We study the distinct impacts of own and rival actions on risk and return when firms strategically compete in the product market. Contrary to simple intuition, a competitor’s options to adjust capacity reduce own-firm risk. For example, if a rival possesses a growth option, an increase in industry demand directly enhances profits but also encourages value-reducing competitor expansion. The rival option thus acts as a natural hedge. Within the industry, we obtain endogenous differences in expected returns. In a leader-follower equilibrium, own-firm and competitor risks and required returns move together through contractions and oppositely during expansions, providing testable new predictions.

The two related problems of agency and informational asymmetry have received increasing attention in finance. In particular, prominent authors in this area (e.g., Jensen and Meckling [7], Ross [15, 16], Leland and Pyle [10], etc.) have demonstrably argued that the financial structure of the firm can be determined in the process of eliminating, or at least reducing, the costs associated with these problems.

To date, a number of studies involving the use of bond prices and/or returns have utilized the published prices of trades on the New York and other exchanges. These exchange quotes reflect the odd-lot activities of individual investors and account for only a negligible portion of the trading in listed issues. In contrast, the vast majority of listed corporate trading occurs over-the-counter and involves round-lot trades between institutions. Given differences in market characteristics, odd-lot exchange prices may differ substantially from those in the round-lot institutional market. This study compares exchange quotations from Moody's Bond Record with prices assigned by Merrill Lynch's institutional pricing service and uses each set of prices to calculate return and risk measures. Institutional (Merrill Lynch) bond prices are shown to be systematically greater than exchange (Moody's) prices. In addition, bond returns based on Merrill Lynch prices are shown to yield significantly higher beta and R2 estimates, as well as significantly lower standard deviation and residual risk estimates.

Sharpe's market model [29] is widely used both by academic researchers and practitioners in finance, but it cannot be accepted with complete confidence until some of its basic assumptions are tested more thoroughly. The applicability, usefulness, and reliability of the model are functions of its conformity to real data, which in turn depends partly on the unresolved question of heteroscedasticity.

Myopic investors focus on short-run price changes rather than long-term fundamental value, resulting in an overweighting of public information and a slow diffusion of fundamental news. Such processing of information can produce price drifts similar to those seen in behavioral models of momentum. We explore the impact of myopia over an international sample, finding that momentum is stronger in more myopic countries, and this relationship is magnified where the proportion of funds under delegated management is high. We therefore argue that investor myopia, which arises due to agency issues in delegated funds management, is an important determinant of momentum.

Whether borrowers or lenders gain or lose due to inflation depends upon the nominal rate agreed to, the realized inflation rate and their inflationary expectations when the contract was written. The high rate of inflation in recent years has resulted in the real interest rates on traditional, fixed–rate mortgages being substantially below the nominal, contract rate. This recent experience has stimulated borrowers and lenders to consider the implications of inflation in their contract negotiations.

This study extends the Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) analysis by incorporating default risk. Using data for firms that either increased or initiated cash dividend payments during the 23-year period 1986–2008, we find reduction in default risk. This reduction is shown to be a priced risk factor beyond the Fama and French (1993) risk measures, and it explains the dividend payment decision and the positive market reaction around dividend increases and initiations. Further analysis reveals that the reduction in default risk is a significant factor in explaining the 3-year excess returns following dividend increases and initiations.

Pursuing delinquent borrowers requires considerable effort, and creditors may lack the incentive to exert this costly effort in uncompetitive banking sectors. To examine this, we use a uniquely large data set of public and private corporate bankruptcy filings spanning a banking-sector reform that deregulated bank entry across different regions of India. We find that increased banking competition is associated with more firms seeking a stay on assets, a decline in bankruptcy duration, and a shift toward workouts rather than liquidations. The results are consistent with creditors exerting greater effort to pursue delinquent firms and resolve bankruptcies more quickly when competition increases.

Deleveraging risk is the risk attributable to investing in a security held by levered investors. When there is an aggregate negative shock to the availability of funding capital, securities with a greater presence of levered investors experience extreme return realizations as these investors unwind their positions. Using data on equity loans as a proxy for the degree of levered positions in a given stock, we find robust evidence of deleveraging risk. Stocks with a high degree of short selling experience large positive returns and a decrease in short selling around periods of funding capital scarcity.

This paper provides an equilibrium model subject to heterogeneous beliefs about the likelihood of rare events. I explore asset pricing implications in an incomplete capital market and the effects of market completion. Without explicit rare event insurance, investors insure themselves indirectly through the stock and money markets, the risk premium is countercyclical, and flight to quality effects arise. Upon market completion, the risk premium increases as investors increase their exposure to rare event risk. While market completion leads to a more efficient allocation based on investors’ anticipatory utilities, its effect on ex post efficiency is ambiguous.

Certainly, the concept of skewness of returns and its role in the context of portfolio analysis has gained increasing attention in recent literature. Witness the studies by Alderfer and Bierman [1], Arditti [2, 3], Jean [4], and Simonson [5]. Each of these studies has treated skewness as the third moment of a series expansion—accordingly, skewness has been measured and interpreted as a logical extension of the traditional two-dimensional return-versus-standard deviation analysis of security evaluation.

This paper extends the seminal Cox-Ross-Rubinstein ((1979), CRR hereafter) binomial model to multiple assets. It differs from previous models in that it is derived under the complete market environment specified by Duffie and Huang (1985) and He (1990).

The complete market assumption requires the number of states to grow linearly with the number of assets. However, the number of correlations grows at a faster rate, causing the CRR model to be indirectly extendable. We solve such a problem by recognizing that the fast growing correlation number is matched by the number of the angles of the edges of a hypercube spanned by the risky assets. As a result, we derive a solution that allows the number of equations to equal the number of risky assets and the riskless bond. The resulting tree structure hence provides the same intuition of pricing and hedging contingent claims as that provided by the CRR model.

Finally, the proposed model is not only as easy to implement as the one-dimensional CRR model but also it is more memory efficient than the existing multi-factor lattice models.

This paper investigates the relation between shareholders’ portfolio concentration and firm performance. Using data on more than 1.3 million unique shareholders, we create an index that measures how concentrated shareholder portfolios are in each firm. We posit that portfolio concentration will affect incentives when shareholders are resource constrained. We find that average shareholder portfolio concentration is positively related to future operational performance and valuation. We also find that portfolio concentration is positively correlated with abnormal stock returns. Our findings suggest that shareholders with concentrated portfolios are more informed and play a governance role through the stock market.

According to conventional wisdom, industrial country floating exchange rates contain unit roots. SUR tests on panels of monthly Group of Ten (G-10) log nominal rates reject the null of unit roots for various samples over the current float with significance levels from 0.5% to 15%. On average, in out-of-sample forecasts mean reversion models beat random walks significantly in some forecast periods. For monthly data, the range of expected USD-DEM appreciation rates exceeds 15% per year in the mean reversion model. Mean reversion places strong restrictions on international models: over the sample period, the G-10 had to run monetary policies consistent with stable long-run nominal rates.

Masulis and Mobbs (2014), (2015) find that independent directors with multiple directorships allocate their monitoring efforts unequally based on a directorship’s relative prestige. We investigate whether bank loan contract terms reflect such unequal allocation of directors’ monitoring effort. We find that bank loans of firms with a greater proportion of independent directors for whom the board is among their most prestigious have lower spreads, longer maturities, fewer covenants, lower syndicate concentration, lower likelihood of collateral requirement, lower annual loan fees, and higher bond ratings. Our evidence indicates that independent directors’ attention is associated with lower cost of borrowing.

This paper explores risk and return relations in six Asian equity markets affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. After the start of the crisis, national equity betas increased and average returns fell substantially. Beta increases due to leverage linked to exchange rates. The increase in expected return needed to accompany this rise in beta is made possible through the creation of capital losses that lower average returns. We propose a new probability-based asset pricing model that captures leverage effects using valuation ratios. Results show the role of leverage in explaining the likelihood of the financial crises. Crosssectional evidence supports time-series findings.

This paper is concerned with the effect of futures trading in Treasury bills on the volatility of yields in the cash market. It is found that futures trading led to a decrease in volatility initially, but the effect disappeared when futures volume became large and possibly resulted in increased volatility in the secondary cash market. The results also indicated that the deliverable bill appears to sell at a small premium relative to the adjacent maturities prior to the delivery date.

In this paper Ho and Saunders apply a model that has been used to analyze dealer spreads to banking.

A potential contribution to a field can arise whenever a well-developed framework of analysis in one problem area is applied to another field. The risk of a mechanical application, however, is that the institutional structure of the two problem areas is so different that no real insights are gained. What are the facts here?

Since World War II, the significance of the municipal bond market has increased dramatically with state and local government debt growing much more rapidly than public and private debt, federal debt, or the gross national product. Between 1960 and 1970, the annual value of new issues of state and local government bonds increased 110 percent, and there is every indication that the total will continue its rapid rise. In 1969 and 1970, the values of state and local government bond new issues were second only to those of the corporate bond market. Despite the size of the state and local bond market, investors and researchers have devoted their attention to the markets for corporate and U.S. government securities; the interest in these markets has tended to overshadow activity in the municipal bond market.

This study examines whether the gambling behavior of investors affects volume and volatility in financial markets. Focusing on the options market, we find that the ratio of call option volume relative to total option volume is greatest for stocks with return distributions that resemble lotteries. Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Stein (1987), we demonstrate that gambling-motivated trading in the options market influences future spot price volatility. These results not only identify a link between lottery preferences in the stock market and the options market, but they also suggest that lottery preferences can lead to destabilized stock prices.