It is commonly accepted that education in human rights may be one of the most effective tools in promoting the observance of those rights. Those whose profession entails the exercise of power over others have an obvious need to know the limits of their power and members of the armed forces represent just such a group. Their acts engage the responsibility of their State under human rights treaties, wherever those acts are committed. Some instruction in human rights law, particularly non-derogable rights, is therefore necessary but the body of rules which imposes the greatest prohibitions and restraints on the conduct of armed forces is humanitarian law. That term is used here as including both “The Hague law”, which imposes limits on the means and methods of warfare, and “Geneva law”, which seeks to protect certain victims of the conflict, such as the wounded and sick in the field, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea, prisoners of war and civilians living under belligerent occupation. The latter body of rules was updated in 1977 by the addition of two Protocols which extended the range of protection by incorporating elements of “The Hague law”. The 1949 Geneva Conventions have been ratified by 166 States and Hague Convention IV, with which we shall principally be dealing, was held by the Nuremberg Tribunal to represent customary international law. To all intents and purposes then, every State is bound by the two bodies of rules. In addition, the 1977 Protocols are binding on those States which have ratified them.

Sous ce titre, le Dr Mohamed Abdallah Draz, professeur à l'Université El Azhar au Caire, a publié, dans la « Revue égyptienne de droit international», une étude d'un intérêt soutenu, nourrie d'abondantes citations, où il s'efforce de rechercher les principes fondamentaux du droit international public dans le Coran et la Tradition prophétique, textes sacrés dont il nous révèle utilement toutes les pensées de haute sagesse et les réserves spirituelles.

La Convention de la Haye du 18 octobre 1907, signée et ratifiée aujourd'hui par la plupart des Etats, a adapté à la guerre sur mer les principes de la Convention de Genève de 1906 «pour l'amélioration du sort des blessés et malades dans les armées en campagne».

Qu'en est-il de la guerre dans les airs, et quel régime appliquer aux aéronefs?

Avant la guerre déjà, en 1912, des études à la fois théoriques et pratiques avaient été faites par M. le docteur en droit Ch. L. Julliot, M. le sénateur Reymond, M. le colonel R. Quinton, tous trois en France, et M. Paul Fauchille s'en était occupé dans l'excellente Revue de droit international public qu'il dirige depuis si longtemps. Ces auteurs s'étaient demandé comment, en fait, il serait possible d'utiliser ce mode de locomotion nouveau et rapide, soit pour la recherche des blessés sur le champ de bataille, soit pour le transport de ceux-ci aux établissements hospitaliers de l'arrière — et comment, en droit, le bénéfice de la Convention de Genève pourrait être assurée à ces avions sanitaires.

Like other international organizations, the European Union has progressively included an «international humanitarian law» dimension in the policies it intends to pursue in its international relations. Initially focused on human rights, the regional European organization has taken the convergence between the various legal instruments for the protection of the individual into account. Today it no longer regards international humanitarian law as an alternative, hut as a useful complement to be applied within its foreign and common security policy. At first concentrated in its basic policy statement that law now features in all legal instruments at the organization's disposal to act in accordance with its international vocation. This new reference thus highlights the European Union's role not only in disseminating the Geneva Conventions and Protocols and promoting respect for them, but also in ensuring that the rules of international humanitarian law progress and become adapted to new forms of conflict.

The role normally played by monuments in conflict is that of passive and innocent observers, occasionally drawn into the fighting through their locations. In the Syrian conflict, monuments have been more deliberately used as pawns, as ideological weapons and as favoured strongpoints for combatants. The resulting damage to historical sites, particularly to the monumental centres of Aleppo and Palmyra, has been considerable. However, damage to heritage presents a small proportion of the harm compared to the destruction of civilian housing and facilities throughout the country and should not distract us from the irreplaceable loss of innocent life in the fighting. The country's eventual recovery will require the return of refugees to their devastated communities, a precondition for any effort to restore the country's rich monumental heritage.

Advances in mobile phone technology and social media have created a world where the volume of information generated and shared is outpacing the ability of humans to review and use that data. Machine learning (ML) models and “big data” analytical tools have the power to ease that burden by making sense of this information and providing insights that might not otherwise exist. In the context of international criminal and human rights law, ML is being used for a variety of purposes, including to uncover mass graves in Mexico, find evidence of homes and schools destroyed in Darfur, detect fake videos and doctored evidence, predict the outcomes of judicial hearings at the European Court of Human Rights, and gather evidence of war crimes in Syria. ML models are also increasingly being incorporated by States into weapon systems in order to better enable targeting systems to distinguish between civilians, allied soldiers and enemy combatants or even inform decision-making for military attacks.

The same technology, however, also comes with significant risks. ML models and big data analytics are highly susceptible to common human biases. As a result of these biases, ML models have the potential to reinforce and even accelerate existing racial, political or gender inequalities, and can also paint a misleading and distorted picture of the facts on the ground. This article discusses how common human biases can impact ML models and big data analytics, and examines what legal implications these biases can have under international criminal law and international humanitarian law.

This article examines whether and how non-State armed groups, as distinct entities, might be required to provide reparations for their violations of international humanitarian law. It shows that the possibility of holding armed groups to reparations is marked by uncertainty in international law. This complex question calls for clarification. In building on these observations, the article explores how the duty to provide reparations by armed groups could be operationalized as a matter of lex ferenda. This exercise involves examining how such a duty could be conceptualized and put into practice. From this discussion, a multi-faceted proposal emerges, which draws upon existing approaches in international law and responds to the particular challenges presented by armed groups. The article ends by considering the implications of the proposal.

Starting with the usual functions of truth and reconciliation commissions, the article outlines the possibilities for and limits of cooperation by the ICRC with the varying types of commissions. The question as to the degree of such cooperation has mostly been resolved on similar lines to the privilege of non-disclosure in international criminal trials. Within the parameters of its principles of neutrality and impartiality and the operative rule of confidentiality established to enable access to victims of armed conflicts and internal violence, the ICRC has, however, cooperated with such commissions. The author explains some criteria determining the appropriate degree of cooperation and shows some forms it can take. He finally discusses the ICRC's policy vis-à-vis the amnesty provisions of truth and reconciliation commissions, which often preclude the prosecution of persons involved in offences committed during periods of violence.

Last February we devoted an article to a book by Jacques Moreillon, ICRC delegate-general, which had been published by the Henry Dunant Institute. We give below an English version of one chapter (translated by us) of the book which, we would state, was submitted as a thesis to the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, under the sole responsibility of the author.

The law regulating the use of force at sea has long been due fora reevaluation in the light of developments in methods and means of warfare at sea and the fact that major changes have taken place in other branches of international law of direct relevance to this issue. This need was reflected in Resolution VII of the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross, which noted that “some areas of international humanitarian law relating to sea warfare are in need of reaffirmation and clarification on the basis of existing fundamental principles of international humanitarian law” and therefore appealed to “governments to co-ordinate their efforts in appropriate fora in order to review the necessity and the possibility of updating the relevant texts of international humanitarian law relating to sea warfare”.

Transitional justice aims at once to restore victims' dignity, build confidence between warring groups and foster the institutional changes needed to bring about a new relationship within the population, in order to usher in the rule of law without endorsing practices that amount to total or partial impunity. In situations of post-conflict, however, governments are also faced with other pressing needs, such as disarming fighting forces, improving civilian security, compensating victims and relaunching the economy of a society in ruins. This article explores the relationship between these needs and transitional justice mechanisms, and critically evaluates their influence on the forms justice has taken in post-conflict situations.

This article provides a legal analysis of the largely uncharted notion of “acts harmful to the enemy” under international humanitarian law, which reconciles the humanitarian need to grant special protection to medical services (medical personnel, units and transports) in the interests of the wounded and sick with the military necessity to remove it when acts are committed contrary to good faith and for hostile purposes or with effects which harm the adverse party. The meaning of the notion is clarified by primarily looking into the legality of an attack against land-based medical services by the aggrieved party to the conflict as a consequence of harmful acts. It concludes with specific recommendations on how to interpret the law governing such an attack, considered prima facie lawful, on a hospital.

The use of arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering, and more especially of poisoned weapons (chemical and biological weapons), was banned under the conceptual framework of both the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. In the discussions leading to a ban on the use of chemical weapons, diplomats from around the world referred to their use as “barbaric and dishonourable” because of their effect on soldiers or the likely indiscriminate impact on civilians. It is a universal achievement that it is now impossible to conceive of a world that does not show concern for civilians caught up in war. As international attention to the protection of civilians in internal armed conflicts grows, it is accompanied by renewed debate regarding regulation of warring parties' conduct through humanitarian and human rights law.

Water, life-giving and bounteous, the symbol of fertility and purity, is also a source of fear, risk and danger, of covetousness and conflict. Serving many purposes, all equally necessary, it constitutes a vital resource of which man has always tried to regulate the use and management. But unlike peacetime legislation, reflected in the customs and practices of the most ancient societies as well as in the domestic and international legal instruments of modern times, the law of armed conflicts has devoted only few of its provisions expressly — and belatedly — to water. This is not so much a criticism as an observation and may be explained by the fact that water is indispensable in all circumstances. Apart from the consequences of natural disasters, when water may be either threatening or threatened, some human activities can harm the environment and impair the population's means of survival, of which water is the most essential. The effects of pollution or armed conflict are a case in point. The experience of modern warfare has shown, alas, that the civilian population and civilian objects are exposed to military operations and that in some cases thirst can prove to be more deadly than weapons. The only remedy lies in respect for the universally recognized rules, and in the following article attention will be drawn to the provisions of humanitarian law which apply to the protection of water in wartime (I).

The International Review of the Red Cross is pleased to publish this essay by Professor Vangah Francis Wodie on the perception of humanitarian law by African states, and their contribution to this law's development in view of the problems confronting them. The essay reflects the personal views of the author, who gives special attention to the legal and humanitarian problems facing many states as a result of the influx of refugees and the use of mercenaries in some conflicts.

The implementation of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts must be considered in the light of three basic problems.

First, in time of peace no one wants to think about the kind of situation where this body of law is put into practice. Nor is it easy to foster enthusiasm for legal rules which are beyond people's personal experience. But unless certain efforts are made and steps taken in peacetime, it cannot be expected that these rules will be implemented in time of crisis or war.