We examine the causal effect of stakeholder orientation on firms’ cost of debt. Our test exploits the staggered state-level adoption of constituency statutes, which allows directors to consider stakeholders’ interests when making business decisions. We find a significant drop in loan spreads for firms incorporated in states that adopted such statutes relative to firms incorporated elsewhere. We further show that constituency statutes reduce the cost of debt through the channels of mitigating conflicts of interest between residual and fixed claimants and between holders of liquid claims and holders of illiquid claims, limiting legal liability and lowering takeover threats.

Analysts and investment advisors have long searched for investment tools that would either furnish predictive probabilities for future security price movements, or would aid in minimizing losses. One such tool, often recommended by market practitioners, is the Moving Average. This article describes a series of experiments that were performed upon actual market data, using Moving Averages of different lengths and weights, and presents results of the experiments. Conclusions derived from these experiments are suggested.

We study the informativeness of trades via discount and full-service retail brokers. We find that trades via full-service retail brokers are statistically and economically more informative than are trades via discount retail brokers. This finding holds in every year over the 12-year sample period and in various subsamples. We also find that past returns, volatility, and news announcements positively relate to the net volume of discount retail brokers, but these variables are unrelated to the net volume of full-service retail brokers. Our results suggest that broker type selection bias is an important consideration in studying individual investors’ trades.

As an alteration of the firm's productive asset portfolio, divestiture is the mirror-image of asset acquisition or merger. Yet, though significant efforts have been expended by researchers into the implications of acquisition and merger, the literature of finance is all but silent on the subject of divestiture.

Using a database of daily institutional trades, we document that a majority of short-term institutional trades lose money. In aggregate, over 23% of round-trip trades are held for less than 3 months, and the returns on these trades average -3.91% (nonannualized). These losses are pervasive across all types of stocks, with the lowest returns occurring in small stocks, value stocks, and low-momentum stocks. Short-term trades lose more in more volatile markets. Across funds, the worst short-term returns accrue to funds that do the most trading, and there is no evidence of persistent skill or disposition effect in short-term institutional trades.

Using a large sample of privatized firms, we find that state ownership is significantly positively associated with the use of bank debt financing, suggesting that privatized firms benefit from the soft budget constraint associated with state ownership. We further find that the relation is more pronounced in countries with high government ownership of banks, high corruption in bank lending, a left-oriented government, and a collectivist national culture, which provides additional support for the soft-budget-constraint view. Finally, in external validity tests, we find that state ownership affects other aspects of debt structure, such as debt maturity and debt security.

Given the growth in the importance and popularity of share repurchases, we use an alternative time-series approach to test two hypotheses on the motives for share repurchases and dividends: the flexibility hypothesis and the substitution hypothesis. By investigating both share repurchase and dividend payout policies in the context of a time-series vector autoregression, we account for the dynamic and multi-dimensional nature of the two payout policies. We find that share repurchases are associated with temporary components of earnings, whereas dividends are not, and that share repurchases and dividends are imperfect substitutes.

This paper presents a consumption-based model that explains the equity premium puzzle through two channels. First, because of borrowing constraints, the shareholder cannot completely diversify his income risk and requires a sizable risk premium on stocks. Second, because of limited stock market participation, the precautionary saving demand lowers the risk-free rate but not stock return and generates a substantial liquidity premium. This model also replicates many other salient features of the data, including the first two moments of the risk-free rate, excess stock volatility, stock return predictability, and the unstable relation between stock volatility and the dividend yield.

Despite the proliferation of banking services, the basic commercial and industrial lending process remains the lifeblood of commercial banks and other banking institutions. The lending process is a relatively straightforward series of activities involving two principal parties whose association ranges from the initial loan request to the successful or unsuccessful repayment of the loan. Most students of banking would agree that the process is an interdependent one, but the exact dependencies are rarely articulated in a rigorous manner. One of the purposes of this paper is to investigate the association between at least two important aspects of the lending process, namely, the credit evaluation stage and the sequence of events that describes and quantifies the charge-off and subsequent recovery experience.

We provide a first look at short selling by mutual funds, a phenomenon not examined by prior research. Mutual funds that short do so frequently and in significant amounts, averaging about 16% of fund assets. These funds outperform benchmarks by 1.5% per year. An analysis of portfolio holdings shows that these funds generate abnormal performance from their short (4.1% per year) and long (1.5% per year) positions. Managers of short-selling mutual funds also exhibit superior performance in other funds they manage that do not use short sales. These findings suggest that managers of short-selling mutual funds are skilled.

I argue that overallocation is used as a marketing strategy to increase the offer price and aftermarket price of an initial public offering (IPO). I show that, when there is weak demand, it can be optimal for the underwriter to oversell an issue and take a naked short position. The issuing firm benefits from a higher expected offer price. This is in spite of the fact that, in equilibrium, allocating more shares when there is weak demand requires greater underpricing when there is strong demand.

We develop an estimation approach based on a modified expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm and a mixture of normal distributions associated with skill groups to assess performance in hedge funds. By allowing luck to affect both skilled and unskilled funds, we estimate the number of skill groups, the fraction of funds from each group, and the mean and variability of skill within each group. For each individual fund, we propose a performance measure combining the fund’s estimated alpha with the cross-sectional distribution of fund skill. In out-of-sample tests, an investment strategy using our performance measure outperforms those using estimated alpha and t-statistic.

A significant but unresolved question in the current debate about the role of intermediaries in financial markets is whether intermediaries behave as passive traders or whether they actively seek and trade on information. We address this issue by explicitly comparing the informational advantages of intermediaries with those of other investors in the market. We find that intermediaries account for greater price discovery than other institutional and individual investors in spite of initiating fewer trades and volume. Furthermore, intermediary information does not arise from inappropriate handling of customer orders by intermediaries. We propose that our findings are consistent with noisy rational expectations models, where agents extract valuable information from past prices. Intermediaries bear little or no opportunity cost of monitoring market conditions, which gives them an advantage in making profitable price-contingent trades. Lower trading costs may also enable intermediaries to trade more effectively and frequently on their information.

This paper examines the temporal relationship between interest rates on Treasury securities ranging in maturity from three months to 30 years. We find strong empirical support that the seven Treasury rates selected are cointegrated, a conclusion that is insensitive to the normalization chosen. In particular, the hypothesis of noncointegration is rejected decisively regardless of the rate selected as the dependent variable in the cointegrating equation. To determine whether this information can be used to improve forecasts of Treasury rates, the seven rates are forecasted with a corresponding errorcorrection model that is shown to outperform an augmented VAR model that ignores the cointegration of the rates. The results are consistent with the belief that arbitrage limits the extent to which rates on different maturities of a given security diverge. In addition, the results confirm the appropriateness of imposing a common stochastic process for interest rates in equilibrium models of the term structure.

A currency is not risky because devaluation is highly likely. If the devaluation were certain, there would be no risk at all. A weak currency can be less risky than a strong currency. A strong currency does not become risky because it has been used to denominate a firm's debt.

Until very recently, in most work on normative models for capital investment planning, it has been assumed that availability of capital is unconstrained; i.e., that money may be freely borrowed or lent at a single market rate of interest, and that no other constraints affect the proper choice of available productive investment projects to be undertaken. Since practical situations almost universally do involve such constraints, the traditional theories have, for the most part, been an unsatisfactory guide to achievement of optimal capital investment behavior in the real world.

This paper provides an imperfect information explanation for the existence of bank loan commitments when both the bank and the potential borrower are risk neutral. The borrower is assumed to have access to a two-stage investment project wherein the investment required in the second stage is not known at the outset. The unknown investment requirement is revealed to the borrower, but not to the bank, at the beginning of the second stage. If the investor borrows at the beginning of the first stage, the realization at the beginning of the second stage might prompt a default in a situation where the project yields positive net present value. The reason is that the borrower does not regard the first-stage investment as a sunk cost. We show that a two-stage contract resembling a loan commitment can solve this under-investment problem.

While recent literature documents that U.S. family firms differ markedly from their nonfamily counterparts, there is a paucity of evidence on how these firms differ in terms of their cost of capital or financial structure. In this paper, we show that family and nonfamily firms differ in their debt maturity and leverage ratios in a manner consistent with the higher expropriation potential of family firms. Moreover, while more transparency causes both family and nonfamily firms to increase the maturity structure of their debt and reduce leverage ratios, the effects are stronger for family firms.

This statement presents the usual perception of bond risk. It is striking in that it does not discuss what is, from a portfolio theoretic view, the risk of a bond––the covariance of its return with the returns of other assets. This is in contrast to the typical discussion of the riskiness of common stocks, where we find some discussion of systematic risk and the role it plays in determining equilibrium expected security returns.

This study investigates the liquidity effects of reverse stock splits using bid-ask spread, trading volume, and the number of nontrading days as proxies for the liquidity of the stock. Results indicate a decrease in bid-ask spread and an increase in trading volume after reverse splits. More importantly, the number of nontrading days significantly declines following reverse splits. For the control group, however, no such changes are observed. These results suggest that reverse splits enhance the liquidity of the stock.