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What does agency afford the self?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 March 2018
Abstract
We welcome Doris's dual systems, social account of agency and self. However, we suggest that a level of affordances regarding agency is interpolated between those dual systems. We also suggest a need to consider joint (“we”) agency in addition to individual (“I”) agency, and we suggest a more fundamental role for culture in configuring both the values entering the dialogue that generates the sense of agency and self, and the nature of the dialogue itself.
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