Do consumer and producer considerations influence support for future trade agreements and, if so, how? Prior research has pitted self-interest-based explanations of trade preferences against perception-based explanations, finding limited empirical support for the self-interest hypothesis. Instead of treating perceptions and self-interest as competing explanations, we construct a theoretical model with perceptions of trade as a mediating factor linking self-interest and support for prospective free trade agreements (FTAs). Using new survey data collected by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, we examine how two distinct forms of self-interest (consumer and producer considerations) can indirectly shape attitudes toward the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). We find that the impact of respondents' income level (proxying producer considerations) and their recognition of the price-lowering effect of international trade (proxying consumer considerations) on support for the TPP are largely mediated by perceptions of trade. Together the findings suggest a middle ground between the two sides of the self-interest debate.

What strategies will states pursue in managing their relations with more powerful neighbours? International Relations scholarship identifies a wide range of policy options open to “secondary states,” including soft balancing, bandwagoning and institutional binding. We provide a conceptual framework to distinguish between these similar and often conflated institutional strategies on the basis of two dimensions: threat perception and inclusiveness. We then apply this framework to the inter-American system. Analyzing original data on treaty action between 1946 and 2015, we find that secondary states’ adherence to multilateral agreements increases when the United States participates and when states do not perceive the hegemon to be a threat. These findings suggest that institutional binding captures the dynamics of inter-American cooperation more adequately than either soft balancing or bandwagoning: states balance against perceived threats but bind their friends.

Theories of hegemonic leadership often begin with a constraining assumption: that international structure can explain both a state's capability to provide leadership and its interest in doing so. By conflating these explanations, traditional theories, even those from quite different approaches, share common problems. These problems are illustrated by examining three well-known models, and comparing their applications to the eighteenth century. This period provides difficult cases for all three, since countries with power did not provide political or economic leadership, and those which were attempting to provide leadership were not powerful. An alternative theory of leadership is then offered, using structural factors to explain capabilities, but domestic political economic factors to explain interests. The ability of this model to handle the historical cases with greater accuracy suggests that domestic factors could offer fresh insight into theories of leadership.

Responsible government, as Professor Hodgetts has demonstrated convincingly in his Pioneer Public Service, means more than that the political life of the executive depends on the support of a majority of the members of the elected legislature. Behind the executive, government departments must be so organized that the ministers can exercise a control for which they can be held responsible. The issuance of public money to pay for departmental activities must be under a central authority, and so must a thorough audit of expenditures. The public accounts must be intelligible to the laymen who sit in Parliament, and a system of estimating in advance the needs of government for each ensuing year is indispensable. “Each of these aspects of internal financial control,” in Professor Hodgetts' words, “… had to be satisfactorily developed if Parliament was to become the watchdog of the executive.” They were satisfactorily developed between 1840 and Confederation, some of them as late as the middle sixties.

Partly because several of the political and administrative practices involved were still in their infancy, and partly because Confederation meant the destruction of old lines of authority and the creation of new ones, a severe strain was put on several essential elements in responsible government in 1867. The administrative side of the story, as it concerned governmental financial control, has already been told by Herbert Balls, but the legislative side has hitherto been neglected. The legislative story, not only in its financial aspect but also in the wider context of the whole parliamentary scene, is worth recounting.

Because Canada has a labour force composed of more than one language stock, it is of interest to ask what social organization has developed to take account of this pluralism in her work world. Such an interest may take two main forms. First, with respect to a language variable, differences in occupational opportunities may be seen as the sole problem of Canadian Indians and Eskimos, of French Canadians, or of New Canadians. Second, we may wish to find out how our different language groups achieve interdependence in actual work situations and with what consequences for society as a whole. It is the second approach which will be adopted here; in a sense it includes the first, since the problem of any group stems in large part from the ways in which groups act on each other. The groups to which I shall limit my discussion will be the English and the French Canadians, but my remarks will undoubtedly apply, at least in part, to groups who speak other languages.

The view taken in this paper is that in our society, because English is the sole language which has currency in all aspects of social activity, people of different mother tongues have unequal opportunities for work. In a plural society, two consequences follow from the dominance of one language: a limited utilization of the potential skills of those who do not know the dominant language perfectly and a disengagement of the other mother tongues from important aspects of social reality.

In a consideration of the economic problems that confront agriculture there is much wisdom in a return to the classical tradition of treating these problems within the context of the political economy. In our division of labour in professional effort we have departed from this tradition; and our work has been weakened as a consequence. The Older Economists were deeply concerned about agriculture. They did not, however, make the mistake of treating agriculture in isolation, as if it belonged in another category to be studied, one might be led to suppose, by a different set of analytical models and presumably, largely by surveys and statistics. Such procedures certainly are not in keeping with what the Older Economists did as they put together an engine for economic analysis and laid down a roadbed for policy. On the contrary, their major premises and the basic policies that emerged were heavily weighted with agricultural affairs. This is evident when we consider the attention they gave to the production of food, the distribution of rewards to factors, particularly to rent and land. Whether our analysis pertains to labour, finance, trade, agriculture, or any other problem sphere, we will do well to formulate our approach in terms of the economy as a whole. We need especially to view agriculture as an integral part of the political economy and not as a series of particular farm problems treated as if they were self-contained.

This study tests explanations of the choice of policy instruments. The comparative analysis of the Canadian and United States energy policies for the period 1973-1996 concludes that the choice of a policy instrument is a function of (1) whether the degree of constraint involved is consistent with the ideological predisposition of the party in power, (2) whether the agency needed to implement the instrument already exists, thus reducing costs, (3) whether a policy transfer from other jurisdictions is possible or whether policy harmonization is required, and (4) whether the target groups affected by the use of the instrument are likely to oppose its use.

Much of the literature on unconditional basic income considers reciprocity to be necessary for its success. From a normative standpoint, receiving without giving is unjust. From a technical standpoint, the absence of mechanisms that promote reciprocation invites free riding which threatens to erode the economic structure upon which the system of distribution depends. As a solution, it has been proposed that communities adopt social norms that encourage basic income recipients to contribute to the productive capacity of society by engaging in volunteer work. This article interrogates whether this alternative to conditionality is consistent with the rationale for implementing unconditional basic income and finds the instillation of stronger norms to be unnecessary for the project's success.

In 1946, after visiting Russia, Harold Innis remarked that the time had come to broaden the range of political economy by studying, first, the struggle for social supremacy between states, churches and commerce; and, second, the related competition between languages, religions, cultures and communications media. This, I argue, is what Innis accomplished. His early studies of Canadian economic history transcended conventional economics and laid the groundwork for a later political theory of communications. It expressly took up the 1946 challenge to address competing monopolies of knowledge and power, hence manipulating the space and time-binding properties of communications media. Innis' work reflected a materialist model of communications, a social ecology, a soft determinism or philosophic naturalism and it linked knowledge, freedom and power. Finally, I conclude, these insights permitted Innis to transcend bias and to search for a balanced culture.

Résumé. Cet article a pour objectif de présenter les racines intellectuelles de la politique étrangère canadienne promue par David Bercuson et Barry Cooper, deux membres de ce que d'aucunes appellent « l'école de Calgary », et à qui on attribue une certaine influence sur la pensée du gouvernement Harper. L'article montre que bien que leurs prescriptions puissent se résumer à première vue à un désir de rapprochement avec les États-Unis, leur politique étrangère repose sur des fondements plus complexes, qui combinent leur propre lecture de l'histoire canadienne et des intentions ayant présidé à la Confédération, une certaine conception des relations internationales, ainsi qu'une réflexion philosophique et anthropologique sur la violence, le tout ayant été fortement influencé par la conscience politique particulière de l'Ouest canadien.

Abstract. This article explores the intellectual roots of Canada's foreign policy as conceived and promoted by David Bercuson and Barry Cooper, two prominent members of the “Calgary School” and public intellectuals credited with influencing the Harper government's view of the world. While their notion of Canada's foreign policy can be simply boiled down to their belief that Canada should align with the foreign policy of the United States, it is, in fact, more complex. Bercuson and Cooper's vision of Canada's foreign policy blends in a distinct way their own understanding of Canadian history and the original intent behind Canadian Confederation; their particular conception of international relations; philosophical and anthropological reflections on violence; and their typically Western Canadian political consciousness.

The ideological weakness of modern liberalism has long been recognized as one of the more striking features of contemporary politics. Although constitutional democracy has on the whole proved rather more successful than totalitarian government in satisfying the ordinary needs of men, its achievements have generally failed to arouse a great deal of enthusiasm. In comparison with the aggressive self-confidence of communists and fascists, the attitude of contemporary liberals is notoriously defensive and pessimistic. What are the causes underlying this curious failure of liberal morale? To what extent can it be attributed to deficiencies in the theoretical structure of modern liberalism? These questions must be of interest to anyone who is concerned with the problems of contemporary political thought.

When substantial accomplishments fail to evoke enthusiasm, it is reasonable to suppose that those accomplishments are being measured against standards which in some way or other are alien to their nature. A good deal of the weakness of modern liberalism arises out of the fact that it insists on judging the achievements of constitutional democracy, an essentially pluralist system, in terms of standards which are still largely absolutist in character. Liberal government depends in practice on the existence of a multi-myth, multi-group society. Policy is determined not, as in totalitarian countries, by imposing the will of a homogeneous ruling group upon the rest of the community, but by a process of parliamentary negotiation between the supporters of widely varying points of view. In a society of this sort, the coercive functions of government are necessarily limited by the claims of rival individuals and groups.

In the 1870's, party attitudes to Canada's nascent labour movement were clearly reflected in the federal legislation of successive Conservative and Liberal administrations. Especially was this true of the Trade Unions Act of 1872 and the Breaches of Contract Act of 1877. The bill concerning trade unions was guided through the House a few weeks before a federal general election by Sir John A. Macdonald, conscious of the special contribution it would make to the success of his National Policy. It was passed in response to organized labour's outspoken demands and in the face of George Brown's determined efforts to destroy trade unionism. The Breaches of Contract bill was driven through the Commons for no clear electoral purpose by Edward Blake and Alexander Mackenzie, conscious of the special contribution they could make to the success of the Grand Trunk Railway Company. It was passed in spite of labour fears and in the face of stiff opposition from Macdonald, Irving and other leading Conservative and Independent politicians. Whereas the famous Trade Unions Act asserted the right of all workers to organize and to strike, the less well-known Breaches of Contract Act denied the right to strike to all employees of public utilities. Thus the seventies, while witnessing some major federal legislation directly affecting Canada's young trade-union movement, also saw labour inevitably moving within the orbit of Macdonald's Conservative party.

Résumé. L'auteur entend défendre dans cet essai une conception de la sécession qu'il appelle délibérative et la justifier par rapport à d'autres théories concurrentes de la sécession. En l'absence d'un encadrement juridique clair et rigoureux des cas de sécession, de plus en plus nombreux, qui échappent aux situations de domination coloniale prévues par le droit international, la question se pose en effet de savoir s'il n'existe pas d'autres moyens de les résoudre dans des conditions pacifiques. L'auteur soutient que la démocratie délibérative pourrait offrir de tels moyens. Le but de l'article est d'examiner dans quelles conditions et à l'intérieur de quelles limites.

Abstract. In this article, the author aims at supporting a deliberative conception of secession and at justifying it against other rival theories. In the absence of clear and rigorous legal regulations of more and more numerous cases of secession going beyond the situations of colonial domination already covered by the international law, the question arises as to whether other means for their pacific solution are available. The author contends that deliberative democracy could provide such a means and examines in what conditions and within what limits this could be achieved.

Résumé. Après plus de deux décennies, un tribunal manitobain a fixé une date pour entendre l'affaire FMM qui touche à la concession des terres aux Métis selon l'art. 31 de la Loi de 1870 sur le Manitoba. Le politologue Thomas Flanagan répète inlassablement que les Métis ne se sont jamais décrits comme peuple aborigène ayant des droits fonciers spéciaux pendant la résistance de 1869–70. Puisqu'il est fort probable que la Couronne se serve encore une fois de la recherche de Flanagan dans l'affaire FMM, le moment est opportun pour réexaminer les arguments de Flanagan. Dans ce but, l'auteur examine ici de plus près certaines des prétentions de Flanagan, notamment celles qui veulent que : 1) les Métis n'aient jamais revendiqué le statut de peuple autochtone ou des droits autochtones pendant les événements de 1869–70; 2) les listes de droits ne contiennent aucune référence aux droits aborigènes des Métis; et 3) l'abbé Ritchot i) n'ait eu aucun mandat de négocier l'extinction du titre aborigène des Métis et une concession de terres; ii) n'ait été qu'un délégué parmi trois.

Abstract. After more than two decades, a Manitoban court has set a date to hear of the MMF case which touches on the Métis land grant in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870. Political scientist Thomas Flanagan has continually repeated that the Métis never described themselves as an Aboriginal people with special land rights during the resistance of 1869–70. As it is quite probable that the Crown will use Flanagan's research in the MMF case, it is timely to reexamine it. To this end, the author takes a closer look at some of Flanagan's conclusions, most notably those that claim that: 1) the Métis never claimed status as an Aboriginal people during the events of 1869–70; 2) the various Bills of Rights contain no reference to the aboriginal rights of the Métis; 3) the abbot Ritchot : i) had no mandate to negotiate the extinction of Métis aboriginal rights and a land grant; ii) was but one of three delegates.

The growing economic liberalization within, and interdependence between, modern states have limited the ability of state administrations effectively to pursue public policies without the “co-operation and self-restraint” of their citizens. The concept of citizenship will thus increasingly be a battlefield in the struggle for ideological hegemony between major political interests who attempt to define citizenship to enhance their respective political agendas. These debates over the nature of citizenship have been articulated most clearly in the United Kingdom, where the Speaker's Commission on Citizenship (report released in September 1990) has been a focal point in the discussion of what citizenship in a modern state entails.