Since the 1960s manga has boasted a firm standing in the Japanese economy and society by continuously offering captivating and commercially successful narratives. This has been made possible in great measure by the manga magazines as the central venue of publication from the 1960s until the late 1990s, and their editor-in-charge system. This chapter surveys the multiple roles that manga editors fulfill, from corporate agent to manga artists’ collaborator and target-audience representative. It introduces the basic institutional steps of producing a manga serial while considering differences between printed and digital formats, up to and including remuneration practices. The main focus is on corporate manga’s commodity value as the common goal of both editors and artists, as well as the related fact that readership, or consumption, is given precedence over authorship, and collaborative over individual authorship.

In the previous chapter we saw that modern community expectations require that all types of directors fulfil their duties of care and diligence meticulously. No longer may directors hide behind ignorance or inaction; nor are the duties of non-executive directors seen as being of an intermittent nature. All directors have a positive duty to challenge, inquire and investigate when controversial or potentially risky matters are discussed at board level. In this chapter we see that there are various types of company directors and officers, although the basic position is that the law will expect the same duties of all directors and that senior employees and senior executives owe duties to the company comparable to those of directors.

The multi-faceted role of arbitrators is complex and protean. While there is consensus on the fact that the nature of the international arbitrator’s role entails according the arbitrator wide-ranging powers and that the arbitrator also undertakes a panoply of obligations, the scope of these powers and duties is not always well defined.Views about the nature and scope of these powers and duties might diverge depending on whether arbitrators are seen as service providers, justice purveyors, or both. Following a brief overview of this core question, the contribution proceeds to identify the sources of an arbitrator’s powers. Next, the most important duties of international arbitrators, including those pertaining to ethical obligations, the need to ensure due process, the necessity to apply the proper law, the duty to provide a reasoned award, and several others are explored. This contribution also highlights the most important rights of international arbitrators, such as the right to receive good faith cooperation from the parties, as well as the rights to remuneration and immunity, amongst others. Finally, we make some observations on ways in which the rights and duties entailed by the complex mandate of arbitrators can be reconciled in the event of conflict.

This chapter investigates the practice of bankers’ remuneration in the UK after the GFC and analyses the effectiveness of the regulatory initiatives. To track the changes, the investigation is also based on the UK ‘Big Four’ banks. It is found that the focus of performance-based remuneration has shifted from short-term incentives to long-term incentives. Complying with deferral, clawback and malus, the period of performance assessment has been significantly extended. Banks have also adopted risk-adjusted and stability-oriented indicators to link bankers’ remuneration to the sustainability and risk management of banks. However, to circumvent bankers’ bonus cap, banks have introduced role-based pay – a new form of fixed remuneration. Role-based pay is counterproductive, as it may reduce pay-performance sensitivity while encouraging bankers to take excessive risks. This chapter also argues that bankers’ bonus cap is conflicted with other initiatives, the implementation of which relies on performance-based remuneration constituting a significant portion of the total remuneration.

This chapter compares the differences between the UK and China in their regulations and practices of bankers’ remuneration and analyses the institutional reasons for the differences.The problem of bankers’ remuneration in the UK was the distorted market practice. The purpose of the regulation is to correct market failures. Nevertheless, the regulators also intend to keep the balance between regulatory intervention and bank autonomy. In China, the practice of bankers’ remuneration was based on the administrative and politicised approach. The regulation is to guide banks to modernise their remuneration systems. However, it is not effectively implemented, as the state maintains its decisive role. The differences between the two countries are due to the different institutional traditions of their financial systems, as the current regulation and practice of bankers’ remuneration have been profoundly influenced by the traditional model of state–market interaction.

This chapter analyses the regulatory framework of bankers’ remuneration in China. The framework is comprised of the CBRC Guidelines and the MOF Measures. The CBRC Guidelines are based on the FSB principles and standards, aiming to guide banks to apply modern remuneration incentives. The MOF Measures are special for SOCBs and SOE-controlled banks, which contain a series of compulsory rules on the level and structure of remuneration and a detailed system of performance assessment. In addition, the MOF imposed a temporary ban on equity-based remuneration, and the CPC issued a policy to reduce and cap the level of remuneration in these banks. These requirements are intrusive, which consolidate state intervention in the practice of bankers’ remuneration while contradictory to the objective of the regulation-led reform.

This chapter investigates the pre-GFC practice of bankers’ remuneration in the UK to discover how bankers’ remuneration affected the sustainability of banks. It starts with an overview of executive remuneration in Anglo-American corporate governance, focusing on its role as both a solution to the agency problem and a mechanism for shareholder interest maximisation. This chapter then examines the practice of bankers’ remuneration in the ‘Big Four’ banks of the UK from 2000 to 2007. It is found that performance-based remuneration, which was aimed at aligning bankers’ wealth with shareholder interest, was the primary remuneration component. Stock options and restricted shares were widely used as performance-based remuneration, and financial indicators oriented by short-term profit and shareholder return were the primary metrics of bankers’ performance. As a result, bankers were incentivised to take excessive risks, which eventually contributed to the vulnerability of banks and their failures.

This chapter describes the international and domestic backgrounds related to the regulations and practices of bankers’ remuneration in the UK and China. It provides an overview of the bank failures in the UK during the GFC and the practice of bankers’ remuneration incentives, which was a significant contributing factor to these bank failures. It also summarises the evolution and development of the modern banking system in China and the transitional reform of corporate governance and remuneration incentives in Chinese banks. Based on these backgrounds, this chapter highlights the rationales for the regulations of bankers’ remuneration in the UK and China respectively.

This chapter analyses the regulatory framework of bankers’ remuneration in the UK in response to the problems in the pre-GFC practice. It first summarises the ideological change among regulators and academics with respect to the regulation of bankers’ remuneration and concludes that maintaining financial stability and protecting the public interest are the primary objectives. The chapter then discusses the initiatives implemented by the UK banking regulators, including deferral, clawback, malus and risk-adjusted performance metrics, which are aimed at guiding banks to reform their incentive mechanisms by extending the assessment period of performance assessment and applying risk-adjusted and stability-oriented indicators. It also discusses the EU bankers’ bonus cap and the opposite stance of the UK regulators to its implementation.

This chapter concludes the key findings and arguments with respect to the practices and regulations of bankers’ remuneration in the UK and China. The reforms in the UK and China are in opposite directions. In the UK, the state needs to move forward to enhance its regulatory power over the practice of bankers’ remuneration; conversely, in China, the state should retreat from the practice and give more leeway to banks. However, influenced by the traditional institutions of the financial system, in either country, the regulation of bankers’ remuneration will not thoroughly change the allocation of power between the state and the market; nevertheless, incremental reforms can be devised to gradually improve the practice of bankers’ remuneration.

This chapter investigates the practices of remuneration and political incentives in major Chinese banks in recent years and the implementation of the regulatory initiatives. The investigation is split into two parts, focusing on SOCBs and listed JSCBs, respectively. Low remuneration level, weak pay-performance sensitivity, the lack of economic incentives, and the predominance of political incentives are the major features of the practices of SOCBs, which are consistent with the traditional administrative and politicised approach. It is found that the regulatory initiatives based on international principles are not effectively implemented; however, the requirements that enhance state intervention have been strictly followed. The majority of the listed JSCBs are connected to the central or local state through direct or indirect ownership. Political incentives also play an important role in these JSCBs. In contrast, remuneration incentives are effective in privately owned JSCBs.

This chapter examines the appointment, retirement and capacity of trustees. They are initially appointed under the trust instrument by the settlor but provision must be made for their replacement. The settlor can reserve the power to appoint new trustees in the trust instrument, alternatively a named person may have the power. There is a statutory power to appoint where no provision has been made by the settlor and the appointment may be made by the surviving or continuing trustees. On rare occasions appointment can be made by the court or by the beneficiaries. Anyone with legal capacity can be appointed as a trustee although a minor cannot be a trustee of land. Professional trustees are sometimes appointed. There is no limit on the number of trustees for a trust of personalty but for trusts of land the limit is four. The Trustee Act 1925 provides for when a trustee can retire or be removed. Trustees are not usually paid but in some circumstances payment is made subject to provisions in the common law or the Trustee Act 2000. This act widened the circumstances when remuneration will be made to the trustees.

This chapter traces the development of clerical ministry in the Church in Wales since disestablishment in 1920. Ordained ministry has undergone profound changes across the century with many landmarks in relation to all aspects of it, from training through ordination to functions, deployment and pay and conditions of service. These include the ordination of women as priests and the introduction of terms of service (both driven in large measure by developments in secular society). There have also been key changes with regard to the training of clergy and the demise of classical residential theological formation, as well as provision for the personal and professional development of clerics as well as in the area of clerical discipline. Today the church faces a dramatic decline in the number of vocations to ordained ministry, responding in part with the evolution of the parish system into ministry areas, and with the advent of non-stipendiary ordained ministry. Overall, whilst the Church in Wales, in its structures, discipline and organisation, is radically different from the church in 1920, it is today more inclusive and more willing to experiment in its ever-evolving approaches to ordained ministry.

This chapter offers some suggestions on how reciprocity might be used to justify specific policy directions. For instance, so long as salaries remain the predominant form of remuneration for public sector employees, performance incentives – both positive and negative – might be beneficial so long as all parties accept that the chosen indicators of good and bad performance are appropriate and deem the corresponding performance-related compensation/penalties as fair. Moreover, insofar as reciprocity is entwined with reputational concerns, a reputational model of governance that threatens to punish bad absolute performance and that supports the implementation of good practice is recommended. Relatedly, group selection theory implies that providing the conditions for reputational competition across regions in relation to public sector services may incentivise cooperation and more innovation within each region, generating lessons that could be shared across regions. Furthermore, given that people naturally reciprocate, framing messages with this fundamental motivational force is worthy of consideration when trying to secure individual behaviour change.