Chapter 2 turns towards the neighbourhood of Ituura. It introduces my field site in detail by exploring cases of local youth who are said to have been ‘wasted’ by alcoholism. In contrast to those who are said to have ‘given up’ on their futures, other young men are shown to embrace discourses of moral fortitude to sustain their hopes for the future while working for low, piecemeal wages in the informal economy. Such youth claim that one must be ‘bold to make it’. Engaging with anthropological discussion on waithood and hope, the chapter shows how young men cultivate moral fortitude through an ethics of endurance – a hope for hope itself, a way of sustaining belief in their own long-term futures that involves economising practices, prayer, and avoidance of one’s peers who are seen to be a source of temptation and pressure to consume.

“Manners” alternates between the portrayal of self-reliant “gentlemen” like Montaigne, Socrates, and El Cid, who are “original and commanding” and “fashion,” an imitative “hall of the Past” where “virtue [has] gone to seed.” But near the end of the essay he turns away from forms of aristocratic morality by introducing two new heroes: a woman, “the Persian Lilla,” who reconciles “all heterogeneous persons into one society”; and then “Osman,” a poor beggar at the gates of the Shah who is a “great heart … so sunny and hospitable in the centre of the country,” and whose wealth lies in his ability to “harbor” madness without sharing it. The introduction of Lilla and Osman late in “Manners” raises the question of how they align with its other heroes. Are they part of a turn or contrary tendency showing up late in the essay, or a deeper exploration of forms of virtue – especially love – already introduced?

This chapter sets the scene in urban Penang at the time of research through a consideration of public discourses about marriage and gender relations. It examines newspaper accounts, public events, debates, exhibitions and theatrical productions in Penang’s capital, George Town. Alongside interviews with lawyers, these public discourses show how discussions about what are perceived by many as ‘dysfunctional relations’, including child marriage, polygamy, the conversion of minors to Islam, divorce and LGBTQ rights, have the capacity to expand and take on a life of their own at moments of national tension. The chapter illuminates the dense connections between kinship, gender, ethnicity, religion and law. Stories about child marriage at different political moments – to take one example – condense ethical and political concerns and contestations in times of radical change.

This chapter discusses the relation between ‘Morals’ (Sitten, Moral) and ‘Right’ (Recht) in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Two questions should be distinguished: (1) Are Kantian Morals necessary for Kantian Right in the sense that the latter presupposes Kant’s specific account of morality? (2) Is Kant’s account of Morals sufficient to justify his conception of Right, in the sense that the fundamental principles of Right can be derived from, or normatively justified by, the Categorical Imperative (or some other element of Kantian Morals) without additional normative principles? With respect to the first question, it is argued that Kantian Right presupposes a central aspect of Kantian Morals: the idea of moral universality, where moral rights and duties are the same for all. This idea must be distinguished from the Categorical Imperative introduced in the Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals. Concerning the second question, it is argued that only when applied to individual juridical (coercible) rights does the idea of moral universality result in a Kantian conception of Right. Thus, Kant’s conception of Morals alone is not sufficient to derive juridical rights and duties.

This chapter explores, in a roundabout way, whether Kant’s legal philosophy relies on his mature ethics of autonomy and respect. The normativity of the law must be externally enforced by coercive measures. The proportionate and credible threat that transgressions will be punished acts as a deterrent and make the rights of individuals comparatively secure – the law is occasionally broken. Now, the Kantian state does not concern itself with why in particular citizens break or comply with the law. In that sense, Kant’s philosophy of law does not rely on his ethical theory or moral psychology. But agents must be in a position to comply with the law. They must face a meaningful choice, which can only be secured by the availability of the motive of ethics: respect for the law. Without respect, agents would be exposed to prudential considerations only. Those who break the law take their criminal act to be prudentially justified. Viewed from this limited perspective, their actions turn out to be imprudent if they are punished for them. But punishability and imprudence are different. So, making what the law prohibits properly illegal requires an ethical foundation after all.

Moral distress as a reason for ethics consultation is common, but perceived or real racism is underrecognized as a potential cause. The consultation requested in this case was nominally for moral distress, but elements of cultural misunderstanding and culturally relevant value conflicts rapidly became apparent. Cultural concordance between the ethics consultant and the patient’s family enhanced communication and allowed the medical care team to change their perspective on interactions they had observed and previously considered to be belittling between family members and staff. This led to a broadening of medically permissible options being considered and ultimately resulted in a discharge plan that was acceptable and welcome by both the patient’s family and the ICU staff. Further discussion of reasons why greater diversity in ethics consultation members may be helpful.

An ethics consultation case is presented in which a hospice patient wished to deactivate his Cardiovascular Implantable Electronic Device (CIED), specifically an implantable cardioverter-defibrillator, at the end of life to prevent the prolongation of the dying. The consultants developed an ethical analysis supporting the deactivation of the pacemaker based on authoritative literature and moral reasoning. The consultants’ recommendations to deactivate the pacemaker were ultimately rejected by the medical team based on an alternative assessment which concluded the patient is suicidal, doubts based on the consultants not being physicians, and the healthcare professionals’ sense that deactivating a pacemaker is different from withdrawing other forms of life-sustaining treatment at the end of life. Professional reflections by the consultants and lessons learned are discussed.

This chapter dives into one of the most difficult clinical ethics consultations in the author’s career. A vibrant patient suffers a cardiac arrest and severe anoxic brain injury on their way to dialysis. After weeks of ICU treatment, the family came when the patient was liberated from the ventilator. The daily spontaneous breathing trials made everyone think (and prepare) that the patient would only have minutes to live after extubation. Yet, the patient began to breath. When the minutes turned into an hour, the yelling began. The ethics pager went off moments later, and no one could have be prepared for journey ahead. Trust was gone, and the current course of comfort care would bring an irreversible outcome. The effort to buy time in the face of uncertainty resulted in a complex sequence of events that unfolded over months. The author reflects on the case and shares the opportunity to learn by failing forward.

The question of how politics and ethics connect, if at all, in our societies is crucial, especially given today’s socio-economic and geopolitical challenges. Commentators have sought answers in Kant’s texts: the relation between the Categorical Imperative (CI) as the fundamental principle of ethics, and the Universal Principle of Right (UPR) as the fundamental principle of politico-legal norms, has been variously interpreted as one of simple dependence, simple independence, or complex dependence. Recent interpretations increasingly agree that Kant was not a simple independentist. However, questions persist about the philosophical significance of Kant’s account, specifically whether certain aspects of his thought inconsistently commit him to simple independentism. One aim of this chapter is to illustrate this critical strategy starting from a specific interpretation of the UPR. It is argued that, although robust, this interpretation is not the most accurate. While this strategy opens new avenues for further objections to Kant, the chapter concludes that the complex dependentist reading is philosophically the most convincing to date.

The introduction to this Critical Guide offers some background to Hume’s classic A Treatise of Human Nature, originally published in three books in 1739 and 1740. The introduction then briefly broaches the debate whether Hume leaves the doctrines of the Treatise behind with his later works, and it defends the importance of the Treatise to Hume’s corpus and to subsequent and contemporary philosophical thought. It presents a summary of the fourteen critical essays contained in the volume, which include seven articles on Hume’s epistemology and philosophy of mind, six articles on the passions and ethics, and one essay on the early reception of the Treatise. Several of these essays highlight the unity of Hume’s approach in the Treatise, showing how the principles of Hume’s epistemology and psychology in Book 1 are foundational to his discussion of the passions and of morality in Books 2 and 3.

This chapter discusses the definitions of the virtues employed by early scholastic authors and examines their systems for classifying the virtues, as well as their accounts of specific virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Chapter 6 gives a survey of ethical themes in Plotinus. It begins with happiness (eudaimonia) as life at its highest degree, the life of intellect of which human soul is capable. The affairs of bodily existence have no part in this life of intellect, which is a perfect, joyful, peaceful state. To reach this state, virtue is required. Two sorts of virtue are distinguished: the ‘political’ virtues and the ‘higher’ (or ‘greater’) virtues, as stages in assimilation to the divine life of transcendent Intellect. The affairs of our bodily life concern us as souls which have a need, a natural ‘appropriation’, to take care of bodily lives, ours and that of others. Action in this bodily existence should be guided by practical wisdom, a wisdom guided by ‘premises’, i.e., norms derived from theoretical wisdom. Finally, I indicate the variety of texts composed by Plotinus’ Platonist successors where ethical themes may be found.

Unlike any other ancient author, the philosopher and priest of Apollo at Delphi discussed all aspects of religious tradition, praxis, and even personal piety. He talks about religion more or less in all parts of his oeuvre, either in connection with philosophy, history, music and the household, or with myths, symbols, and rituals. He deals with personal religion both as a historian and from the perspective of the experiences of personal life – as a biographer of illustrious Greeks and Romans, as a priest and initiate, and as a husband and father. Several of the speakers in his dialogues talk about religious matters on a personal level, and the author also expresses his views on the importance of religion for the individual in his own voice in works such as On Isis and Osiris, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible, or the Consolation to His Wife. Once the religious perspective is recognized not only as a general trait of Plutarch’s thought, but also as an aspect of his philosophy as an ars vitae, it becomes visible across the whole of his oeuvre.