The author commenced an earlier study of the 1980 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (Conventional Weapons Convention) by quoting the late Sir Hersch Lauterpacht's remark: “If international law is, in some ways, the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law”. He then carried Lauterpacht's statement one stage further to suggest that the vanishing point of the law of war was most likely to be found in the body of law restricting the use of weapons. Shortly after writing these words, the author discovered that a colleague had also used the remarks of Sir Hersch and asserted that the vanishing point of the law of war was the law of air warfare. More recently, the author read a paper by a younger colleague in which Sir Hersch was quoted once again, but this time it was asserted that the vanishing point of the law of war was to be found in the body of law regulating nuclear weapons. The two lessons one might derive from this brief tale are that serious students of the law of war rarely have grandiose expectations for their discipline and that a good quotation is always reusable.

This article describes some of the challenges raised by multinational operations for the application of international humanitarian law. Such challenges are the result of different levels of ratification of treaties, divergent interpretations of shared obligations, and the fact that there is no central authority that determines who is a party to an armed conflict. The article discusses methods that have been developed to ensure ‘legal interoperability’. Some of these methods attempt to avoid situations where such interoperability is required. Where this is not possible, a ‘maximalist’ or a ‘minimalist’ approach can be taken, and in practice these are usually combined.

Artificial intelligence (AI)-supported systems have transformative applications in the humanitarian sector but they also pose unique risks for human rights, even when used with the best intentions. Drawing from research and expert consultations conducted across the globe in recent years, this paper identifies key points of consensus on how humanitarian practitioners can ensure that AI augments – rather than undermines – human interests while being rights-respecting. Specifically, these consultations emphasized the necessity of an anchoring framework based on international human rights law as an essential baseline for ensuring that human interests are embedded in AI systems. Ethics, in addition, can play a complementary role in filling gaps and elevating standards above the minimum requirements of international human rights law. This paper summarizes the advantages of this framework, while also identifying specific tools and best practices that either already exist and can be adapted to the AI context, or that need to be created, in order to operationalize this human rights framework. As the COVID crisis has laid bare, AI will increasingly shape the global response to the world's toughest problems, especially in the development and humanitarian sector. To ensure that AI tools enable human progress and contribute to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, humanitarian actors need to be proactive and inclusive in developing tools, policies and accountability mechanisms that protect human rights.

Numerous truth commissions of different types are being created around the world. The purpose of this schematic overview is to study the variety and to sketch out the differences and similarities between the different truth commissions established since the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa launched in 1995.

By introducing a new ‘debate’ section, the Review hopes to contribute to the reflection on current ethical, legal, or practical controversies around humanitarian issues. This section will expose readers to the key arguments concerning a particular contemporary question of humanitarian law or humanitarian action.

For this first debate, the Review asked two members of its Editorial Board, Professor Marco Sassòli and Professor Yuval Shany, to debate on the topic of equality of states and armed groups under international humanitarian law. Professor René Provost comments on this debate, adding a third dimension to the discussion.

The crucial question is whether it is realistic to apply the current legal regime to non-state armed groups. How can armed groups, with sometimes very limited means and low levels of organization, meet the same obligations as states? What are the incentives for armed groups to respect rules that their opponents have enacted? Why should they respect any rules when the very fact of taking arms against the state already makes them ‘outlaws’?

All participants in this discussion share an aspiration to ensure better legal protection for all those affected by armed conflicts. Professors Sassòli and Shany have agreed to present two ‘radically’ opposed stances, Professor Sassòli maintaining that equality should be reconsidered and replaced by a sliding scale of obligations, and Professor Shany rebutting this assertion. Professor Provost then reflects on the stances put forward by the two debaters and invites us to revisit the very notion of equality of belligerents.

The debaters have simplified their complex legal reasoning for the sake of clarity and brevity. Readers of the Review should bear in mind that the debaters actual legal positions are more nuanced than they may appear in this debate.

“Classical” or “Dunantist” humanitarianism has traditionally been constructed around the core principles of neutrality (not taking sides) and impartiality (provision of assistance with no regard to ethnicity, religion, race or any other consideration, and proportional to need), plus the operational imperative (rather than a formal principle) to seek the consent of the belligerent parties. These principles, whilst never unchallenged, have dominated the contemporary discourse of humanitarianism and have been synonymous with or at least reflections of a presumed essential, enduring and universal set of humanitarian values. This paper offers a more dynamic and changing vision of the content of humanitarian action. It maps the origins and content of the “new humanitarian” critique of the humanitarian sector and principles and argues that this has both misrepresented the ethical content of neutrality and obscured what amount to significant operational adaptations that leave traditional humanitarianism well prepared for the contemporary operating environment.

In both disasters and armed conflicts, domestic regulatory control over the entry and operation of international humanitarian relief operations can significantly affect their ability to address the critical needs of affected persons. The types of regulatory problems that arise, such as customs barriers, visa issues and taxation of aid, are often similar, but both the underlying dynamics and the applicable international law can be quite different. This article analyses these similarities and differences and suggests distinct steps that might be taken to move forward in the two contexts.

Gangs have long been considered a source of violence and insecurity, but they are increasingly identified as a cause of instability and a threat to the state. Yet gangs operate mainly in non-conflict settings, raising questions about whether applying a conflict lens to understand gangs is appropriate. Marked differences appear between armed groups and gangs when considering concepts of ungoverned spaces, the state, violence, and sustainability. Few gangs reach the threshold of posing a direct challenge to the state; this makes comparisons with other armed groups difficult and suggests the need for a more specific analytical lens.

Applying the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence in a relevant manner in concrete operational settings is a constant challenge for humanitarian organizations. Bound by this set of norms, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has incrementally developed over the years a rational framework that allows its leadership and staff on the ground to act according to these principles while developing adapted solutions and pragmatic approaches. This article begins by describing the history and development of the humanitarian principles; it then explains how the strategic choices of the ICRC are informed by these principles, and what the consequences are for the organization's capacity to act in favour of victims of armed conflicts.

This article addresses the relationships between the principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity and the difficulties in their implementation. Even if the two principles are well known, there are still a number of obstacles – legal and non-legal – to proper and better implementation. Moreover, universality and complementarity are quite often to be applied in a difficult political environment, keeping in mind that these principles have to deal with international and national constraints. The number of obstacles is such that the two principles face many challenges. This article advocates that the principle of complementarity represents one aspect of the principle of universality and should rely on its general acceptance to further its efficiency and implementation. In conclusion, the article explores some possible ideas to be developed to reach this goal.

Of all the seven Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, neutrality and impartiality are perhaps the least well understood. They are often confused with each other and give rise to controversy. How can a National Society that is an auxiliary of the public authorities possibly be called neutral? Isn't neutrality sometimes synonymous with passivity or indifference? Can the ICRC regard itself as neutral when it points publicly to violations of international humanitarian law? Does impartiality mean sharing relief equally between the victims on both sides of a conflict? Is it possible to give humanitarian assistance to only one of the parties without violating the principles of neutrality and impartiality? These are questions that have occurred to every man and woman working in the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

In 2010, Pakistan was struck by devastating floods, the latest in a series of disasters to strike the country in recent years. As it had during the 2005 Kashmir earthquake, the Pakistan military played a significant operational and co-ordination role in the humanitarian response that followed. Its role raised important questions about civil–military relations between humanitarian actors and national (as opposed to international) militaries. This article looks at the interaction between the humanitarian community and the Pakistan military in responding to the 2010 floods in order to identify key successes and challenges. It also highlights a number of issues that emerged in the context of Pakistan but that may also be relevant to civil–military relations – particularly between the humanitarian community and the national military of an affected state – in other natural disaster and complex emergency settings.

Today there can no longer be any doubt: international humanitarian law and international human rights law are near relations. This oft-repeated observation must now be accepted by all. Many believe that the close relationship between these two areas existed and was perceived “from the outset”. That is not at all the case. Formerly assigned to separate legal categories, it was only under the persistent scrutiny of modern analysts that they revealed the common attributes which would seem to promise many fruitful exchanges in the future. Let us try to clarify the situation.

Based on her experience as a member of the South African and the Sierra Leonean truth and reconciliation commissions, the author formulates guiding principles and looks at the circumstances in which a truth and reconciliation commission constitutes an appropriate instrument to deal with transitional justice issues. The author also identifies possible contributions that truth and reconciliation commissions can make during a period of transition.

Water scarcity, accelerated by climate change, affects water availability and may threaten peace and security. This role of water, as a contributing factor for triggering wars, sheds light on the significance of the protection of water during armed conflict. Keeping water out of war not only contributes to preserving an indispensable natural resource for life but also serves as a tool for the hostile parties to start negotiations, building trust and peace.

On 15 June 1998, a diplomatic conference in Rome will open a five-week session to remedy one of the long-standing gaps in the implementation system for international humanitarian law by adopting a treaty to establish a permanent international criminal court. Although the current effort within the United Nations to set up a permanent court began half a century ago with a proposal in 1947 by Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, the French judge on the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, it is not widely known that the first serious such proposal appears to have been made more than a century and a quarter ago by Gustave Moynier, one of the founders, and longtime President, of the International Committee of the Red Cross. He wrestled with many of the same problems which will face the drafters of the statute at the 1998 diplomatic conference and the strengths and weaknesses of his proposal still have relevance today. This short essay describes that proposal and its origins, reviews the reaction to it of his contemporaries and its impact on subsequent history and concludes with an assessment of the merits of Moynier's plan.

Since the beginning of the Israeli occupation more than 200,000 cases have been brought before military courts, where Palestinian civilians have been prosecuted and judged by the military authorities. However, despite the large number of judicial decisions, this jurisprudence has not received the attention it merits. Academic researchers and NGOs have usually examined the procedural rights of the accused and have only rarely dealt with other legal matters. This article aims to examine the preliminary issue of territorial jurisdiction. Through the analysis a process of judicial domination is revealed. It is a domination that facilitates extensive control of the military authorities over the Palestinian civilian population through their judicial powers.