This chapter examines if the systems of evidence in annulment, failure to act proceedings, and actions for damages, are designed to support private parties’ access to and participation in actions brought directly before the EU courts. Against the backdrop of evidence theory and the so-called procedural abilities doctrine, this chapter argues that, in the context of direct actions, the principle of effective judicial protection receives a restrictive reading. As a result, the requirements that private parties must meet to launch those actions do not, in practice, give way to broad procedural abilities and an unhindered access to the Union courts. These requirements thus seem designed to uphold a (strong) presumption of lawfulness of the EU legislature’s normative action, seeking to preserve the stability and coherence of EU law, rather than to ensure an effective access to, and exercise of the legal remedies included in the EU Treaties’ system of procedures.

This chapter discusses different types of evidence that conversation analysts use to ground their claims about social action. We begin by reviewing the epistemological perspective of CA, which demands that evidence reflect participants’ orientations; as a critical part of understanding the terms ‘participant orientation’ and ‘relevance,’ here we also discuss two ways in which CA’s position and emphasis on them are commonly misunderstood. The bulk of this chapter then reviews and illustrates a range of types of participant-orientation evidence. We organize our presentation of types of evidence roughly by sequential position vis-à-vis the focal action about which the analyst is making claims, including evidence to be found in: (i) next-turn, (ii) same-turn (e.g., same-TCU self-repair, accounts), (iii) prior turn or sequence, (iv) third turn/position (e.g., repair after next turn, courses of action/activity), (v) fourth turn/position, and (vi) more distal positions. We also discuss other forms of evidence that are not necessarily defined by sequential position, including: (i) third-party conduct, (ii) reported conduct, (iii) deviant cases, and (iv) distributional evidence. We conclude by offering some brief reflections on bringing different types and positions of evidence together toward the construction of an argument.

We explore the necessarily comparative nature of CA’s methodology. We focus less on cross-linguistic comparisons, comparisons between talk-in-interaction in different settings, and comparisons between speakers from diverse speech communities. Instead, we consider the micro ways in which analysts work comparatively, ways that generally go unnoticed in accounts of CA’s methodology but which underpin our approach in data sessions, to building collections of phenomena, and even our research strategies when exploring certain linguistic or interactional forms. We demonstrate what can be learned from comparisons to be found in data, for example between the different responses by different participants to the same observation or question, or between different speakers’ versions of events, or from the different forms used by speakers when referring to the ‘same’ thing but in different action environments. We highlight the significance of speakers’ production of different versions of the ‘same’ something in their self-corrections. Finally, we illustrate the utility of a research strategy in which comparisons are made between speakers’ use of a certain reference form at one point in an interaction and the form they use at other points in the same interaction. In short, we explore the methodological significance of endogenous comparisons in data.

This chapter argues that Collingwood’s “logic of question and answer” (LQA) can best be understood in the light of contemporary argumentation theory. Even if Collingwood quite often describes LQA in terms of inner thinking and reasoning, as was still usual in his time, his insistence on the normative (“criteriological”) character of LQA, paired with his attack on the pretensions of psychologists to describe logic (as well as other normative endeavours) in a purely empirical manner, makes clear that LQA has the same aspirations as the rising discipline of formal (mathematical) logic. The concise exposition of the form, content, and application of LQA is supported by references to all the relevant passages in Collingwood’s oeuvre as well as illustrated by means of a concrete example of his way of doing history. Although a recent and still developing discipline, contemporary argumentation theory was born as an attempt to describe and analyze argumentative texts as guided by norms constitutive of our argumentative practices in a way that completely escapes formal logic. It thus provides a place for LQA that has so far been lacking.

An inquest is an inquisitorial process, and this has an impact on the roles of the advocates and the jury, if there is one. This chapter explains their roles, and also when a professional may require separate legal representation, with some further tips on giving evidence from the perspective of an advocate.

This chapter gives an understanding of the court setting and proceedings, and practical tips on to prepare for the day and give evidence effectively.

The chapter presents an overview of the procedural arrangements adopted at the international criminal jurisdictions, namely the UN ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court (ICC), covering the main milestones from the initiation of the investigation to trial phase to appeals against the judgment and sentence and review. Before delving into the trajectories of an criminal case before international criminal courts and tribunals, the chapter highlights the origins of international criminal procedure in the common law (Anglo-American, or ‘adversarial’) and civil law (Continental, or ‘inquisitorial’) approaches, resulting in its legal nature as a hybrid scheme where the balance between the domestic influences varies by tribunal and over time due to reforms pursued by judge-legislators (ICTY and ICTR) or by states and, to a lesser extent, judges (ICC). The chapter reviews the role and functions of the main actors in international criminal proceedings, including repeat or professional players (judges, prosecutors, and defence) and other participants such as victims and witnesses and states and international organisations. It also highlights the normative importance of human rights to international criminal process and the imperative of complying with the principles of public, fair and expeditious proceedings.

Although maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent health is a well-established determinant of health across the lifecourse and across generations, the underpinning concept of DOHaD has not had significant impact on policymaking. This chapter identifies some of the barriers involved and how DOHaD researchers may overcome them. Policymaking is a complex process that is influenced by many factors other than science. Translating evidence to policy requires brokerage that explains the implications of science in a clear, frank way, accompanied by impactful solutions. Yet, the largely preventive approach advocated by DOHaD science does not inherently offer simple, high-impact interventions but rather a broad shift in thinking within the policy community. DOHaD advocacy will need to demonstrate short- and medium-term, as well as long-term, benefits. A complementary approach is to engage with communities to adjust scientific ideas to local knowledge and expertise.

Chapter 1 provides essential orientation for the rest of the volume’s contents. It begins by introducing some key issues including recent attempts to define ‘law’ and the challenges of undertaking a comparative history of ancient law (past and present). The next section moves on to introducing the different types of source material covered in the volume, introducing seven ‘rough categories’ of evidence: normative texts; commentaries; documentary records; ‘reports’ or ‘records’ of ‘cases’; portrayals of legal processes, and model forensic speeches; ritual forms; and ‘law’ in other forms of text. The final part of the chapter gives an overview of the major features and specific historical contexts for the principal legal traditions, intended as both introduction and information to be referred back to when consulting the volume as a whole.

Mental health services are intended to provide the means to deliver interventions and care to people experiencing mental health problems. This can only be achieved if the staff and resources to provide interventions and care are available. Unfortunately, the current design and resourcing of services can seriously interfere with this happening. Services have evolved over centuries, and many practices are determined by convention and limited by resources, particularly availability of staff in sufficient numbers and with appropriate skills. Mental Health Service provision, commissioning and funding in the NHS, and the evidence base are rapidly developing. Community mental health services, early intervention, assertive outreach, inpatient, outpatient, intensive care units and home treatment teams form key components, but clinical and patient-rated outcomes are still too infrequently measured to guide service development. The complexity of these services and their interfaces with primary care and specialist mental health teams are discussed in this chapter.