Summarizes the industrial policies of Britain since World War II, especially how Britain failed because it lacked an economic theory of what industrial policy was for, and had weak institutions for implementing such policies.

Continuing from the account of Iran–South Africa relations in Chapter 3, this chapter looks in particular at the increasing importance of Iranian oil to South Africa in the wake of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, as a result of which, by 1978, Iran supplied over 90 per cent of South Africa’s crude oil imports. Because of its importance as a supplier of oil, not just to South Africa but also its neighbouring countries, Iran attained an influential position in Southern Africa during this period. Its influence was such that in 1977 and 1978, the United States and Britain asked the shah to help negotiate a settlement with the Ian Smith government to end the crisis in Rhodesia. The chapter explores Iran’s role in the crisis, not only its support of US-British initiatives, but also its outreach to Rhodesia’s revolutionary politicians, like Joshua Nkomo, who travelled to Iran and met with the shah several times during this period. As the chapter will show, Iran’s involvement was driven by concerns over the possibility of civil war spreading into neighbouring countries, and the implications of this for Iran’s Indian Ocean aspirations.

In this chapter we give a brief overview of corporate governance in the United States (‘US’), the United Kingdom (‘UK’), New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, India and Singapore, some of the major Anglo-American corporate governance jurisdictions that are based on the unitary (one-tier) board model. In Chapter 12 we deal with corporate governance developments in the European Union (‘EU’), the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, and corporate governance in Germany, Japan and China. The Principles include traditional Anglo-American corporate governance principles but go wider – as well as principles applying to a traditional unitary board structure, they include principles applying to a typical two-tier board structure.

The Introduction discusses the British usage of the term ’Europe’ and its historically contingent connotations before it outlines the complex historical relationship between the two entities, both of whom were in perennial flux. Global wars, imperialist ambitions, religious affiliations, revolutions political and industrial, travel and technology all played a part in shaping its permutations. The volume’s multi-pronged approach to the topic comprises four parts, covering geographical zones of influence, pan-European movements, cultural transfers, and uncertainties and anxieties. The editors also point to alternative critical approaches to ’Europe’ including philosophical discussions about the idea of Europe and literary essays on the topic.

Despite the recent focus on Asia, the relationship with the European Union (EU) has, between 1991 and 1995, remained very important to Australia in a number of ways. These have been years when the EU has established and maintained its place as Australia’s largest economic partner if investment is added to merchandise and service trade. The EU is the world’s largest trader, accounting for 20 per cent of world trade (as compared with the United States at 16.3 per cent, and Japan at 8.2 per cent). Further, the EU is the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) and one of Australia’s largest partners in trade in goods and services. For the EU, Australia is a growing market and provider of direct foreign investment and a potential base for EU companies in the Asia-Pacific region.

Following two centuries of white settlement and several ’waves’ of immigration, many Australians retain a sense of identification with European cultures and societies. This is despite understandable and fairly successful efforts to focus on cultivating a national identity and diminished support among political élites for the project of fostering cultural links with Europe. The Australian tendency to associate immigration with waves of European immigrants landing on Australian shores picks up on only part of the story. There has also been movement in the opposite direction, with many Australians migrating to Europe. This trend may well increase among those able to apply their skills in European labour markets. It reflects a degree of cosmopolitanism, and the capacity of many Australians to adapt to different cultures. For most Australians this adaptation appears to be easiest in English-speaking cultures, particularly the United Kingdom. There is also a strong resonance for Australians with aspects of North American culture, and powerful incentives to migrate to that continent among those with marketable knowledge-based skills.

Facial recognition technology (FRT) has achieved remarkable progress in the last decade owing to the improvement of deep convolutional neural networks. The massive deployment of FRT in the United Kingdom has unsurprisingly tested the limits of democracy: where should the line be drawn between acceptable uses of this technology for collective or private purposes and the protection of individual entitlements that are compressed by the employment of FRT? The Bridges v South Wales Police case offered guidance on this issue. After lengthy litigation, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales ruled in favour of the applicant, a civil rights campaigner who claimed that the active FRT deployed by the police at public gatherings infringed his rights. Although the Bridges case offered crucial directives on the balancing between individual rights and the lawful use of FRT for law enforcement purposes under the current UK rules, several ethical and legal questions still remain unsolved. This chapter provides an overview of sociological and regulatory attitudes towards this technology in the United Kingdom; discusses the Bridges saga and its implications, and offers reflections on the future of FRT regulation in the United Kingdom.

In an end-of-term address to an ’Australian Business in Europe’ (ABIE) luncheon in London on 18 July 1990, the High Commissioner and a former Labor politician, Douglas McClelland, spoke warmly of the relationship between the two countries and especially of its value to Australia: ’Today, Australia House has an annual budget of over $23 million and the value that Australia gets for that expenditure is immeasurable. For instance, we are drawing from this country some 26 000 migrants annually, and they take with them on a conservative estimate something like $830 million. We also write some 210 000 working holiday visas and those people produce and spend in Australia. On the estimates of the Australian Tourist Commission, these working holiday people earned Australia some $310 million. British investment into Australia is running at the $45 billion mark. Britain has now restored herself to being the largest overseas investor in our country. In turn, Australian companies have invested in Britain something like $15 billion.’

When in January 1976 the Fraser Government restored the use of “God Save the Queen” as Australia’s alternate national anthem, the London Daily Telegraph editorially welcomed the decision. Although admitting that Britain could “no longer act as chief investor or market protector or nurse” to Australia and New Zealand, it commented: We share with the Australians and New Zealanders a common parentage: we are of the same family ... And now, at a very dark time for us when everything seems to be going wrong for us and all certainties are in doubt, we hear from the other end of the earth a resounding symbolic reaffirmation of belief in the values and loyalties which were once our own and will—God willing—be ours one day again ... We may learn from down under that self-respect does not reside in vulgar novelty, or rude disrespect for what we were and still are.

By 2024, the prime minister had emerged as the dominant figure in control of foreign policy, taking over the powers initially from the monarch, then Parliament, then the Foreign Secretary. The prime minister decides British foreign relations, whether the country goes to war, and how it is fought. This chapter will examine how and why this transition occurred, and why the prime minister today can afford to be more preoccupied with foreign rather than domestic policy, and what this has meant to the office and powers of the prime minister – even in the face of war and increasing geopolitical tension.

Shifting conceptions of social justice were intricately entangled with changing conceptions of the market in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Understanding this interwoven history requires an analysis of the anthropological, moral, social, and political implications constructions of a market order. This observation is the starting point for a sketch of three distinctive periods in Western European history of entanglements between conceptions of social justice and understandings of the market. In the first period, defined by the social question, a notion of property as entitlements to social security created the social basis for the recognition of political agency and the empowerment of precarious workers. In a second period, notions of social justice centred on the creation and maintenance of a productive workforce, with sufficient spending power to contribute to the efficiency of markets and the growth of national wealth. The third period was characterised by an understanding of social justice as a disturbance of the price mechanism resulting from the capture of the state by self-interested professionals and interest groups. Social justice is not an alternative to a market morality; they together contribute to shifting entanglements of ‘socially’ informed markets and ‘market’ informed constellations of social justice.