The purpose of this article is to examine the key elements of the legal framework in which naval mines are used both across the spectrum of conflict and during peacetime. The article will also consider the legal issues associated with the use of mines by States in international armed conflict, and address the distinct legal issues which arise in non-international armed conflict, where the emergence of an increasing presence of non-State armed groups has been a hallmark of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The obligations placed upon States in peacetime, and under the law of neutrality, when the use and presence of naval mines is a relevant factor will also be analyzed.

This article tries to imagine how the development of international humanitarian law (IHL) could continue despite current difficulties, increasing the ownership and contribution of States and armed groups in this process. After suggesting that some traditional assumptions about IHL may need to be abandoned, it tries to suggest a new way in which IHL rules could be developed, through States adopting together core obligations and principles and each State and armed group then specifying the details internally, but publicly. Finally, it stresses the importance and difficulties of involving non-State armed groups in this process.

As an emerging and largely unfamiliar form of cultural heritage, digital cultural property remains something of an enigma. Under the law of armed conflict, States are bound to protect cultural property from harm, yet the rules applicable to traditional cultural property do not transfer neatly to digital works. It is unclear, for example, how the twin obligations to safeguard and respect cultural property, as outlined in the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, should apply to digital creations – or even what digital material appropriately qualifies as cultural property. Can only new digital creations, otherwise known as “born-digital” material, be cultural property? What about high-quality copies of existing works, such as an extremely high-resolution image of the Mona Lisa? Does it matter whether a digital work has been reproduced in large quantities? Given the ubiquity of digital media and the growing popularity of digital art and other works, protecting digital cultural property in the event of armed conflict will require States to consider and resolve as-yet undecided questions concerning the nature of digital creations and the reasons why certain works should be preserved.

The often highly complex and fluid nature of displacement on the ground makes coverage of IDPs' needs a difficult task, and a flexible response is required to fit different contexts. The ICRC's humanitarian response is guided by the vulnerability and the needs of all people affected by armed conflict and violence – including, of course, IDPs, whose vulnerability is often (but not automatically) exacerbated by their particular situation. The protection and assistance of IDPs therefore naturally lies at the heart of the ICRC's mandate and activities. In identifying and responding to needs, the ICRC looks at the whole context in which internal displacement occurs, as well as all the people affected. The aim is to promote self-reliance among vulnerable communities so as to avoid displacement, or to strengthen their capacity to host IDPs. Nevertheless, where needed, the ICRC also fills gaps by providing emergency aid in IDP camps, coordinating with other international organizations in order to optimize response.

Comparing the two tsunamis of Lisbon in 1775 and of Asia in 2004, the article analyses the different paradigmatic interpretations of “Western” religious and secular causality. Based on the rational concept of risk making and risk taking, the need to accept failures and their consequences is discussed, as well as the responsibility to develop human strategies for disaster prevention and to foster living conditions which may avoid large-scale suffering.

The ICRC Study on Operational and Commercial and Other Non-operational Issues Involving the Use of the Emblems (‘the Emblem Study’) is an efficient and user-friendly tool to tackle issues regarding the use of the emblems of the red cross, red crescent, and red crystal. This article presents the Emblem Study's origin and objectives, and explains the structure and the methodology followed in its preparation. Recurrent questions regarding joint use of emblems and other signs are also examined, in order to demonstrate the Emblem Study's potential as an analytical and practical tool. Particular emphasis is placed on the need to avoid diluting the protective value of the emblems by maintaining a distinction between those entitled to use the emblems, their partners, and other players in the humanitarian field.

For almost two decades now, Geneva Call has been engaged in developing humanitarian dialogue with some 150 armed non-State actors (ANSAs), with the aim of increasing their knowledge and respect of humanitarian norms. Developing a protection dialogue with ANSAs is not an easy task, and it becomes more complex when groups split, mutate or join larger movements. Humanitarian organizations need to adapt their analysis to a more frequent timescale, keeping in touch constantly with a wide range of key stakeholders in order not to lose track of the current groups’ status and structure. In this note, Geneva Call's Director of Operations discusses some of the organization's experiences and lessons learned.

The article aims to examine, in light of the codification work of the International Law Commission and of the most recent practice, some issues concerning the allocation of responsibility between an organisation and its troop-contributing states for the conduct taken in the course of a multinational operation (with a specific focus on UN operations). After explaining the general rule of attribution of conduct based on the status of the multinational force as an organ or an agent of the organisation, this article will examine the validity of special rules of attribution of conduct based on the notions of ‘effective control’ or ‘ultimate control’ over the acts of the multinational force. Finally, I will discuss the possibility of dual responsibility of both the organisation and the troop-contributing state concerned.

Respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) comes in many forms, one of which is through the practice of domestic courts in addressing IHL-related cases. This article takes a closer look at the structural conditions necessary for the effective enforcement of IHL by domestic courts, elaborates on the spectrum of options that are available to national judges when faced with IHL-related cases, and describes the functional roles of courts in adopting a particular posture. It is demonstrated that even if the structural conditions are fulfilled, this will not necessarily result in the normative application of the law. It appears that national judges are in the process of defining their own roles as independent organs for overseeing the State's acts during armed conflicts. In that regard, the article outlines a few suggestions for future research on the choices courts make and the conditions necessary for them to effectively handle IHL-related cases.

The use of chemical weapons in the armed conflict in Syria has attracted universal and widespread condemnation and has led to unified responses by various international bodies. This article examines the international community's responses to chemical weapons use in Syria from the perspective of international law. It also analyzes the potential options for accountability that are available for chemical weapons-related crimes. The intention is ultimately to make the case that the special status the international community has ascribed to chemical weapons crimes could be harnessed to create an accountability mechanism, such as an ad hoc tribunal, that could help pave the complex road towards a negotiated peace.

Article 36 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 states that:

“In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party”.

The provision is not new law, but codifies the customary law duty of implementing a treaty or customary rule in good faith. Article 36 does, however, draw attention to the fact that new developments in weapons are quietly going on, and that care must be taken, before their deployment, that their use in some or all circumstances does not violate international humanitarian law. Although the duty to determine in advance the legality of the use of new weapons lies with the State developing them, other States have a legal interest in ensuring that this is done.

In its Judgment of 27 June 1986 in the case concerning “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua”, the International Court of Justice dealt at length with some of the most vexed questions in humanitarian law. Although the Court had previously touched upon certain problems in this legal field, for example in the Corfu Channel case and that of the Pakistani Prisoners, this was the first time it expressed itself in detail on more general issues, notably on the customary nature of the “general principles” of humanitarian law.

Parce qu'il aura été le premier républicain convaincu et s'avouant tel, d'aucuns ont accusé Francisco Suárez, le «prince des juristes modernes», d'être un grand antimonarchiste, voire le premier régicide.

Les études et analyses politiques contemporaines relatives à l'Islam portent souvent l'empreinte des jugements et valeurs éthiques propres au milieu culturel des chercheurs.

Lors de la XXVe Conférence internationale de la Croix-Rouge (Genève 23–31 octobre 1986), le CICR a présenté un rapport sur l'identification des moyens de transports sanitaires, y compris les suites données à la résolution VIII de la XXIVe Conférence internationale (Manille, 1981). Il a souligné que dans un conflit naval, la protection des transports sanitaires maritimes dépendait dans une large mesure des moyens techniques disponibles dans le domaine de l'identification.

En adoptant la résolution III, «Identification des moyens de transports sanitaires», la XXVe Conférence internationale a reconnu la nécessité d'efforts continus pour adapter au développement technique les moyens d'identification et de signalisation du personnel, des unités et des moyens de transports sanitaires.

Les juristes, conscients de la multiplicité des règies qui s'appliquent pendant la guerre, donnent une définition relativement élaborée du droit international humanitaire. Selon eux, l'expression «droit international humanitaire applicable dans les conflits armés s'entend des règies internationales, d'origine conventionnelle ou coutumière, quisont spécifiquement destinées a régler les problèmes humanitaires dècoulant directement des conflits armés, internationaux ou non, et restreignant, pour des raisons humanitaires, le droit des Parties en conflit d'utiliser les mèthodes et les moyens de guerre de leur choix ou protégeant les personnes et les biens affectés, ou pouvant être affectés, par le conflit».

Advances in mobile phone technology and social media have created a world where the volume of information generated and shared is outpacing the ability of humans to review and use that data. Machine learning (ML) models and “big data” analytical tools have the power to ease that burden by making sense of this information and providing insights that might not otherwise exist. In the context of international criminal and human rights law, ML is being used for a variety of purposes, including to uncover mass graves in Mexico, find evidence of homes and schools destroyed in Darfur, detect fake videos and doctored evidence, predict the outcomes of judicial hearings at the European Court of Human Rights, and gather evidence of war crimes in Syria. ML models are also increasingly being incorporated by States into weapon systems in order to better enable targeting systems to distinguish between civilians, allied soldiers and enemy combatants or even inform decision-making for military attacks.

The same technology, however, also comes with significant risks. ML models and big data analytics are highly susceptible to common human biases. As a result of these biases, ML models have the potential to reinforce and even accelerate existing racial, political or gender inequalities, and can also paint a misleading and distorted picture of the facts on the ground. This article discusses how common human biases can impact ML models and big data analytics, and examines what legal implications these biases can have under international criminal law and international humanitarian law.