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Collaborating agents: Values, sociality, and moral responsibility

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

John M. Doris
John M. Doris*
Affiliation:
Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program, Philosophy Department, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO 63130jdoris@wustl.eduhttp://www.moralpsychology.net/jdoris/
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Abstract

I respond to the Behavioral and Brain Sciences commentaries on my book, Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency. I defend and amend both the skeptical challenge to morally responsible agency, that is, the book's impetus, and the anti-skeptical theory I develop to address that challenge. Regarding the skeptical challenge, I argue that it must be taken more seriously than some of my sanguine commentators assert, and consider some ways its impact might be blunted, such as by appeal to individual differences and the practical efficacy of human behavior. Regarding my positive theory, I defend the role of values in morally responsible agency against numerous criticisms, and consider various suggestions for elaborating my social, “collaborativist” account of morally responsible agency. In closing, I comment on the appropriate aspirations for theorizing about moral responsibility and agency.

Type
Author's Response
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e65
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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