The following are some consequences of a recent result concerning the prime implicants of disjunctive normal formulas.

I. Introduce the void fundamental formula λ, and define the consensus of αϕ and as in [5], but allowing ϕ or ψ or both to be λ. Then a normal formula Φ is valid if and only if the operations of dropping subsuming clauses and adjoining consensus formulas end by transforming Φ into the single formula λ. (For under the notions of fundamental formula and consensus as now extended, λ is a (unique) prime implicant of all valid formulas and of no others; and the argument of [5] now shows that the operations mentioned transform every normal formula, whether valid or not, into the disjunction of its prime implicants.)

II. A normal formula ψ implies a normal formula Φ if and only if every clause of ψ subsumes one of the prime implicants of Φ, which are found as in I above. (The condition is clearly sufficient. It is necessary, for if ψ implies Φ, then every clause of ψ implies Φ and subsumes a shortest fundamental formula implying Φ.) In this condition, the prime implicants of Φ may be replaced by the clauses of the result of merely adjoining, as long as possible, consensus formulas to Φ.

We give an application of the extender based Radin forcing to cardinal arithmetic. Assuming κ is a large enough cardinal we construct a model satisfying 2κ = κ+n together with 2λ = λ+n for each cardinal λ < κ, where 0 < n < ω. The cofinality of κ can be set arbitrarily or κ can remain inaccessible.

When κ remains an inaccessible, Vκ is a model of ZFC satisfying 2λ = λ+n for all cardinals λ.

In this paper we introduce a recursive notation system O(Π3) of ordinals. An element of the notation system is called an ordinal diagram. The system is designed for proof theoretic study of theories of Π3-reflection. We show that for each α < Ω in O(Π3) a set theory KP Π3 for Π3-reflection proves that the initial segment of O(Π3) determined by α is a well ordering. Proof theoretic study for such theories will be reported in [ 4].

Associated with each first-order theory is a Boolean algebra of sentences and a Boolean space of models. Homomorphisms between the sentence algebras correspond to continuous maps between the model spaces. To what do recursive homomorphisms correspond? We introduce axiomatizable maps as the appropriate dual. For these maps we prove a Cantor-Bernstein theorem. Duality and the Cantor-Bernstein theorem are used to show that the Boolean sentence algebras of any two undecidable languages or of any two functional languages are recursively isomorphic where a language is undecidable iff it has at least one operation or relation symbol of two or more places or at least two unary operation symbols, and a language is functional iff it has exactly one unary operation symbol and all other symbols are for unary relations, constants, or propositions.

Generally speaking, it appears correct to say that in a formulation of first order logic in which a large number of connectives are taken as primitive (e.g. ∼, Λ, ∨, ⊃, ∀, ∃ as opposed to ∼, ⊃, ∀, or still more economically, ↓, ∀ proofs within the formal system tend to be smoother and more natural, but the metatheory tends to be that much more elaborate. In [1] we introduced a unifying ‘α, β, γ, δ” notation (which we also used in [2]–[7] and which we briefly review in this paper) which allows us to have our cake and eat it too.

Lawvere hyperdoctrines give categorical algebraic semantics for intuitionistic predicate logic. Here we extend the hyperdoctrinal semantics to a broad variety of substructural predicate logics over the Typed Full Lambek Calculus, verifying their completeness with respect to the extended hyperdoctrinal semantics. This yields uniform hyperdoctrinal completeness results for numerous logics such as different types of relevant predicate logics and beyond, which are new results on their own; i.e., we give uniform categorical semantics for a broad variety of non-classical predicate logics. And we introduce an analogue of Lawvere–Tierney topology and cotopology in the hyperdoctrinal setting, which gives a unifying perspective on different logical translations, in particular allowing for a uniform treatment of Girard’s exponential translation between linear and intuitionistic logics and of Kolmogorov’s double negation translation between intuitionistic and classical logics. In the hyerdoctrinal conception, type theories are categories, logics over type theories are functors, and logical translations between them, then, are natural transformations, in particular Lawvere–Tierney topologies and cotopologies on hyperdoctrines. The view of logical translations as hyperdoctrinal Lawvere–Tierney topologies and cotopologies has not been elucidated before, and may be seen as a novel contribution of the present work. From a broader perspective, this work may be regarded as taking first steps towards interplay between algebraic and categorical logics; it is, technically, a combination of substructural (or Lambekian) algebraic logic and hyperdoctrinal (or Lawverian) categorical logic, as the hyperdoctrinal completeness theorem is shown via the integration of the Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra construction with the syntactic category construction. As such this work lays a foundation for further interactions between algebraic and categorical logics.

In the past four decades, the notion of quantum polynomial-time computability has been mathematically modeled by quantum Turing machines as well as quantum circuits. This paper seeks the third model, which is a quantum analogue of the schematic (inductive or constructive) definition of (primitive) recursive functions. For quantum functions mapping finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces to themselves, we present such a schematic definition, composed of a small set of initial quantum functions and a few construction rules that dictate how to build a new quantum function from the existing ones. We prove that our schematic definition precisely characterizes all functions that can be computable with high success probabilities on well-formed quantum Turing machines in polynomial time, or equivalently uniform families of polynomial-size quantum circuits. Our new, schematic definition is quite simple and intuitive and, more importantly, it avoids the cumbersome introduction of the well-formedness condition imposed on a quantum Turing machine model as well as of the uniformity condition necessary for a quantum circuit model. Our new approach can further open a door to the descriptional complexity of quantum functions, to the theory of higher-type quantum functionals, to the development of new first-order theories for quantum computing, and to the designing of programming languages for real-life quantum computer

This note arose out of my efforts to understand results of van den Dries, Denef, and Weispfenning on definable Skolem functions in the elementary theory of Qp. The first person to prove their existence was van den Dries, who devised and applied a model-theoretic criterion for theories, admitting elimination of quantifiers, which also admit definable Skolem functions [3]. The proof, though elegant, does not describe how one defines the Skolem functions. In the particular case of Qp, Denef found an ingenious, easily described method for writing out the definitions [2, pp. 14–15]. Unfortunately, his argument directly applies only in the following special case: if

and there is a fixed m ≥ 1 such that

for all , then can be given as a definable function of . While this special case includes many of interest, van den Dries' theorem seems more general. Weispfenning suggested how his results on primitive-recursive quantifier elimination could produce algorithms yielding definitions of Skolem functions in the specific theories van den Dries considered [10, pp. 470–471]. Though these algorithms provide a more concrete version of van den Dries' theorem, and do not suffer the lack of generality of Denef's result, Weispfenning's argument is extremely subtle and applies only to certain theories of valued fields.

The paper [Schütte + Simpson] deals with the following one-dimensional case of Friedman's extension (see in [Simpson 1]) of Kruskal's theorem ([Kruskal]). Given a natural number n, let Sn+1 be the set of all finite sequences of natural numbers <n + 1. If s1 = (a0,…,ak) ∈Sn+1 and s2 = (b0,…,bm) ∈Sn + 1, then a strictly monotone function f: {0,…, k} → {0,…, m} is called an embedding of s1 into s2 if the following two assertions are satisfied:

1) ai, = bf(i), for all i < k;

2) if f(i) < j < f(i + 1) then bj > bf(i+1), for all i < k, j < m.

Then for every infinite sequence s1, s2,…,sk,… of elements of Sn + 1 there exist indices i < j and an embedding of si into Sj. That is, Sn+1 forms a well-quasi-ordering (wqo) with respect to embeddability. For each n, this statement W(Sn+1) is provable in the standard second order conservative extension of Peano arithmetic. On the other hand, the proof-theoretic strength of the statements W(Sn+1) grows so fast that this formal theory cannot prove the limit statement ∀nW(Sn+1). The appropriate first order -versions of these combinatory statements preserve their proof-theoretic strength, so that actually one can speak in terms of provability in Peano arithmetic. These are the main conclusions from [Schütte + Simpson].

We wish to extend this into the transfinite. That is, we take an arbitrary countable ordinal τ > 0 instead of n + 1 and try to obtain an analogous “strong” combinatory statement about finite sequences of ordinals < τ.

We prove that every ultraproduct of p-adics is inp-minimal (i.e., of burden 1). More generally, we prove an Ax-Kochen type result on preservation of inp-minimality for Henselian valued fields of equicharacteristic 0 in the RV language.

In this article propositions will be identified with a certain kind of changes of belief. The intended interpretation is that a proposition is characterised by the change it would induce if added to a state of belief. Propositions will thus be defined as functions from states of belief to states of belief. A set of postulates concerning the properties and existence of propositions will be formulated. A proposition will be said to be a tautology iff it is the identity function on states of belief. The main result is that the logic determined by the set of postulates is intuitionistic propositional logic.

The basic epistemic concept is that of a belief model, which is defined as a pair 〈, 〉, where is a nonempty set and is a class of functions from to . The elements in will be called states of belief and they will be denoted K, K′,…. A discussion of the epistemological interpretation of the states of belief can be found in Gärdenfors [2]. Here, no assumptions about the structure of the elements in will be made.

The elements in will be called propositions, and A, B, C, … will be used as variables over . Functions from states of belief to states of belief can be characterised as epistemic inputs. The intended interpretation of the functions in is that they correspond to changes of belief where the new evidence is accepted as “certain” or “known” in the resulting state of belief. This means that not all functions defined on can properly be called propositions.

We give some sufficient conditions for a predicate P in a complete theory T to be “stably embedded”. Let be P with its “induced ∅-definable structure”. The conditions are that (or rather its theory) is “rosy”. P has NIP in T and that P is stably 1-embedded in T. This generalizes a recent result of Hasson and Onshuus [6] which deals with the case where P is o-minimal in T. Our proofs make use of the theory of strict nonforking and weight in NIP theories ([3], [10]).

A (binary) relation is a collection of ordered couples. Two relations are isomorphic if there is a 1–1 correspondence between their fields which preserves the ordered couples. Isomorphism between relations is itself an equivalence relation, and a structure is an isomorphism class of binary relations.

Carnap ([1], p. 124) asks certain questions concerning (both the exact and) the asymptotic value of the relative frequency that a relation on p objects satisfies certain properties. Among the most interesting special cases are the asymptotic value of the relative frequency that a binary relation on p objects be (a) symmetric, (b) reflexive, (c) transitive irreflexive anti-symmetric, and (d) symmetric irreflexive. These results already appear either in, or almost in, the literature, in various disguises. The object of this expository note is to bring them to light, especially since some of the references may not be generally known to logicians.

Carnap ([1], p. 124) points out explicitly the correspondence between binary relations and linear graphs. Davis [2] and Harary [4] obtains precise results for the number of structures with certain properties using the language of relations and graphs respectively; but these do not supply the asymptotic values directly. The asymptotic results which are most useful here are either contained in, or are straight-forward extensions of, the formulas presented in Ford and Uhlenbeck [3], which in turn are based on unpublished work of G. Pólya. In addition, we utilize a result of L. Moser on transitive relations, which appears in Wine and Freund [5].

The purpose of this note is (i) to point out an important similarity between the nominalistic system discussed by Quine in his recent paper On universals and the system of logic (the system н) developed by the author in A homogeneous system for formal logic, (ii) to offer certain corrections to the latter, and (iii) to show that that system (н) is adequate for the general theory of ancestrale and for the definition of any general recursive function of natural numbers.

Nominalism as a thesis in the philosophy of science, according to Quine, is the view that it is possible to construct a language adequate for the purposes of science, which in no wise admits classes, properties, relations, or other abstract objects as values for variables.

With the help of various square principles, we obtain results concerning the consistency strength of several statements about trees containing ascent paths, special trees, and strong chain conditions. Building on a result that shows that Todorčević’s principle $\square \left( {\kappa ,\lambda } \right)$ implies an indexed version of $\square \left( {\kappa ,\lambda } \right)$, we show that for all infinite, regular cardinals $\lambda < \kappa$, the principle $\square \left( \kappa \right)$ implies the existence of a κ-Aronszajn tree containing a λ-ascent path. We then provide a complete picture of the consistency strengths of statements relating the interactions of trees with ascent paths and special trees. As a part of this analysis, we construct a model of set theory in which ${\aleph _2}$-Aronszajn trees exist and all such trees contain ${\aleph _0}$-ascent paths. Finally, we use our techniques to show that the assumption that the κ-Knaster property is countably productive and the assumption that every κ-Knaster partial order is κ-stationarily layered both imply the failure of $\square \left( \kappa \right)$.

In [1], S. Buss introduced the systems of Bounded Arithmetic for (i = 0,1,2,…) which has a close relationship to classes in polynomial hierarchy.

In [4], we defined a very special kind of proof-predicate Prfi for which gives detailed information on bounds of free variables used in the proof. There we also introduced infinitely many Gödel sentences for Prfi (k = 0, 1, 2, …) and showed that the properties of Prfi and are closely related to the P ≠ NP problem. Then we presented many conjectures on Prfi and which imply P ≠ NP.

Now in [2], Feferman emphasized that the arithmetization of metamathematics must be carried out intensionally. Bounded Arithmetic is a very interesting case in this sense.

In this paper, we also introduce the usual proof-predicate PRFi for and infinitely many Gödel sentences for PRFi(k= 0, 1, 2, …). Then we show that (Prfi, )and (PRFi, ) form a good contrast, this contrast is also closely related to the P ≠ NP problem, and present more conjectures which imply P ≠ NP.

As in [4] we define to be the following extension of Buss' original .

(1) We add finitely many function symbols which express polynomial time computable functions to Buss' original language of .

(2) All basic axioms on function symbols and ≤ can be expressed by initial sequents without logical symbols.

This article contributes to the general program of extending techniques and ideas of effective algebra to computable metric space theory. It is well-known that relative computable categoricity (to be defined) of a computable algebraic structure is equivalent to having a c.e. Scott family with finitely many parameters (e.g., [1]). The first main result of the article extends this characterisation to computable Polish metric spaces. The second main result illustrates that just a slight change of the definitions will give us a new notion of categoricity unseen in the countable case (to be stated formally). The second result also shows that the characterisation of computably categorical closed subspaces of ${\Cal R}^n $ contained in [17] cannot be improved. The third main result extends the characterisation to not necessarily separable structures of cardinality κ using κ-computability.

Which groups are isomorphic to automorphism groups of models of Peano Arithmetic? It will be shown here that any group that has half a chance of being isomorphic to the automorphism group of some model of Peano Arithmetic actually is.

For any structure , let Aut() be its automorphism group. There are groups which are not isomorphic to any model = (N, +, ·, 0, 1, ≤) of PA. For example, it is clear that Aut(N), being a subgroup of Aut((, <)), must be torsion-free. However, as will be proved in this paper, if (A, <) is a linearly ordered set and G is a subgroup of Aut((A, <)), then there are models of PA such that Aut() ≅ G.

If is a structure, then its automorphism group can be considered as a topological group by letting the stabilizers of finite subsets of A be the basic open subgroups. If ′ is an expansion of , then Aut(′) is a closed subgroup of Aut(). Conversely, for any closed subgroup G ≤ Aut() there is an expansion ′ of such that Aut(′) = G. Thus, if is a model of PA, then Aut() is not only a subgroup of Aut((N, <)), but it is even a closed subgroup of Aut((N, ′)).

There is a characterization, due to Cohn [2] and to Conrad [3], of those groups G which are isomorphic to closed subgroups of automorphism groups of linearly ordered sets.

In this paper, we show the normalization of proofs of NF (Quine's New Foundations; see [15]) minus extensionality. This system, called SF (Stratified Foundations) differs in many respects from the associated system of simple type theory. It is written in a first order language and not in a multi-sorted one, and the formulas need not be stratifiable, except in the instances of the comprehension scheme. There is a universal set, but, for a similar reason as in type theory, the paradoxical sets cannot be formed.

It is not immediately apparent, however, that SF is essentially richer than type theory. But it follows from Specker's celebrated result (see [16] and [4]) that the stratifiable formula (extensionality → the universe is not well-orderable) is a theorem of SF.

It is known (see [11]) that this set theory is consistent, though the consistency of NF is still an open problem.

The connections between consistency and cut-elimination are rather loose. Cut-elimination generally implies consistency. But the converse is not true. In the case of set theory, for example, ZF-like systems, though consistent, cannot be freed of cuts because the separation axioms allow the formation of sets from unstratifiable formulas. There are nevertheless interesting partial results obtained when restrictions are imposed on the removable cuts (see [1] and [9]). The systems with stratifiable comprehension are the only known set-theoretic systems that enjoy full cut-elimination.

The theorem proved in this paper answers some transitivity questions (in the geometric sense) for the type free λ-calculus: Which objects can be mapped on all other objects? How much can an object do by applying it to other objects (see footnote 2)?

The main result is that, for closed terms of the λI-calculus, the following conditions are equivalent:

(a) M has a normal form.

(b) FM = I for some λI-term F.

(c) MN1 … Nn = I for some λI-terms N1 …, Nn.

By the same method it follows that if M is a closed term of the λK-calculus having a normal form, then for some λI-terms (sic) N1, …, Nn, MN1… Nn = I is provable in the λK-calculus.

The theorem of Böhm [2] states that if M1, M2 are terms of the λK-calculus having different βη-normal forms, then ∀A1, A2 ∃N1, …, NnMiN1 … Nn = Ai is provable in the λK-βη-calculus for i = 1, 2. As a consequence of this it was shown (implicitly) in [1, 3.2.20 1/2 (1)] that if M has a normal form, then for some λK-terms N1, …, Nn, MN1 … Nn =I is provable in the λK-calculus.

It was not clear that this also could be proved for the λK-calculus since the proof of the theorem of Böhm essentially made use of λK-terms.

We conjecture that, using the results of this paper, the full theorem of Böhm can be proved for the λI-calculus.