We examine two competing views regarding the impact of competition among credit rating agencies on rating quality: the view that rating agencies do not sacrifice their reputation by inflating firm ratings, and the view that competition among rating agencies arising from the conflict of interest inherent in an “issuer pay” model creates pressure to inflate ratings. Using Fitch’s market share as a measure of competition among rating agencies and controlling for the endogeneity problem caused by unobservable industry effects, we find no relation between Fitch’s market share and ratings, suggesting that competition does not lead to rating inflation.

We examine the importance of indexing, industry, and broad market forces in driving common effects in order flow, returns, and trading costs. Common effects are strong for order flow and returns in a sample of S&P 500 stocks, but are weak in a sample of non-index stocks and for trading costs in both samples. Industry and broad market effects exist in order flow for both samples, but indexing effects are dominant. Correlated order flow drives common effects in returns and, to a lesser extent, those in trading costs. An event study of the effect of index addition on order flow and return comovement reinforces these conclusions. Our results show that common effects are not pervasive and have implications for diversification strategies and price formation models.

We extend the Fama-French (1992) model by considering growth option (as well as distress/leverage) variables in explaining the cross section of stock returns. We find that growth option variables, namely growth in capital investment and yet-unexercised growth options (GO), are significantly and negatively related to stock returns. Investors may be willing to accept lower average returns from growth stocks in exchange for a more favorable (positively skewed) risk-return profile. Book-to-market (BM) ratio seems to proxy for omitted distress/leverage variables. When these are explicitly accounted for, BM is not that significant. Our growth options variables have added explanatory power.

We study the effect of algorithmic trading (AT) on market quality between 2001 and 2011 in 42 equity markets around the world. We use an exchange colocation service that increases AT as an exogenous instrument to draw causal inferences about AT on market quality. On average, AT improves liquidity and informational efficiency but increases short-term volatility. Importantly, AT also lowers execution shortfalls for buy-side institutional investors. Our results are surprisingly consistent across markets and thus across a wide range of AT environments. We further document that the beneficial effect of AT is stronger in large stocks than in small stocks.

We analyze the dividend behaviour of the aggregate stock market. We propose a model that assumes managers minimize the costs of adjustment associated with being away from their target dividend payout. The target is expressed as a function of lagged stock prices and permanent earnings, generalizing previous models of dividend behaviour. We present a new method for measuring unobserved permanent earning based on the Kalman filter. Our specification of dividend behaviour is strongly supported by the data relative to both alternative models and over time. We find significant evidence of dividends conveying information regarding unexpected positive changes in current permanent earnigs. We also find that both the speed of adjustment of dividends to target dividends and tests of signaling are sensitive to the specification of the model.

This paper explores implications of differential personal taxation for corporate investment and dividend decisions. The personal tax advantage of dividend deferral causes shareholders to generally prefer greater investment in real assets under internal as opposed to external financing. Furthermore, dividend deferral is shown to be costly at the corporate level, causing shareholders in different tax brackets at times to disagree over optimal investment and dividend policies under internal financing. The profitability of internally-financed security investment is shown to depend on a security's tax status and shareholders' tax brackets. However, externally-financed security purchases are unprofitable from a tax standpoint.

The phenomenal growth in corporate merger activity of the 1960s revived interest in the motives and effects relating to corporate mergers. In recent years, many theories for explaining mergers have been discussed and tested in the literature of finance, law, and economics. Various authors have argued that motives for merger include increased market power [15, 21, 23], achievement of operating or managerial scale economies [2, 8], diversification [6], tax reduction [19], growth maximization [14, 16], and bankruptcy avoidance [7, 10, 12, 13]. The bankruptcy avoidance motive is perhaps the most recently articulated of all merger motives, and perhaps the only one for which no systematic attempts at empirical validation have been forthcoming.

In a general sense this analysis has been concerned with the extent of a market and the effect of limiting the extent on the prices of assets in that market. One example of the type of limited market extent with which we have been concerned is provided by nonmarketable assets and another is provided by market segmentation.

Unambiguous statements of the effect of nonmarketable assets and market segmentation on the level of prices require that and be oppossite in sign (unless one or both are zero). Only two cases have been identified where unambiguous statements can be made. The first, the case of constant absolute risk aversion, implies there is no effect of nonmarketable assets or market segmentation on the level of asset prices. The second case, constant relative risk aversion, where the coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to or less than one, implies that prices are lower in the presence of these imperfections.

Arrow [1] argues that the coefficient of relative risk aversion must “hover around 1.” Thus, if constant relative risk aversion is a reasonable approximation to reality we should accept the implication of the latter case. Certainly, if a choice had to be made, the latter case would be the more palatable of the two. That is, constant relative risk aversion does imply decreasing absolute risk aversion, which appears more acceptable than the hypothesis of constant absolute risk aversion.

The constant relative risk aversion case has implications for such things as the organization and operation of markets and corporate merger decisions. For example, higher margin requirements that inhibit diversification would be expected to lower asset values. Also, as a matter of corporate policy, it would appear that, ceteris paribus, mergers that increase the extent of a market would be preferable to within-market mergers.

This paper develops a normative model to analyze the hedging and fee-pricing decisions of a financial institution supplying fixed rate loan commitments to its customers. In supplying fixed rate loan commitments, the financial institution (hereafter referred to as “bank”) is assumed to act as an agent that transforms commitment risk through the use of financial futures contracts. While most previous loan commitment models have analyzed the interest rate (or price) risk the bank faces in supplying fixed rate loan commitments, they either have ignored or assumed away the loan take-down (or quantity) risk.

Numerous studies have analyzed the stock market reaction to information released in proxy statements. Two possible biases in proxy statement research are suggested frequently: misspecification of the return benchmark and a sample selection bias from analyzing only “clean” events. This paper presents evidence that most of the conclusions of existing studies are not affected by these potential biases. A significantly positive abnormal return was found around a random sample of shareholder meeting dates. The result indicates that interpreting event study results for announcements occurring around annual shareholder meetings must be conducted carefully. The results are consistent with the findings of Kalay and Loewenstein [14], who argue that risk and expected return can increase around predictable, information-producing events. Alternatively, the study can be viewed as being consistent with several recent studies that find anomalous results, using daily return data and large samples.

Using unique daily fund-manager trade data, we examine the role of institutional trading in influencing firm performance. We show that short-horizon informed trading by multiple institutional investors effectively disciplines corporate management. Our focus is on short-term “swing” trades, sequences with three phases (e.g., buy-sell-buy). We find swing trades increase stock price informativeness, are profitable after costs, and improve market efficiency. This increase in stock price informativeness is associated with subsequent firm outperformance. Trades are most beneficial with optimal stock holdings that reflect the information acquisition incentives of investors as well as liquidity costs.

We use short interest as an investor-based measure of over- or undervaluation that distinguishes between the misvaluation and Q-theories of mergers. Using this measure, we find that misvaluation is a strong determinant of merger decision-making. Firms in the top quintile of short interest are 54% more likely to engage in stock acquisitions and 22% less likely to engage in cash acquisitions. Stock (but not cash) acquirers have higher short interest than their targets. Overall, our results suggest that the previously documented underperformance of stock acquirers and the overperformance of cash acquirers can be explained by misvaluation, as captured by short interest.

Recently, the finance literature has included empirical analysis of consumption in asset pricing models based on the cross-equation restrictions implied by optimality of a representative agent's consumption and investment plan. These studies have required some specification of an aggregate utility function, and power (constant relative risk aversion) utility has been predominant. The present paper extends this body of research by including models with constant absolute, as well as constant relative, risk aversion.

In portfolio risk minimization, the inverse covariance matrix prescribes the hedge trades in which a stock is hedged by all the other stocks in the portfolio. In practice with finite samples, however, multicollinearity makes the hedge trades too unstable and unreliable. By shrinking trade sizes and reducing the number of stocks in each hedge trade, we propose a “sparse” estimator of the inverse covariance matrix. Comparing favorably with other methods (equal weighting, shrunk covariance matrix, industry factor model, nonnegativity constraints), a portfolio formed on the proposed estimator achieves significant out-of-sample risk reduction and improves certainty equivalent returns after transaction costs.

We find that local analyst recommendations are systematically more optimistic than foreign analyst recommendations in emerging markets. The effects of this novel “home bias” among local analysts overwhelm any information asymmetry between foreign and local analysts. Consequently, local analyst upgrades underperform foreign analyst upgrades, while local analyst downgrades outperform foreign analyst downgrades. Neither foreign investors, local institutions, nor retail investors appear to be fully cognizant of this bias. Trade reactions suggest that foreign investors overestimate the bias in foreign analyst recommendations while local institutions underestimate the bias in local analyst recommendations. These results are pervasive across countries, time periods, and stock groupings, and can be traced to investment banking pressure.

During the past decade considerable empirical evidence has been accumulated suggesting the stock market adjusts to the arrival of new information in an efficient manner. The studies providing this evidence consist of announcement tests of new publicly available information (such as earnings, stock splits, accounting changes, etc.) on the risk-adjusted return of securities. The specific methodology employed is crucial since it directly affects the results of a test for market efficiency. Following the pioneering work of Ball and Brown [1] and Fama, et al. [15], many researchers [6, 12, 21, 22, 27] have employed a similar methodology in order to test for market efficiency. This cumulative average residual (CAR) methodology consists of: (1) estimating the parameters of the market model based on data in a time period prior (and sometimes subsequent) to an announcement, and (2) analyzing the residuals derived from applying this model to a time period which includes the announcement date.

The process of security price adjustment to the release of new information has long held the interest of the finance profession, both in academics and in practice. The efficiency of financial markets in reflecting new information significantly impacts the allocation of capital and income within the markets1 and, consequently, can affect social welfare. Thus, public, business, and investment policies are all related to an understanding of the functioning of security markets and their utilization of information. As a result, a significant body of economic research has considered the impact of information upon security markets under a number of alternative market structures. In this paper, we attempt to contribute to this literature by extending previous research in the two related areas of speculation and information dissemination.

This paper models the strategic pre-tender offer share acquisition problem faced by potential bidders in takeovers. The model provides a rational explanation for the seemingly anomalous empirical evidence that the information about the impending tender offers is not fully conveyed through the potential bidders' pre-tender offer trades and for the evidence that a large fraction of bidders do not hold any target shares prior to launching the tender offers. Additional testable implications are also provided.

We present a simple 2-factor model that helps explain several capital asset pricing model (CAPM) anomalies (value premium, return reversal, equity duration, asset growth, and inventory growth). The model is consistent with Merton’s intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) framework, and the key risk factor is the innovation on a short-term interest rate, the federal funds rate, or the T-bill rate. This model explains a large fraction of the dispersion in the average returns of the joint market anomalies. Moreover, the model compares favorably with alternative multifactor models widely used in the literature. Hence, short-term interest rates seem to be relevant for explaining several dimensions of cross-sectional equity risk premia.

We analyze the optimal mix of debt, common equity, and preferred equity in a model with an investment opportunity and asymmetric information about its quality, and show that an all-equity financed firm will overinvest. Issuing the appropriate amount of debt before the project becomes available resolves this overinvestment problem. Introducing a second motive for debt, such as taxes, leads to a role for preferred stock as a means of enhancing the firm's “debt capacity,” by creating additional incentives to invest. We derive an optimal capital structure involving debt, preferred stock, and common stock.