No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
To kill a bee: The aptness and moralistic heuristics of reactive attitudes
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2018
Abstract
Although we are sensitive to the advantages of reactive attitudes as a starting point, we are concerned that confusion on the level of analysis can easily plague this type of account. We argue that what is needed here is a serious appraisal of the effects on the promotion of values of moralistic responses toward different types of agency.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018
References
Alesina, A. & Angeletos, G.-M. (2005) Fairness and redistribution. The American Economic Review
95(4):960–80.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barrett, H. C., Bolyanatz, A., Crittenden, A. N., Fessler, D. M. T., Fitzpatrick, S., Gurven, M., Henrich, J., Kanovsky, M., Kushnick, G., Pisorf, A., Scelzaa, B.A., Stichl, S., von Ruedenn, C., Zhaoh, W. & Laurence, S. (2016) Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
113(17):4688–93. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1522070113.Google Scholar
Benabou, R. & Tirole, J. (2006) Belief in a just world and redistributive politics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
121(2):699–746.Google Scholar
D'Arms, J. & Jacobson, D. (2000) The moralistic fallacy: On the “appropriateness” of emotions. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research
61(1):65–90.Google Scholar
Debove, S., Baumard, N. & André, J.-B. (2015) Evolution of equal division among unequal partners. Evolution
69(2):561–69. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/evo.12583.Google Scholar
Doris, J. M. (2015b). Talking to our selves: Reflection, ignorance, and agency. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fessler, D. M. & Holbrook, C. (2013) Baumard et al.'s moral markets lack market dynamics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences
36(1):89–90.Google Scholar
Fiske, A. P. & Rai, T. S. (2014) Virtuous violence: Hurting and killing to create, sustain, end, and honor social relationships. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Frank, R. H. (1988) Passions within reason: The strategic role of the emotions. Norton.Google Scholar
Gavrilets, S. (2012) On the evolutionary origins of the egalitarian syndrome. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
109(35):14069–74.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Jacquet, J., Hauert, C., Traulsen, A. & Milinski, M. (2011) Shame and honour drive cooperation. Biology Letters
7:899–901. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbl.2011.0367.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Levy, N. (2011) Hard luck: How luck undermines free will and moral responsibility. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morris, I. (2015) Foragers, farmers, and fossil fuels: How human values evolve. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Pinker, S. (2011) The better angels of our nature: Why violence has declined. Viking Books.Google Scholar
Scanlon, T. (2013) Interpreting blame. In: Blame. Its nature and norms, ed. Coates, J. & Tognazzini, N., pp. 84–99. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Weeden, J. & Kurzban, R. (2014) The hidden agenda of the political mind: How self-interest shapes our opinions and why we won't admit it. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Target article
Précis of Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency
Related commentaries (28)
A limited skeptical threat
A related proposal: An interactionist perspective on reason
Acknowledging and managing deep constraints on moral agency and the self
Acting without knowledge
Agency enhancement and social psychology
Agency is realized by subpersonal mechanisms too
Another rescue mission: Does it make sense?
Getting by with a little help from our friends
Grounding responsibility in something (more) solid
Innate valuation, existential framing, and one head for multiple moral hats
Learning to talk to ourselves: Development, ignorance, and agency
Manipulation, oppression, and the deep self
Moral agency among the ruins
Negotiating responsibility
On properly characterizing moral agency
Responsibility: Cognitive fragments and collaborative coherence?
Seeing for ourselves: Insights into the development of moral behaviour from models of visual perception and misperception
Talking to others' selves: Why a valuational paradigm of agency fails to provide an adequate theoretical framework for moral responsibility, social accountability, and legal liability
Talking to others: The importance of responsibility attributions by observers
The dark side of dialog
The Nietzschean precedent for anti-reflective, dialogical agency
The participatory dimension of individual responsibility
The practice of everyday life provides supporters and inviters of morally responsible agency
The tangled web of agency
To kill a bee: The aptness and moralistic heuristics of reactive attitudes
What does agency afford the self?
Why value values?
“Defeaters” don't matter
Author response
Collaborating agents: Values, sociality, and moral responsibility