We investigate whether access to information prior to an initial public offering (IPO) generates a trading advantage after the IPO. We find that limited partners (LPs) of lead venture capital funds obtain high returns when they invest in newly listed stocks backed by their funds. These returns are not explained by LPs’ differing stock-picking abilities, and they are higher when LPs’ information advantage over the public is higher. LPs are more likely to invest if they have an information advantage, and access to information eliminates the familiarity bias that they display otherwise.

In 1959, Henry Lataná [2] proposed an approximation to the geometric mean that was a simple function of the arithmetic mean and variance, thereby indicating a mathematical relationship between the risky investment choice model of Bernoulli and the Markowitz mean-variance model. In 1969, Young and Trent [4] presented empirical test results of the Latané approximation, as well as a set of other approximations to the geometric mean based on moments, and concluded that the Latane formula yielded a quite accurate approximation to the geometric mean. In Jean's 1980 paper [1] relating the geometric mean model to stochastic dominance models, the infinite series representation of the geometric mean used suggests a more accurate approximation with moments of the geometric mean than that contained in the earlier papers may be possible. Various forms of that series expressed in alternate-origin moments are tested empirically below, and the results confirm that this later series does yield the greatest accuracy of the three approaches.

The purpose of this paper is to determine the correct procedure for discounting cash outflows in a capital market context. Beedles has stated flatly that “the risk adjusted discount (RADR) approach should not be applied to investment projects with negative benefits” ([1], p. 176). Lewellen also has recently examined the problem because he felt that there “is something at least vaguely disturbing about the associated write-down of the present value of cash outflows for risk” ([7], p. 1332). Lewellen, however, concluded that “the standard procedure used for inflows can therefore be transferred intact. The logic is symmetric because the sign of the flows is reversed.” In a comment on Lewellen, Celec and Pettway stated that they are “in substantial disagreement with Lewellen's development as well as with any implied generality of employing the standard RADR procedure in valuing cash outflow streams” ([3], P. 1061). This inappropriateness of the standard RADR approach to valuing cash outflows seems to have been accepted in the 1iterature. Kudla [6] recently claimed that it has been proved by the above authors and others that the normative rules in capital budgeting do not hold in evaluating cash outflows.

In the process of managing a financial institution there are decisions that require special considerations beyond those in other firms. In this paper dividend disbursal practices in the banking firms will be analyzed. The central issue is what part of profits should be distributed and what part should be retained within firms as an addition to the banks' net worth.

This paper reviews and extends definitions and properties of the three classical performance statistics (the Sharpe Ratio, the Treynor Index, and Jensen's Alpha) by locating them in a more general framework: the Asymmetric Response Mode. This allows various notions of beta, which can be related to downside risk, to be employed, and includes, as special cases, a market timing model and the mean-variance CAPM. Due to the general lack of data on fund performance in practice, our emphasis is on small sample analysis where possible. We illustrate our results empirically using data on 15 U.S.-based emerging markets investment funds.

The results of this study indicate that the individual common stocks in the Dow-Jones. Industrial Average were not consistent inflation hedges. Assuming an 8.2 percent normal required rate of return, none of the common stocks was a complete inflation hedge during all three recent inflationary periods tested. Even assuming a zero normal required rate of return á la traditional investment theory, only six (20 percent) of the thirty common stocks sampled were inflation hedges during all three inflationary periods.

This paper addresses the problem of testing financial models in the presence of market micro structure effects. The moment restrictions implied by the financial and market microstructure models are jointly tested using Hansen's (1982) GMM approach. To illustrate the methodology, I consider the random walk model in combination with the bid-ask price effect model of Blume and Stambaugh (1983). Within this sufficiently simple framework, I obtain closed-form expressions for the estimators, standard errors of the estimators, and the test statistic, which affords an opportunity to examine the precision of the estimators and the power of the test as the return interval increases. I show that apparent rejections of the random walk model cannot be sustained when tests of the model are adjusted for market micro structure effects, and I discuss other applications of the methodology.

This study uses Cremers and Petajisto’s (2009) method to separate active institutional investors from passive ones and shows that active investors can alleviate the anomalous comovement of stock returns. Focusing on 2 events linked to the excess comovement anomaly, Standard & Poor’s 500 Index additions and stock splits, I find that if an event stock has more active institutional investors trading in the post-event period, the anomalous comovement effect disappears. In contrast, if an event stock experiences a massive exit of active investors, this anomaly persists. The exit of active institutional investors also results in a strong price synchronicity effect.

We investigate how ownership structure influences operating performance and implied agency costs. Our sample includes over 42,000 U.K. private and public firms. We document several new results of considerable economic significance relating to i) horizontal agency costs arising from unequal ownership within private firms, ii) amplification of agency costs from joint presence within the same firm of horizontal agency problems and vertical agency problems arising from separation of ownership and control, iii) mitigation in agency costs wrought by a second large shareholder, iv) impact of complex ownership structures, and v) agency cost differences between public firms and comparable private firms.

Since Markowitz [15, pp. 98–101] and Sharpe [19] developed the single-index market model (SIMM hereafter) it has received considerable research attention. Empirical tests have established the model's econometric significance [3, 12, 13] in partial equilibrim analysis. However, research into the relationship between the SIMM and its macroeconomic environment has been meager. It has been shown that the market factor changes intertemporally [13, 16, 18, 20]. However, whether these changes in the market factor and, more basically, changes in the macroeconomic situation affect the SIMM is unknown.

Numerous studies have already examined the investment performance of mutual fund management with data from the 1950s and 1960s. Although the previous studies differed in the time period and evaluation method, they generally agreed that mutual funds, on the average, had failed to outperform the market over time. Thus they rendered a strong support to the efficient market hypothesis. Yet there is a need for an investigation of the data of the past several years. This study evaluates the quarterly investment performance of mutual funds in the period 1969–1975, using the weighted index benchmark portfolio approach.

This study has addressed itself to that group most immediately affected in corporate acquisition, the stockholders of acquired companies. We find that in the years observed, acquired company stockholders seem to have benefited from the acquisitions. This study differs from other studies of post-merger performance of the common stock of acquirors and not the performance of securities received by acquirees in exchange for their common stock. It should also be noted that most of the financial gain resulting from the acquisitions accrued at the time of merger because of substantial premiums paid by acquirors. While the stockholders of the acquired companies have, on average, benefited, these results tell us little of the effect of mergers on the welfare of society or, for that matter, of their effect on the stockholders of the acquiring firm. If the merger cannot be justified on the basis of some economy of scale or synergistic advantage, the newcomers reap their lucrative returns only at the expense of the old guard. If the acquiring firm pays a premium in acquisition on the basis of justifiably sound expectations of increased profits, social welfare is not necessarily enhanced. Increased profitability may not reflect increased efficiency; it may, for example, be a manifestation of decay in the competitive environment.

This paper investigates the relation between information on the state of the economy and equity risk premium. We use a setup where investors have Epstein-Zin preferences and the economy randomly switches between booms and recessions. We are able to establish 2 key results: First, investors with high elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) will require lower excess returns for holding stocks if they are provided with better information on the state of the economy. Second, we find that this also holds for investors with moderate EIS if they are sufficiently risk averse.

Existing empirical research investigating the size of the equity premium has largely consisted of a series of innovations around a common theme: producing a better estimate of the equity premium by using better data or a better estimation technique. The equity premium estimate that emerges from most of this work matches one moment of the data alone: the mean difference between an estimate of the return to holding equity and a risk-free rate. We instead match multiple moments of U.S. market data, exploiting the joint distribution of the dividend yield, return volatility, and realized excess returns, and find that the equity premium lies within 50 basis points of 3.5%, a range much narrower than was achieved in previous studies. Additionally, statistical tests based on the joint distribution of these moments reveal that only those models of the conditional equity premium that embed time variation, breaks, and/or trends are supported by the data. In order to develop the joint distribution of the dividend yield, return volatility, and excess returns, we need a model of price and return fundamentals. We document that even recently developed analytically tractable models that permit autocorrelated dividend growth rates and discount rates impose restrictions that are rejected by the data. We therefore turn to a wider range of models, requiring numerical solution methods and parameter estimation by the simulated method of moments.

Prior studies argue that investment by undervalued firms that require external equity is particularly sensitive to stock prices in irrational capital markets. We present a model in which investment can appear to be more sensitive to stock prices when capital markets are rational, but subject to imperfections such as debt overhang, information asymmetries, and financial distress costs. Our empirical tests support the rational (but imperfect) capital markets view. Specifically, investment–stock price sensitivity is related to firm leverage, financial slack, and probability of financial distress, but is not related to proxies for firm undervaluation. Because, in our model, stock prices reflect the net present values (NPVs) of investment opportunities, our results are consistent with rational capital markets improving the allocation of capital by channeling more funds to firms with positive NPV projects.

We find that defined benefit employee pension plans of firms that are targets of hedge fund activism experience underfunding and their defined contribution plans experience reductions in employer contributions. Pension underfunding occurs due to reduced employer contributions to the plans, which target firms justify by increasing the assumed rates of returns on plan investments and the discount rate used to compute the present value of plan obligations. Despite tilting plan investments toward riskier assets, pension fund performance does not improve after activists target a firm. Our evidence suggests that shareholder wealth gains from activism are partly wealth transfers from employees.

The average firm going public or issuing new equity underperforms the market in the long run. This underperformance could be related to the endogeneity of the number of new issues if new issues cluster after periods of high abnormal returns on new issues. In such a case, ex post measures of new issue abnormal returns may be negative on average, despite the absence of ex ante abnormal returns. We evaluate this endogeneity problem in event studies of long-run performance. We argue that it is unlikely that the endogeneity of the number of new issues explains the long-run underperformance of equity issues.

Edward Miller [5], expanding on the work of Williams [8], Smith [6], and Lintner [4], has proposed a direct relationship between a stock's “risk” and its “divergence of opinion.” Under conditions of uncertainty, potential investors in a stock arrive at different assessments of expected return. Thisvariation in expectations is characterized as the stock's divergence of opinion. Miller argues persuasively that at a point in time a stock's price does not reflect the expectations of all potential investors, but rather the expectations of only the most optimistic minority who are trading the issue. As long as this minority can absorb the entire supply of stock, an increase (decrease) in divergence of opinion-leaving the average expectation unchanged-will increase (decrease) the market clearing price.

The purpose of this article is to produce a conservative estimate of how often traditionally conceived seasonal components are present in prices of individual Dow Jones industrial stocks. A careful estimate is needed to resolve some of the current confusion on the question and to provide basic information along lines suggested by Smidt [27, p. 238]: “… investigations of the random walk hypothesis would be most fruitful if they were conducted in the spirit of attempting to determine the size and extent of systematic tendencies that may exist in price series” (italics added).

Several theoretical studies suggest that coordination problems can cause arbitrageur crowding to push asset prices beyond fundamental value as investors feedback trade on each others’ demands. Using this logic, we develop a crowding model for momentum returns that predicts tail risk when arbitrageurs ignore feedback effects. However, crowding does not generate tail risk when arbitrageurs rationally condition on feedback. Consistent with rational demands, our empirical analysis generally finds a negative relation between crowding proxies constructed from institutional holdings and expected crash risk. Thus our analysis casts both theoretical and empirical doubt on crowding as a stand-alone source of tail risk.