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Talking to others' selves: Why a valuational paradigm of agency fails to provide an adequate theoretical framework for moral responsibility, social accountability, and legal liability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

Tobias A. Mattei
Tobias A. Mattei*
Affiliation:
Neurosurgery and Spine Specialists, Eastern Maine Medical Center, Bangor, ME 04401tobiasmattei@gmail.comhttps://www.emmc.org/Providers/Mattei,-Tobias-A-,-MD.aspxhttps://www.researchgate.net/profile/Tobias_Mattei
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Abstract

In this commentary, I highlight the importance of a proper discussion of the pragmatic implications of John Doris's paradigm for allocation of personal responsibility proposed in his new book Talking to Our Selves. By employing some classic concepts of the American common law tradition, I discuss why Doris's valuational understanding of agency fails to provide an adequate framework for moral responsibility, social accountability, and legal liability.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e51
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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