This article offers some general thoughts on the rule of law in international economic law. It begins by briefly defining the rule of law and indicating the legal sources on which it is based. It then shows that the TFEU, confirmed by the case law of the Court of Justice, requires the rule of law to be respected in the conduct of the Union’s commercial policy. However, although the rule of law may be favourable to international trade and investment, it is not indispensable to them. The rule of law is conducive, but not essential, to trade and investment. For businesses, the risks associated with a weak respect for the rule of law represent a cost, which they take into account when setting the price of their products. Finally, it should be remembered that the principles of the rule of law do not apply in the same way in the domestic sphere as in international law. This article is intended as a panoramic introduction to the relationship between the rule of law and international economic law. More specialised studies are published later in this issue, including analyses focusing on trade or investment or national perspectives, such as that of China.

Our paper sheds light on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) cooperation among trading countries. We contribute to the existing literature a data-driven analysis on the effectiveness of various forms (in monetary value, duration, and diversification) of SPS related technical assistance received by 33 countries from 1993 to 2015. The World Trade Organization's (WTO's) SPS Agreement encourages biosecurity for countries through technical assistance, to safeguard human health and productivity from contamination by biological hazards (pests, pathogens, or invasive species). Our panel model finds that WTO's SPS program encourages simultaneously agricultural trade and biosecurity. We implement a Multiple Indicator Solution (MIS) to correct bias from the endogenous technical assistance. The effectiveness of technical assistance depends on geography and the level of development among the heterogeneous countries referred to in our data. This investment in biosecurity benefits both donors and recipients of technical assistance. Based on our results donors should be encouraged to invest in countries with below average resources and abilities.

Much has been written about changing the world's perception of international trade—from an area of development that will accelerate climate change to a powerful tool that can drive climate action. This article elaborates on four mechanisms of international trade law developed and honed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) that can play a pivotal role in accelerating climate action. The four mechanisms are the WTO's dispute resolution system, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the regional trade agreements (RTAs) negotiated under the WTO framework. Elucidating the WTO's role, this article supports the proposition that every multilateral institution can rise to the occasion and spearhead climate action in its own unique capacity.

One of the most significant recent trends in global trade governance has been the increasing use of regulatory “reliance” arrangements as a significant element of trade alliances. Against this backdrop, an important set of questions are raised about how existing institutions of global trade governance – especially the World Trade Organization and international regulatory standards organisations – should respond. To what extent, and how, should such institutions facilitate reliance arrangements? And what role can they usefully play in overseeing and guiding their use? This paper begins to answer these questions through a focused case study of regulatory reliance in the agrifood sector. Four challenges are identified regarding the implementation of such arrangements: the high costs of establishment and maintenance; the lack of agreed and reliable assessment methodologies; the potential for arbitrary discrimination between trade partners; and the difficulties of dealing with regulatory change over time. In light of these challenges, the paper assesses the work of existing international organisations in governing reliance arrangements in the agrifood sector. The paper concludes with a number of preliminary suggestions as to how this architecture of global governance might be supplemented or harnessed to address some of the challenges posed by reliance arrangements.

Companies from emerging economies have started internationalizing their production operations; they are following the same path as American, European and East Asian corporations before them, setting up factories in third countries to serve their export markets from closer locations and produce more efficiently. Thus, it is no longer only developed countries’ multinationals which are moving their operations to developing countries, but emerging market companies that are increasingly engaging in production abroad. This is having beneficial effects in countries where these companies invest and might help them start their own industrialization process. This has attracted the ire of developed countries, which are now targeting these downstream production plants abroad by using the so-called anti-circumvention instrument, resulting in trade defence duties imposed on the parent companies being extended to their foreign subsidiaries. This application of the anti-circumvention instrument departs from its historic rationale and might hinder the development of countries in need of foreign investment. Therefore, affected governments should consider taking international legal action to bring developed countries to the negotiating table to put a halt to this abuse of the anti-circumvention instrument.

This article uses data from several publicly available databases to show that the distribution of intellectual property for frontier technologies, including those useful for sustainable development, is very highly skewed in favor of a handful of developed countries. The intellectual property rights (IPR) regime as it exists does not optimize the global flow of technology and know-how for the attainment of the sustainable development goals and is in need of updating. Some features of the Fourth Industrial Revolution imply that the current system of patents is even more in need of reform than before. COVID-19 vaccines and therapies and the vast inequality in access to these has highlighted the costs of inaction. We recommend several policy changes for the international IPR regime. Broadly, these fall into three categories: allowing greater flexibility for developing countries, reassessing the appropriateness of patents for technologies that may be considered public goods, and closing loopholes that allow for unreasonable intellectual property protections.

Binding taxpayer-initiated international dispute resolution has traditionally played a minor role in the international tax system. Despite being long pursued by corporate interests and increasingly accepted by developed countries, international tax arbitration has remained less developed and less respectful of private interests than investor–State arbitration. The binding multilateral dispute settlement endorsed by over 130 countries as part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Two Pillar Solution to issues raised under Action 1 of the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project marks a change and is noteworthy at a time when some States are reconsidering their consent to the international adjudication of trade and investment disputes. The design of international dispute settlement in the Two Pillar Solution, and the focus on the protection of multinationals from juridical double taxation, displays little appreciation of the experience with dispute settlement in international trade and investment over the past two decades.