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The participatory dimension of individual responsibility
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2018
Abstract
Collaborativism is the view that moral reasoning is better when it is socially embedded. We propose that, when people take part in dialogic exchanges, they align in ways that open up novel avenues for sharing values and rationality criteria and, therefore, for exercising responsible agency. The hypothesis that collaborative interactions unfold through the alignment of minds and bodies helps articulate Doris's participatory approach to morality.
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- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018
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Target article
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