Le mérite essentiel des fondateurs de la Croix-Rouge est d'avoir introduit dans les relations entre tous les Etats, en cas de guerre, la reconnaissance d'un principe de morale, et de l'avoir implanté dans le droit international comme dans la pratique par la conclusion d'une convention diplomatique universellement respectée et généralement observée.

Il est done permis d'affirmer que l'existence même de la Croix-Rouge, malgré son rayon d'action limité, implique la possibilité et la légimité d'une morale internationale, c'est à dire d'une morale des Etats, dont elle a été l'un des apôtres les plus influents et dont elle reste le constant défenseur.

Les premières tentatives d'employer des avions dans un but sanitaire remontent en Pologne à l'année 1924, époque à laquelle le Dr Pilecki, médecin-colonel à Poznañ, s'est servi d'un aéroplane militaire du type « Albatros »C.X., qu'on avait transformé en avion sanitaire. L'avion en question, qui pouvait transporter deux personnes, notamment un pilote et un malade étendu horizontalement, provenait du matériel de démobilisation. II a été essayé en présence des officiers de la mission turque.

L'idée du respect de la personne humaine est à l'origine du droit humanitaire.

C'est en vertu du principe qu'un adversaire désarmé demeure respectable en tant qu'homme que les Conventions de Genève et de La Haye ont protégé les blessés et les malades des armées en campagne, puis les prisonniers de guerre.

Il restait à protéger les civils que le Règlement de La Haye sur les lois et coutumes de la guerre, texte conçu avant les grands développements de la guerre moderne, laissait à peu près sans défense devant les dangers de la «guerre totale».

Les dernières années de ce siècle seront une véritable gageure pour les Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge. La vulnérabilité augmente pour une grande partie de la population mondiale à mesure que les changements politiques et économiques s'accélèrent. Les ressources susceptibles de satisfaire aux besoins des communautés vulnérables sont aussi soumises à davantage de restrictions.

Since the adoption of the first United Nations Security Council (UNSC) counterterrorism resolution after the 9/11 attacks, the UNSC has increasingly required the domestic criminalization of “terrorism” acts and ancillary activities. Without the inclusion of an explicit international humanitarian law (IHL) or humanitarian exception, the UNSC has – so far – failed to harmonize the counterterrorism legal framework with IHL, leaving it up to States to define the interaction between the two. In their national legislation and courts, States’ interpretations have varied but counterterrorism legislations have been used to adjudicate conducts in armed conflicts, regardless of their legality under IHL. As the domestication of UNSC offences is ongoing, good practices are highlighted in this paper and recommendations are offered to ensure the development of international customary law in accordance with IHL.

Despite widespread State acceptance of the international law governing military use of force across the spectrum of operations, the humanitarian reality in today's armed conflicts and other situations of violence worldwide is troubling. The structure and incentives of armed forces dictate the need to more systematically integrate that law into operational practice. However, treaty and customary international law is not easily translated into coherent operational guidance and rules of engagement (RoE), a problem that is exacerbated by differences of language and perspective between the armed forces and neutral humanitarian actors with a stake in the law's implementation. The author examines the operative language of RoE with a view to facilitating the work of accurately integrating relevant law of armed conflict and human rights law norms. The analysis highlights three crucial debates surrounding the use of military force and their practical consequences for operations: the dividing line between the conduct of hostilities and law enforcement frameworks, the definition of membership in an organized armed group for the purpose of lethal targeting, and the debate surrounding civilian direct participation in hostilities and the consequent loss of protection against direct attack.

Among the increasingly frequent acts of non-compliance with, and grievous violations of, international humanitarian law around the world, especially in non-international armed conflicts, attacks on objects and persons enjoying special protection, and their abuse, as well as the misuse of the distinctive emblems of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, come as no surprise. Although a repressive approach to the problem – through the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators – cannot completely prevent such occurrences, an effective and appropriate judicial stigmatisation can significantly contribute to making them as rare as possible. In this regard, the court proceedings held before the War Crimes Chamber in Belgrade and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague in connection with the events in and around the Vukovar Hospital and Ovčara farm have provided an appropriate judicial response. This is notwithstanding the fact that, at least for now, not all perpetrators have been prosecuted for their acts (or failure to act) at the time of the commission of these grave crimes.

The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies (Montreux Document) was adopted in 2008 by seventeen States to reaffirm and, as far as was necessary, clarify the existing obligations of States and other actors under international law, in particular under international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). It also aimed at identifying good practices and regulatory options to assist States in promoting respect for IHL and IHRL by private military and security companies (PMSCs). Today, fifty-one States and three international organizations have endorsed the Montreux Document. It contains twenty-seven “Statements” – sections recalling the main international legal obligations of States in regard to the operations of PMSCs during armed conflicts. Each statement is the reaffirmation of a general rule of IHL, IHRL or State responsibility formulated in a way that clarifies its applicability to PMSC operations. This article aims to detail the basis of each legal obligation mentioned in the first part of the Montreux Document (Part I). The article follows the structure of Part I, in order to better facilitate its comprehension. The second part of the Montreux Document, relating to good practices, is not covered in this article.