sharing and learning, not merely risk reduction. Diversification can reduce returns if it spreads staff too thinly across industries or is motivated by risk aversion rather than performance bonuses.

Insurance companies often follow highly correlated investment strategies. As major investors in corporate bonds, their investment commonalities subject investors to fire sale risk when regulatory restrictions prompt widespread divestment of a bond following a rating downgrade. Reflective of fire sale risk, the clustering of insurance companies in a bond has significant explanatory power for yield spreads, controlling for liquidity, credit risk, and other factors. The effect of insurer clustering on bond yield spreads is more evident for bonds held to a greater extent by capital-constrained insurance companies, those with ratings closer to National Association of Insurance Commissioners risk categories with larger capital requirements, and during the financial crisis.

Citizens Utilities Company (CU), Stamford, CT, has two classes of common stock, one paying cash dividends and one paying stock dividends. Unless CU shareholders ignore dividend taxation, the price of the cash dividend shares should increase relative to the stock dividend shares after the 1986 tax change. Contrary to this hypothesis, we find that the relative valuation of these two classes of shares was not permanently affected by the tax change. We do observe a pricing change around the time of the tax reform, but the effect is only temporary—the relative valuation before the tax change (1982–1984) and after (1987–1989) is almost equal. Two possible explanations for the observed valuation of the two stocks are clientele effects and differences in liquidity. We find that neither of these explanations can account for the relative pricing of the shares.

The purpose of this paper is to develop the financing and investment policies for the multinational firm in the framework of international capital market equilibrium. The analysis incorporates foreign exchange rate fluctuations, differential international interest rates, and differential international taxes. The current valuation theories do not contain realistic treatment of these characteristics of the international financial environment. Therefore, the existing financial theory has to be amply modified if it has to accommodate multinational corporations. Nonetheless, the few notable works in contemporary financial economics, which seek to extend the theory into the international setting, are subject to significant limitations.

We trace directors through time and across firms to study whether acquirers’ access to nonpublic information about potential targets via their directors’ past board service histories affects the market for corporate control. In a sample of publicly traded U.S. firms, we find acquirers about 4.5 times more likely to buy firms where their directors once served. Effects are stronger when the acquirer has better corporate governance, the interlocked director has a larger ownership stake at the acquirer, or the director played an important role during past service. The findings are robust to endogeneity of board composition and controls for contemporaneous interfirm interlocks.

We propose a single-factor asset pricing model based on an indicator function of consumption growth being less than its endogenous certainty equivalent. This certainty equivalent is derived from generalized disappointment-aversion preferences, and it is located approximately 1 standard deviation below the conditional mean of consumption growth. Our single-factor model can explain the cross section of expected returns for size, value, reversal, profitability, and investment portfolios at least as well as the Fama–French multifactor models. Our results show strong empirical support for asymmetric preferences and question the effectiveness of the smooth utility framework, which is traditionally used in consumption-based asset pricing.

The consensus view of the influential economist John Maynard Keynes is that he was a stellar investor. We provide an extensive quantitative appraisal of his performance over a quarter century and present detailed analysis of his archived trading records. His top-down approach initially generated disappointing returns with no evidence of any market-timing ability. However, from the early 1930s his performance improved as he evolved into a bottom-up stock picker with substantial active risk and pronounced size and value tilts. Our reconstruction of Keynes’s stock trading provides a unique record of realized performance and sheds light on how equity investing developed historically.

This paper is an initial attempt to bridge the gap that presently exists between the theoretical and empirical literature on the instability of equity beta. We focus on two factors from the joint Option Pricing Model/Capital Asset Pricing Model framework—leverage and unexpected changes in the risk-free rate—which are hypothesized to influence the instability of equity beta across firms and over time. Using alternative variable parameter regression models, we find that highly leveraged firms exhibit greater equity beta instability than firms with lower leverage. Over time, equity betas exhibit greater instability during periods of large unexpected changes in the risk-free rate when compared to periods with small unexpected changes in the risk-free rate.

This paper examines the role of focus versus diversification in explaining the economic impact of corporate capital investments. I find that the stock market's responses to announcements of capital investments are more favorable for focused firms than for diversified firms. I also show that focused firms exhibit significantly better post-investment operating performance than diversified firms. The overall findings in this study suggest that the investment opportunities hypothesis dominates the internal capital markets hypothesis in terms of the net economic impact of capital investments on the investing firms.

In a model of dual-agency problems where borrower–lender and bank–nonbank incentives may conflict, we predict a hockey stick relation between bank skin in the game and covenant tightness. As bank participation declines, covenant tightness increases until reaching a low threshold, at which point the relation sharply reverses and covenant protection is removed with a commensurate increase in spread. We find support for the hockey stick relation with bank’s stake in covenant-lite loans averaging 8% (0% median). We also find that covenant-lite loans are more likely when borrower moral hazard is less severe and when bank relationship rents are high.