In a recent article in this Journal Joy and Tollefson [10] (hereafter J&T) critically analyzed discriminant analysis and its application to bankruptcy analysis. The authors make several interesting points and provide a useful discussion of the application of this statistical technique in finance. There are, however, three aspects of their presentation which need further elaboration. These relate to their discussions of (1) the difference between the stability of the discriminant model and its predictive ability, (2) the alternative methods of making inferences about the relative discriminatory power of variables, and (3) the reference statistics to use in assessing classification efficiency. In commenting on these points we will make use of the data from the Altman [1] study as did J&T.

Portfolio analysis has generally been restricted to problems in, at most, two dimensions, expected return and risk, the latter usually measured by standard deviation. In two papers Jean [2, 4] has attempted to extend the analysis to three and many dimensions by deriving risk premiums as functions of higher order moments. This paper corrects several errors in his work and derives a normative, individual pricing model for risky securities analogous to the capital market line within the framework of a perfect market.

Sweden has a high degree of separation of ownership from control through pyramids, dual-class shares, and cross-holdings. This increases the potential for private benefits of control. However, Sweden's extralegal institutions—tax compliance and newspaper circulation—are consistent with greater shareholder protection. Using data on Swedish mergers we find limited evidence of shareholder expropriation. Apparently, Sweden's extralegal institutions offset the drawback of weak corporate governance.

This paper compares the newer uniform-price U.S. Treasury auctions to the traditional discriminatory mechanism and examines the extent to which the auction mechanisms are responsible for underpricing. Empirically, I find that even for the newer uniform-price auctions, the average price received by the Treasury is less than the price of the same securities in the concurrent secondary market although this underpricing is reduced by half relative to the older mechanism. From the summary statistics released by the Treasury, I calibrate common value auction models for the two mechanisms and predict the level of underpricing in each auction. I find that the observed magnitude of underpricing in the auctions is consistent with the model's predictions.

In this paper, we formally show that the cross-sectional variance of stock returns is a consistent and asymptotically efficient estimator for aggregate idiosyncratic volatility. This measure has two key advantages: It is model free and observable at any frequency. Previous approaches have used monthly model-based measures constructed from time series of daily returns. The newly proposed cross-sectional volatility measure is a strong predictor for future returns on the aggregate stock market at the daily frequency. Using the cross section of size and book-to-market portfolios, we show that the portfolios’ exposures to the aggregate idiosyncratic volatility risk predict the cross section of expected returns.

Using a comprehensive sample of U.S. mutual funds from 1992 to 2004, we find strong evidence that investment bank-affiliated funds underperform unaffiliated funds. Consistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis, we find that affiliated funds hold disproportionately large amounts of stocks of their initial public offering and seasoned equity offering clients. Moreover, worse-performing clients are more likely to be held by affiliated funds. Our results are robust to alternative risk adjustments, portfolio weighting schemes, and regression methodologies. Overall, our findings are consistent with the idea that investment banks use affiliated funds to support underwriting business at the expense of fund shareholders.

We compare reactions in the prices and trading patterns of common stocks and closed-end funds (CEFs), securities with substantially different investor clienteles, to the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. When the market reopened 6 days later, retail investors sold and there were sharp price declines, even in assets with net institutional buying. In the subsequent 2 weeks, price reversals were substantially security specific and thus not simply due to improved systematic sentiment. Consistent with microstructure theory, comparisons between CEFs and common stocks show the speed of these reversals depended significantly on the relative quality and availability of information about fundamental values.

We examine the impact of trading on markets partially exempt from National Market System requirements (“dark venues”) on equity-market quality. We find evidence consistent with the notion that dark venues rely on their special features to segregate order flow based on asymmetric information risk, which results in their transactions being less informed and contributing less to price discovery on the consolidated market. Except for the execution of large transactions and trading in small stocks, the effects of dark-venue order segmentation are damaging to overall market quality. Our results have important implications for the regulation of international equity markets.

We examine the role of macroeconomic uncertainty in the cross section of corporate bonds and find a significant uncertainty premium for both investment-grade (IG) (0.40% per month) and non-investment-grade (NIG) (0.81% per month) bonds. The economic-uncertainty premium declines as we progressively remove downgraded bonds, indicating that the premium represents an increase in required returns for bonds with higher credit and macroeconomic risk. The economic-uncertainty premia vary across equities and bonds in a manner consistent with the heterogeneous risk-aversion levels of dominant players in equities (retail investors) versus bonds (institutional investors).

This study examines the joint influence of board composition, leadership structure, and board ownership structure on the market's reaction to corporate antitakeover amendment proposals. The stock price reaction to antitakeover amendments is more negative when the board is dominated by inside and affiliated outside board members. Further, for firms in which the CEO also chairs the board, the reaction becomes increasingly negative as inside and affiliated outside board members increase their ownership stake in the firm and proportional representation on the board. In contrast, board composition and ownership structure have little power to explain the stock price reaction when the CEO does not chair the board. We conclude that monitoring by outside independent board members is important particularly when the CEO is also the board chair.

We investigate the impact of Focus Listing by the Council of Institutional Investors on targeting poorly performing firms. Post-listing stock returns for the targeted firms differ insignificantly from those of a suitable benchmark group. Institutional investors increase their holdings of targeted firms, but not by more than those of the benchmark firms. Similarly, though analysts revise earnings forecasts up for Focus Listed firms, they do so well after the listing event and positive revisions are no greater than the benchmark group. Moreover, there appears to be little difference between Focus List and benchmark firms in the incidence of post-listing events such as mergers and stock repurchases. Overall, we find very little evidence of the efficacy of shareholder activism.

Analysis of the growth record of many economies indicates that foreign capital is an important factor in the process of economic development. For many developing countries, a continuing flow of foreign funds is necessary if desired growth targets are to be achieved. These funds are most likely to be in the form of loans rather than grants. This link between economicdevelopment and debt accumulation manifested itself in the enormous growth of less developed countries’ (LDCs) external indebtedness in recent years, especially after the oil crisis of 1973.

Using the FPE/multivariate Granger-causality modeling technique, this paper tests whether changes in Canadian stock returns are caused by a number of economic variables, including base money and fiscal deficits. The empirical results from monthly data show that lagged changes in fiscal deficits, in particular, Granger-cause stock returns. If expected returns to equity are not time-varying, such a finding appears inconsistent with market efficiency.

This paper provides a comprehensive study of weekly seasonal effects in GNMA, T-bond, T-note, and T-bill futures returns. Two distinct patterns are found in returns on GNMA, T-bond, and T-note contracts, while no seasonals are noted for T-bill futures. A negative Monday seasonal—similar to the well-known Monday effect in stock returns—is found for GNMA and T-bond contracts. A positive Tuesday seasonal is found on GNMA, T-bond, and T-note contracts. Our evidence indicates that the significance of weekly seasonals depends in an important way on the time period studied. The negative Monday phenomenon occurs only in the data before 1982, while the positive Tuesday effect is present only after 1984. In addition, we find that both seasonal phenomena occur only during months prior to a delivery month. This effect appears to be related to the calendar month. More specifically, the Monday effect is apparently concentrated during February, while the Tuesday effect is concentrated during May.

This paper argues that an aggregate preferred habitat for investors exists on (or about) the last day of the calendar month, due to standardizations in the nation's payments system resulting in a concentrated flow of funds on this date. Thus, equilibrium yield discounts are predicted for securities maturing on such dates. Empirical tests on monthly and daily Treasury bill data support the principal hypothesis, as well as several ancillary hypotheses. The results have implications for Treasury debt management, for the short-term cash and debt management practices of businesses and banks, and for the empirical estimation of daily, weekly, or monthly return premiums on risky securities.

We survey theoretical and empirical research on antitakeover provisions, focusing on the relation between antitakeover provisions and shareholder value. We divide the empirical studies based upon the evidence that they provide: short-term event studies, studies on performance and policy changes around adopting antitakeover provisions or passing state antitakeover laws, studies on the impact of antitakeover provisions on takeovers, studies on the relation between antitakeover provisions and firm characteristics, and long-term studies on the relation between antitakeover provisions and firm performance or policies. We also discuss the place of antitakeover provisions in the current debate about “good governance” practices.

In this paper, we examine how stock option usage affects total corporate payout. Using fixed-effects panel data estimators on various samples of ExecuComp firms from 1993 to 2005, we find the higher the executive stock options, the lower the total payout, ceteris paribus. We also find some evidence that firms increase payouts through repurchases in order to offset earnings per share dilution that occurs due to usage of executive and non-executive stock options. However, incentives from not having dividend protection for options appear to dominate those from antidilution, resulting in lower total payout for firms with higher options usage.

This paper presents evidence that the mean-adjusted returns and raw-market returns models are misspecified when the event under investigation occurs during either bull or bear markets. To demonstrate this phenomenon, simulation techniques as well as an actual event are employed to examine the reliability of four different return-generating models. When the event occurs during a bull (bear) market, both the mean-adjusted and raw-market returns models produce upwardly (downwardly) biased positive (negative) abnormal returns. This results in statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns over selected preevent and postevent intervals. In contrast, both the market-adjusted and single-index models show far less evidence of any unusual price activity over these same intervals.

Using a 57-year global foreign listing sample, we identify cross-listing waves at the host market, home market, and industry levels. Waves in host markets are often due to cross-listing waves in proximate home markets. Consistent with gravity-model implications and economic-synergy arguments of cross-listing decisions, cross-listing waves in a given host country coincide with the outperformance of the host and proximate home countries’ economies and financial markets. The valuation gains from listings associated with cross-listing waves are transitory, supporting the market-timing component in these decisions. Our results provide novel evidence of nonmonotonic market development across countries and over time.

This paper proposes a way to allow Bayesian priors to reflect the objectives of an economic problem. That is, we impose priors on the solution to the problem rather than on the primitive parameters whose implied priors can be backed out from the Euler equation. Using monthly returns on the Fama-French 25 size and book-to-market portfolios and their 3 factors from January 1965 to December 2004, we find that investment performances under the objective-based priors can be significantly different from those under alternative priors, with differences in terms of annual certainty-equivalent returns greater than 10% in many cases. In terms of an out-of-sample loss function measure, portfolio strategies based on the objective-based priors can substantially outperform both strategies under alternative priors and some of the best strategies developed in the classical framework.