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Agency is realized by subpersonal mechanisms too

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

Neil Levy
Neil Levy*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia. Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 1PT, UK. neil.levy@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Abstract

John Doris argues that, when behaviors are caused by processes that we would not endorse, our agency is defeated. I argue that this test for defeaters is inappropriate. What matters is not what we would but what we should endorse. The subpersonal mechanisms he identifies as defeaters enable us to track and respond to reasons. They realize agency, rather than defeating it.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e49
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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