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Learning to talk to ourselves: Development, ignorance, and agency
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2018
Abstract
Although anti-reflectivism seems to preclude a role for reflection, this dichotomy could be synthesized in a Piagetian developmental framework. Development integrates a role for error and ignorance in reflection, and supports Doris's espousal of valuation, collaboration, and pluralism, and the importance of extrinsic factors to the self.
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Target article
Précis of Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency
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