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Responsibility: Cognitive fragments and collaborative coherence?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

James S. Uleman ,
Yael Granot  and
Yuki Shimizu
James S. Uleman
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY 10003. jim.uleman@nyu.edujimuleman.compsych.nyu.edu/Uleman
Yael Granot
Affiliation:
Yale Law School, New Haven, CT 06520. yael.granot@yale.edu
Yuki Shimizu
Affiliation:
Faculty of Education, Saitama University, Saitama, Saitama Prefecture 338-8570, Japan. shimizu@mail.saitama-u.ac.jphttp://en.saitama-u.ac.jp/research/researchers/dr-yuki-shimizu/
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Abstract

We describe additional research that expands upon many of Doris's points, focusing on collaboration (Ch. 5), selves, and identity (Ch. 8). We also suggest some elaboration of his treatment of dual process theories (Ch. 3). Finally, we ask whether collaborationist accounts confer logical consistency.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e60
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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