I do not understand how, by whatever words that proposition is dressed up, it means anything else except that section 117 does not apply if the Court does not want it to.

Seeds are crucial for plant reproduction, dispersal and agriculture. Seed quality and vigour greatly impact crop production by enabling rapid and uniform germination under various environmental conditions. This leads to healthy seedlings that can withstand both biotic and abiotic stresses, which are particularly important in the context of the accentuation of global climate change. Upon imbibition during germination sensu stricto, seeds release exudates, complex mixtures of organic and inorganic molecules, into the microenvironment surrounding them, known as the spermosphere. These exudates play a pivotal role in seedling development and overall plant fitness by influencing microbial selection, growth and interactions in the spermosphere, ultimately shaping the plant's microbiome. Proteins such as enzymes with protection properties have previously been demonstrated to be released by the seeds in their exudates. However, limited information is available pertaining to peptides in seed exudates. Here, we developed an experimental protocol to extract and identify peptides in the spermosphere of germinating common bean seeds. We showed that our methodology was successful in identifying a broad spectrum of peptides and that extraction solvent choice impacts peptide identification both qualitatively and quantitatively. We also show the possibility of using online prediction tools to predict the properties of identified peptides based on their amino acid sequence. We propose that this approach may be used to identify potential molecules that could be used as candidates for developing strategies to enhance seed quality and improve crop productivity.

Interruption of the inferior caval vein complicates device closure of atrial septal defects. We present a case where a simplified technique was used: from right jugular access the delivery system was directly engaged into the left atrium, where the entire septal occluder was deployed. Both discs were aligned with the interatrial septum, after which the right disc was recaptured and re-deployed in the right atrium under tension. This technique will allow device closure of atrial septal defects from the upper caval vein in selected cases.

This paper examines the relationship between so-called “merits review” of administrative decision-making, and “judicial review” of administrative action as that term is used in the title of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (ADJR Act), for instance. In particular, it assesses and, in some respects, challenges the widely held view that there is a qualitative difference between merits review and judicial review. The main thrust of my argument will be that the differences between judicial review and merits review are not as stark as they are often portrayed. More provocatively, I will suggest that merits review can plausibly be described as judicial review in disguise.

Section I considers the constitutional underpinnings of merits review, and concludes that from a functional point of view, the exclusion of merits review from the judicial power of the Commonwealth is hard to justify. Section II examines various suggested distinctions between judicial review and merits review. Its main conclusion is that merits review is characterised by the power to exercise afresh the decisionmaking power invested in the original decision-maker.

To say that managers should be accountable to the market only begins the analysis. The problematic downside to this glib norm is that a volatile market can be a fickle master who may regularly override the superior judgment of his manager-servant. Thus, the central question from a public law perspective is how much accountability is too much.

John C Coffee, Jr

The last two decades of corporate law scholarship in the United States have been marked by the ascendancy of law-and-economics research, the centrepiece of which is the contractarian theory of the corporation and the corporate law. Contractarians seek to explain the corporation as the focal point for a process of contracting between various constituencies. Contractarians explain corporate law as a corpus of “default rules” which fills gaps where these contracts are less than fully specified, but which can be excluded by the parties.

While State legislatures have responded, to some extent, to pressure for greater legal protection of consumers, consumer protection had never been an area of legislative activity on a national level until the passing of the Trade Practices Act 1974-1975 (Cth). Mr Goldring examines the effect of the Trade Practices Act 1974-1975 (Cth) on the area of consumer protection in Australia, and notes that the Act, in addition to introducing regulation of restrictive trade practices on a scale beyond that previously experienced in Australia, includes sweeping legislative innovations aimed to protect consumers. The Act is shown to prohibit certain types of undesirable commerical activity and gives to a wide range of potential plaintiffs the right to take action for damages and injunctive relief. The terms implied by law into contracts of sale of goods and hire-purchase are extended and similar terms are included in other types of contract.

As is well known, the High Court held in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally that federal courts can only exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth, and cannot exercise State judicial power. In this article I ask whether the Court would ever take a similar approach to Chapter II of the Constitution, and hold that the Commonwealth executive can only exercise the executive power of the Commonwealth, and not State executive power. If it did, it would probably follow that the executive power of the Commonwealth could only be exercised by the Commonwealth executive, and not by a State executive. Obviously, these twin conclusions would have major implications for existing Commonwealth–State cooperative legislative schemes.

I should stress immediately that I do not think that this is the preferable view. However, for reasons that I explain in Part 2 below, there is an undercurrent in recent decisions that could be taken to suggest that the Commonwealth executive government is limited to performing functions within the scope of Commonwealth legislative power, and cannot be given additional functions.

The franchise is the linchpin of representative democracy. The level of representation is dependent upon the extent of the franchise. This most fundamental of democratic rights, the right to vote for those who govern, is not entrenched in the Commonwealth Constitution. At the time the Constitution was enacted, the franchise was in a period of flux, with property qualifications and plural voting on the demise and the concept of a universal franchise in the ascendant. Proposals to enshrine the franchise in the Constitution met with protests that the smaller colonies, such as South Australia (which allowed women the right to vote) were attempting to impose their will on the larger colonies of New South Wales and Victoria. It is not surprising therefore that such protection as mar be found in the Constitution for the right to vote has been described as “obscure”.

Life (at least for company lawyers) without Salomon's case seems inconceivable. It is generally seen as a landmark decision. Every British and Australian company law textbook refers to it as a key case in the development of company law. The story of Salomon's case is, in fact, so well ingrained in our sensibilities that we all “know” (or at least think we do) the story of the unravelling of modern company law and the crucial role the decision by the House of Lords in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd plays in that story. We know the script so well that questioning the iconic status of Salomon's case would seem to be a ludicrous exercise. Despite the seeming futility of such an exercise it is the intention of this paper to suggest that re-examining some of our unquestioned assumptions may lead to some useful insights into the development of “modern” company law, and by inference, into a number of the problems (both theoretical and practical) facing contemporary corporations law academics and practitioners.

The executive power of the Commonwealth largely has been neglected, both by the High Court and by commentators, receiving scant attention in comparison with the Commonwealth's legislative and judicial powers. The High Court has examined executive power on fewer than 10 occasions – principally three cases in the Whitlam era: Barton v Commonwealth, the AAP Case and Johnson v Kent – and, most recently, in the Bicentennial Authority Act Case in 1988. (The power has, of course, also arisen in several Federal Court cases, most notably the Tampa Case in 2001.) The relative neglect of this power is reflected in constitutional commentary, for which High Court cases represent primary 'authority'. The Commonwealth's legislative powers have, of course, received detailed examination in every major text since Quick and Garran in 1901. But, while the first monograph on Commonwealth judicial power appeared as early as 1904, almost 80 years were to elapse before publication of a book devoted to the executive power of the Commonwealth.