I develop new results for long-horizon predictive regressions with overlapping observations. I show that rather than using autocorrelation robust standard errors, the standard t-statistic can simply be divided by the square root of the forecasting horizon to correct for the effects of the overlap in the data. Further, when the regressors are persistent and endogenous, the long-run ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator suffers from the same problems as the short-run OLS estimator, and it is shown how similar corrections and test procedures as those proposed for the short-run case can also be implemented in the long run. An empirical application to stock return predictability shows that, contrary to many popular beliefs, evidence of predictability does not typically become stronger at longer forecasting horizons.

A spurious positive relation between exponential generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (EGARCH) estimates of expected month t idiosyncratic volatility and month t stock returns arises when the month t return is included in estimation of model parameters. We illustrate via simulations that this look-ahead bias is problematic for empirically observed degrees of stock return skewness and typical monthly return time series lengths. Moreover, the empirical idiosyncratic risk-return relation becomes negligible when expected month t idiosyncratic volatility is estimated using returns only up to month t − 1.

Inside debt compensation held by top officers of U.S. banks is negatively related to risk and risk taking. The evidence reveals a robust and strongly negative relation between end-of-2006 inside debt and 2007–2009 bank-specific risk exposures in terms of lost stock market value, volatility, tail risk, and the probability of financial distress. Banks with managers having large inside debt holdings are also characterized by better-quality assets, more conservative balance sheet management, and a stronger tendency toward traditional banking activities. The results suggest that debt-based compensation limits bank risk and risk taking by encouraging more conservative decision making.

The decline of average stock return volatility in the 2001–2006 period provides an opportunity to test various theories on why the average return volatility increased in the pre-2000 period. This paper compares fundamentals-based theories with trading volume-based theories. While both fundamentals-based and trading volume-based theories explain the upward trend in the average volatility in U.S. stocks from 1976 to 2000 and international stocks from 1990 to 2000, only the fundamentals-based theories explain the volatility pattern for 2001–2006. Much of the variation in the stock return volatilities can be explained by the variation in the earnings volatilities and proxies for growth options, but not by trading-related variables. Evidence also shows that the explanatory power of the fundamentals variables is time varying.

We examine the relation between the agglomeration of firms around big cities and chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. We find a positive relation among the metropolitan size of a firm’s headquarters, the total and equity portion of its CEO’s pay, and the quality of CEO educational attainment. We also find that CEOs gradually increase their human capital in major metropolitan areas and are rewarded for this upon relocation to smaller cities. Taken together, the results suggest that urban agglomeration reflects local network spillovers and faster learning of skilled individuals, for which firms are willing to pay a premium and which are therefore important factors in CEO compensation.

The role of dividends in firm valuation continues to be a theoretical puzzle as well as an empirical obsession with economists. The pioneering work by Modigliani and Miller (MM) ([32], [29]) is the archetype of the theoretical dilemma. Whereas the authors proved convincingly the irrelevance of dividend policy to firm value within a perfect capital market, they tempered their irrelevance proposition with what is usually referred to as the “information content of dividends” (ICD) hypothesis. In a more scientific sense, this hypothesis should be labeled as a conjecture, since it is essentially an ad hoc observation that dividends may convey information to the capital market concerning a firm's future earnings potential. Even though the ICD hypothesis was not derived from a well-specified economic model, it has, nevertheless, been subjected to a plethora of empirical studies. In general, these studies have focused upon the precise influence of dividend changes upon a firm's common stock price. Overall, the results can be described as being supportive of the notion that stock price movements are positively correlated with cash dividend changes. This correlation, of course, is consistent with the ICD hypothesis.

This paper develops a nonparametric model of interest rate term structure dynamics based on a spot rate process that permits only positive interest rates and a market price of interest rate risk that precludes arbitrage opportunities. Both the spot rate process and the market price of interest rate risk are nonparametrically specified so that the model allows for maximal flexibility in fitting into the data. Marginal density of interest rates and historical term structure data are exploited to provide robust estimation of the nonparametric term structure model. The model is implemented using U.S. data, and the estimation results are compared to those in the available literature. Empirical results not only provide strong evidence that most traditional spot rate models and market prices of interest rate risk are misspecified, but also confirm that the nonparametric model generates significantly different term structures and prices of common derivatives.

This study examines whether earnings changes convey information in bond markets and finds a significant positive (negative) reaction to unexpected earnings increases (decreases). The results are consistent whether earnings announcements precede or follow dividend announcements. Thus, earnings surprises convey information to bond markets and changes in firm value are split among bondholders and stockholders. This is in contrast to evidence from studies examining unexpected dividend announcements where bond price reaction is asymmetric. Cross-sectional analysis reveals that bond excess returns are positively related to earnings surprises.

We examine stock price behavior in response to initial coverage, buy recommendations that are pre-released to important clients before the stock market opens, and find a strong positive valuation effect at the open. On average, it takes five minutes of trading for NYSE/AMEX stocks and 15 minutes for NASDAQ stocks to reflect the private information contained in these analyst recommendations, so when informational asymmetry is high, the centralized call market is more efficient than a competitive, but fragmented dealer market. Public news release leaves share prices unaltered. Overall, competition among informed traders causes private information to be rapidly incorporated into stock prices.

This article analyzes how creditors’ simultaneous debt and equity holdings affect firm investment policies. We find that firms with dual ownership are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in loan contracts, and the relation varies in predicted ways with the monitoring needs of borrowers and the monitoring capacity of dual owners. A less frequent use of capital expenditure restrictions, however, does not result in borrowers’ risk-shifting. Dual ownership firms are also more likely to be granted an unconditional waiver and do not significantly reduce debt issuance or investment expenditures after a financial covenant violation. Our results highlight how dual ownership can help mitigate shareholder–creditor conflicts.

In an incomplete contracting environment, bankruptcy is considered to be a renegotiation of the firm's financial contracts. An optimal bankruptcy law is derived as optimal restrictions on the environment within which the claimants to a distressed firm bargain. The law is used as a commitment device to ensure actions that are ex ante optimal but not subgame perfect. We show that the bankruptcy court can use two types of mechanisms to implement the optimal bankruptcy outcome: direct restrictions on the bargaining game between the claimants, and the use of a “restricted auction.” In both cases, the restrictions prevent the strategic use of bankruptcy by firms not in financial distress, provide for truthful revelation of information so that distress results in an ex post efficient allocation of resources, and establish a bias toward the manager in reorganizations that provides correct ex ante decision making incentives.

I study the effects of overvalued equity on acquisition activity and shareholder wealth, using managers’ insider trades to measure overvaluation. I find that overvalued equity drives managers to make stock acquisitions, and such acquisitions destroy value for acquirer shareholders. Overvalued stock acquirers earn negative and lower returns in the short run and substantially underperform similarly overvalued nonacquirer firms in the long run. My results do not support the idea that managers can benefit shareholders by converting overvalued equity into real assets through stock acquisitions.

The purpose of this paper has been to empirically test Stone's Two-Index Model. The results are mixed, but generally favor the model. Adding a bond index term for the bank sample only marginally improves the model's explanatory power although the index is more important than the equity index. The lack of importance of the bond index for banks is not surprising upon further consideration, however. Banks and their earnings should be more sensitive to short-term rather than long-term rates, and the index reflects primarily long-term rates. To the extent that short- and long-term rates moved in different directions during the sample period, negative correlation is introduced between bank's returns and the index.

The bond index improves in performance for the 30 Dow Jones firms and contributes to the explanatory power of the model in 80 percent of the cases. There is some instability in signs and, contrary to Stone's speculations, omission of the bond index does not bias the equity beta estimates.

Finally, we caution the reader against generalizing about the long-run value of the two-index model. The short time period used here does not allow us to say anything about the relationship between interest rate movements and the stability of beta. Moreover, during the 1969–1972 period the returns on the bond and equity indexes did not behave as Capital Market Theory would predict. The average monthly return on the bond portfolio was .5 percent and the average return on the equity portfolio was .2 percent. Our findings must, therefore, be interpreted with care, but overall the introduction of interest rate effects into the single-index model looks promising.

We assess the impact of institutions on Chinese firms’ corporate investment in an investment Euler equation framework. We allow the variables measuring institutions to affect the rate at which firm managers discount future investment payoffs. Applying generalized method of moments estimators to large samples of Chinese firms, we estimate the stochastic discount rates derived from actual investment and examine how they vary across institutional variables. We document robust evidence that ownership is the primary institutional factor affecting corporate investment in China. The derived discount rate for a nonstate firm is approximately 10 percentage points higher than that of an otherwise equal state firm. State firms tend to use higher discount rates to invest after they are partially privatized. We also find that firms with higher levels of corporate governance use higher discount rates to make investment.

This paper analyzes the impact of changes in monetary policy regimes on the relation between stock returns and changes in expected inflation. Post-war evidence from four countries reveals a direct link between these relations and the central banks' operating targets (i.e., money supply or interest rates). Specifically, the post-war negative relations between stock returns and changes in expected inflation are significantly stronger during interest rate regimes.

We use a unique database on ownership stakes of equity mutual fund directors to analyze whether the directors’ incentive structure is related to fund performance. Ownership of both independent and nonindependent directors plays an economically and statistically significant role. Funds in which directors have low ownership, or “skin in the game,” significantly underperform. We posit two economic mechanisms to explain this relation. First, lack of ownership could indicate a director’s lack of alignment with fund shareholder interests. Second, directors may have superior private information on future performance. We find evidence in support of the first and against the second mechanism.

This study examines the hypothesis that in the presence of market frictions, relative put and call prices contain information concerning future returns of the underlying asset. A measure of relative prices is derived from the put-call parity relationship for index options and applied to a three-year sample of OEX option transactions. The results show that the measure of relative index option prices leads the stock market by at least 15 minutes.

We find that corporate innovation is positively related to board diversity as measured by a multidimensional index. The benefit of board diversity is more pronounced for firms with more complex operations, more experienced boards, and stronger external governance, suggesting that diverse boards have superior advising capacity. We find evidence to suggest that firms with diverse boards engage in more exploratory innovations and develop new technology in unfamiliar areas. As a result, they create a larger number of both most-cited and uncited patents. Finally, of the six different aspects of board diversity, professional diversity matters the most for corporate innovation.

In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller [11], [12] demonstrate that if capital markets are perfect and investment policy is held constant, the market value of the firm is independent of its financial decisions. Furthermore, if capital markets are perfect, stockholders have incentive to choose the investment policy which maximizes the market value of the firm (see [6]). Motivated by this assumption, the firm has been viewed as a “black box;” namely, as one homogeneous unit whose clear objective is to maximize its market value. However, in a growing body of recent literature (see [1], [2], [7], [9], [13], and [14]), researchers recognize that the firm in an “imperfect” capital market is a collection of groups whose interests can, and do, conflict. Jensen and Meckling [9] study the roles of three important groups—the owner-manager, the stockholders, and the bondholders—focusing on the potential costs resulting from divergence of interests among them. They provide a theory of optimal capital structure in terms of reducing the costs of these conflicts.

We investigate the performance of call markets at the open and close using a unique natural experiment provided by the London Stock Exchange where traders can choose between a call and an off-exchange dealership system. Although the call market dominates dealers in terms of price discovery, it suffers from a high failure rate to open and close trading especially when trading conditions are difficult. The call's trading costs increase with asymmetric information, slow trading, order flow imbalances, and uncertainty. Traders' resort to use of call auctions is negatively correlated with firm size, implying that the call may not be the optimal method for opening and closing trading of medium and small sized stocks.