This chapter details the early phenomenon that was ReInvent Law—an aggressive injection of innovation and creativity into the legal profession and legal education. Propelled by the 2008 financial crisis and the slow-rolling legal industry and education crisis that followed, ReInvent Law brought together thought leaders from around the world for rapid lightning talks at well-produced convenings that were coupled with a savvy and successful viral social media campaign. With the early emergence of legal design coinciding with ReInvent Law’s run, the synergies and ongoing impact are revealed here by one of ReInvent Law’s founders.

Compared to people who are rated as less creative, more creative people tend to produce ideas more quickly, with more novelty, and more actively engage regions of the brain associated with cognitive control. Both inside and outside the laboratory, the evidence is clear: the creative mind is a productive mind. Structural analysis of what more creative people produce has led to two different proposals for how this is achieved. One is based on differences in the underlying knowledge representation – the structure of semantic memory – called the associative theory of creativity. The other is based on more effortful cognitive control – how semantic memory is accessed – called the executive theory of creativity. Evidence supports both, but there are few models integrating these two ideas. Network analysis offers some inroads into how to tackle this problem and invites some creativity of its own.

In this penultimate chapter, we take up the philosophical question of whether immortality is truly desirable, seeking to establish an important difference between existing for a finite and for an infinite stretch of time by introducing the following important consideration. If it remains possible for an event to occur, then even an extremely unlikely event is certain to occur, given infinite time. I shall suggest that this consideration leads to insuperable problems with the most popular scenarios currently being envisioned for achieving immortality by techno-scientific means. These problems, moreover, motivate us to think more deeply about death and thereby rethink the requirements of a genuinely meaningful human life. Drawing on Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and other existential thinkers, I suggest that human beings’ most abiding sources of meaningfulness come not from endlessly repeating certain profound experiences (which sometimes does wear out their appeal) but, instead, from our struggle to stay true to and so continue to creatively and responsibly disclose what such momentous events, often rare and singular, only partly reveal to us in the first place, as we often come to realize only in retrospect – much as Heidegger came only retrospectively to recognize and then spend his life creatively disclosing the seemingly inexhaustible ontological riches of that ambiguous “nothing” Being and Time first glimpsed in the momentous experience of existential death, but in a way that Heidegger only partly understood at that time.

This chapter traces the extant historical literature on the growth and development of party politics in colonial Nigeria. These parties were led by formidable personalities who played an essential role in the formation of national consciousness crucial for the formation of an independent Nigeria. While historians have classified it into four phases, the chapter proposes that the growth of political parties should be analyzed into two generational periods: the 1920s and 1930s, and the 1940s and 1950s. The former period is marked by the promulgation of the Clifford Constitution that led to the creation of the first-ever nationalist parties, such as the Nigerian National Democratic Party and The Lagos Youth Movement which, though claiming nationalist status, was, however, confined to the Lagos area. The latter commenced after the enactment of the Richards Constitution which witnessed the growth of regional political parties such as the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, the Northern People’s Congress, and the Action Group all of which espoused ethnic nationalism. By engaging with historical works produced on nationalist movements in colonial Nigeria, the chapter places their value beyond the simplistic teleological development of politics of nationalism in Nigeria.

This chapter comprehensively lays out all the possible ways that artificial intelligence (AI) might interact with Jewish sources as their relationship develops over the next many years. It divides the scope of the relationship into three parts. First, it engages with questions of moral agency and their potential interactions with Jewish law, and suggests that this path, while enticing, may not be particularly fruitful. Second, it suggests that Jewish historical sources generally distinguish human value from human uniqueness, and that there is therefore quite a bit of room to think of an AI as a person, if we so choose, without damaging the value of human beings. Finally, it considers how Jewish thought might respond to AI as a new height of human innovation, and how the human–AI relationship shares many characteristics with the God–human relationship as imagined in Jewish sources.

This chapter explains and discusses the definition of public sector innovation. Public sector innovation includes two concepts or terms: (1) public sector and (2) innovation. The first concept, “the public sector,” refers to the general government organizations owned and funded by the government and may include or exclude state-owned enterprises. The second concept, “innovation,” refers to novel ideas or practices implemented organizations. Thus, novelty and implementation are two key terms defining innovation. Therefore, public sector innovation refers to innovative activities in the public sector, and this chapter provides information about it. In addition, this chapter discusses how and in what ways innovation differs from public management reforms, organizational change, invention, creativity, entrepreneurship, and improvement.

Chapter 5 looks at talent development and human excellence in a broader social-historical conditions and changes. The flourishing of particular forms of excellence in a given historical period or culture is always distinct, due to both cultural values and priorities as well as societal changes in social structure, leisure, and conditions of education. If human excellence reflects high-level self-organized individuality, then sociocultural contexts matter; ECT supports the notion of personal agency in changing the world and changing history, not by traits and genes, notwithstanding their meaningful role, but by cultural evolution that leverages characteristic and maximal adaptation with its niche construction and infrastructure-building to achieve the prosperity and vitality of its members. However, sociocultural conditions (including available technology) also significantly constrain individual strivings as well as how far individuals can go. The Needham Puzzle on the birth of modern science (why it occurred in the West, not China) is discussed, and a comparison is made of Da Vinci and Wang Yangming to demonstrate that any creative act is a sociocultural act, which can change history, yet is constrained by one’s times.

In this concluding chapter, I draw conclusions about several important aspects of nature of science by drawing on the topics discussed in the various chapters of the book. Such conclusions include: that individual brilliance and creativity can make a difference; the historical milieu of the individual is equally crucial; that scientists are humans with weaknesses and concerns like all of us; and that gender may influence one’s opportunities to contribute to science.

Through close analyses of a wide range of Minoan animalian things, we have explored the specificity of their involvements in the experiences of people, and how those engagements contributed to the unique character of sociocultural life in the Aegean, on various levels. Here we draw out key points from across the foregoing analyses. Special attention has come to the objects’ inter-corporeal relationships with living humans and the connections that would have been realized through the objects’ particular qualities—connections with other animals, things, and spaces. Such relations were afforded through different dynamics, including bodily juxtaposition, cultivation of formal assonance, the sharing of specific features (e.g., a forward gaze), and embodiment with the same substances, as well as through similarities in size, composition (e.g., in friezes), and contextualization. Moreover, by working beyond an implicit focus on the design of the objects, to instead emphasize people’s actual experiences with them, we have opened the space for appreciating how both intended and unintended associations involving these complex things were in play together. We should view these not as alternative lenses on the objects, but as forces working concurrently, and upon one another, in the creative realizations that the animalian objects were.

The sociocultural spaces of the “Minoan” Aegean were teeming with animal bodies. Many of these animals were alive, but many were not—and never had been; the latter are our focus here. Realized across a range of media, such as zoomorphic vessels, frescoes, and seal stones, animals’ bodies took on a rich diversity of material and spatial qualities that could afford distinctive interactive experiences that the notion of “representations” fails to capture. By recognizing both biological and fabricated entities as real embodiments of animals, which could coexist and interact in Aegean spaces, the nature of our discussion changes. We see that the dynamics of representation were caught up in a much wider field of relationships involving these crafted bodies, which characterized their engagements with people. Doing so moves us beyond questions of signification and intentional design, and toward a fuller recognition of people’s actual experiences of animalian bodies. Looking closely at a variety of venues, ranging from palatial courts to a modest house bench, our focus thus can turn to how the world of animalian things was a crucial part of social life in Aegean spaces, and how direct interactions with these other animal bodies were central, yet often overlooked and minimized, components of human relations with nonhuman beasts.