International environmental law rarely refers to the rule of law. However, in fostering inter-state cooperation, international environmental agreements oblige parties to prohibit, restrict or control various activities that are harmful to the environment. The application of these constraints at the national level requires the rule of law to be taken into account.

This Article addresses the pressing issues surrounding the use of automated systems in public decision-making, specifically focusing on migration, asylum, and mobility. Drawing on empirical data, this Article examines the potential and limitations of the General Data Protection Regulation and the Artificial Intelligence Act in effectively addressing the challenges posed by automated decision-making (ADM). The Article argues that the current legal definitions and categorizations of ADM fail to capture the complexity and diversity of real-life applications where automated systems assist human decision-makers rather than replace them entirely. To bridge the gap between ADM in law and practice, this Article proposes to move beyond the concept of “automated decisions” and complement the legal protection in the GDPR and AI Act with a taxonomy that can inform a fundamental rights analysis. This taxonomy enhances our understanding of ADM and allows to identify the fundamental rights at stake and the sector-specific legislation applicable to ADM. The Article calls for empirical observations and input from experts in other areas of public law to enrich and refine the proposed taxonomy, thus ensuring clearer conceptual frameworks to safeguard individuals in our increasingly algorithmic society.

Fundamental rights to positive state action are costly. An allocation in favor of one individual rightsholder always results in lower allocations in favor of others. The dominant approach in fundamental rights doctrine assumes these conflicts can be resolved judicially by balancing competing rights and other public needs. In practice, carrying out an in-depth balancing in resource allocation cases proves challenging but constitutional courts developed different strategies and concepts to deal with costly rights. The European Court of Human Rights applies a “wide” margin of appreciation and requires that positive state obligations do “not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.” Following the German Federal Constitutional Court, several constitutional courts have applied a concept known as the “proviso of the possible.” The proviso of the possible constrains positive rights and results in a wide margin of discretion granted to political authorities. This article attempts to investigate the specific meaning of the “proviso of the possible” in the context of European fundamental rights law by comparing it against alternative doctrinal concepts. The investigation aims to identify common legal principles and methods to deal with fundamental rights conflicts over scarce public resources.

When the Charter of Fundamental Rights was published in 2000, it was the first time that an international human rights instrument had recognised the freedom to conduct a business. To understand how conducting a business came to occupy the status of a fundamental right, I undertake an examination of the drafting process of Article 16 in Section 2. Early drafts protected the freedom to pursue an occupation, before the freedom to conduct a business eventually became a freestanding entitlement. This was thanks to the influence of Convention members associated with the European People’s Party who were instrumental in ensuring Article 16 was added to the draft Charter. In Section 3, I critically assess the claim contained in the Explanations to the Charter that Article 16 was simply a codification of pre-existing entitlements deriving from the case law of the Court of Justice. In Section 4, I examine the impact of Article 16 Many of the limitations that constrain the scope of Article 16 have been weakened, or have not proved to be the limitations that were originally envisaged. The Court of Justice’s defence of select areas, such as consumer protection, has shielded the deregulatory potential of Article 16 from view. Yet Article 16 has had a real and damaging impact on workers’ rights across the Union. Protecting the freedom to conduct a business in Article 16 means that a remarkably broad range of actions taken in the course of running a business are now accepted as the exercise of a fundamental right.

This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the San Antonio v. Rodriguez case, viewed by some as the worst decision in the US Supreme Court’s modern history. As legal scholar Erwin Chemerinsky observed, the court essentially declared that “discrimination against the poor does not violate the Constitution and that education is not a fundamental right.”1 Five decades later, how does this case from the past continue to exert its influence on the present? And how might the present have looked different if the court had reached a different conclusion?

For this policy dialogue, the HEQ editors asked Bruce Baker and David Hinojosa to discuss the Rodriguez decision and its legacy, focusing particularly on how the case has shaped and constrained equity efforts in K-12 education. Bruce Baker is professor and chair of the Department of Teaching and Learning at the University of Miami. A leading scholar on the financing of public elementary and secondary education systems, he is the author of Educational Inequality and School Finance (Harvard Education Press, 2018) and School Finance and Education Equity (Harvard Education Press, 2021). David Hinojosa is the director of the Educational Opportunities Project at the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, where he spearheads the organization’s systemic racial justice work in guaranteeing that historically marginalized students of color receive equal and equitable educational opportunities in public schools and institutions of higher education. He is a leading litigator and advocate in civil rights, specializing in educational impact litigation and policy.

HEQ policy dialogues are, by design, intended to promote an informal, free exchange of ideas between scholars. At the end of the exchange, we offer a list of references for readers who wish to follow up on sources relevant to the discussion.

There has been a turn to fundamental rights in environmental and climate cases before national and international courts in recent years. We know very little whether there has been such a turn in relation to European Union (EU) law before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). The CJEU occupies an increasingly relevant position in this nexus between environmental law and human rights because of strong and effective EU enforcement mechanisms, the abundance of specific EU secondary environmental law, the growing role of fundamental rights since 2009 and the self-standing provision on the environment in Article 37 of the Charter. An analysis of the case law, nonetheless, shows that Charter rights that can be used as ‘swords’ in the interest of environmental protection have so far played only a limited role. After explaining the absence of a rights turn, we argue that such a turn is warranted before the CJEU as well, also from a legal perspective. This article examines two potential avenues. The CJEU can derive positive obligations from relevant Charter provisions, including Articles 2 (right to life) and 7 (right to respect for private life and the home) of the Charter, or it can rely more extensively on Article 37 as a tool for interpreting primary and secondary EU law in an environmentally friendly way.

The article discusses the role for systemic and particular deficiencies in EU criminal law. It does so by analyzing in depth that law as regards the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), but also across measures of EU criminal law that have not yet been explored under this light. While the attention of the literature has been mainly on the EAW and the way those deficiencies can led to refusing the execution of the warrant, a wider assessment reveals the existence of a latent law of the systemic and the particular in this field. The conclusions reveal that the understanding and application of systemic and particular deficiencies in EU criminal law have significant implications in terms of the principle of mutual trust and the complex interaction between different EU values.

The concept of a systemic fundamental rights violation refers to a particular set of violations that are both widespread and embedded, so their reoccurrence may be assumed to be likely. It takes on at least two distinctive roles in EU asylum law and policy. One role is linked with the functioning of the principle of mutual trust, a principle that obliges Member States to recognise each others’ systems and decisions, presuming them to be legal, apart from exceptional cases. In this context, the principle sets the standard from when the presumption of legality is rebutted. In its conceptualisation and application, it is in tension with European human rights law, and, for a period, set up frictions between the CJEU (in NS/ME and Opinion 2/13) and the ECtHR (in MSS and Tarakhel). This tale of judicial frictions is not merely of historical interest. Its legacy is, we conclude, a thin concept of systemic breach, characterised by an over-individualized approach to assessing the human rights risks. The second role for the concept of systemic violations relates to embedded violations, including at the EU’s external borders. We demonstrate the utility of this other invocation, in particular as systemic breaches often signal deeper rule of law issues both within particular national systems and embedded within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). We illustrate that the CEAS itself brings about systemic human rights violations. Identifying and responding to the “systemic” in asylum increasingly relates to the credibility of the EU as a Union based on the respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law.