This chapter considers literary expressions of sovereignty in the nineteenth-century United States that underscore sovereignty’s oppositional nature and its productive potential, and it demonstrates how these literary expressions were, like public argument about sovereignty, constructed through the interplay between law and religion. Religious discourse provided a set of terms, examples, and motifs that shaped the nineteenth-century debate over political autonomy as it ranged across matters of territorial possession and the individual conscience. I first briefly address ideas of sovereignty that circulated in the long nineteenth century and informed US literature and public argument. Then I turn to competing visions of sovereignty expressed by the Cherokee Nation, the state of Georgia, the US federal government, and the US Supreme Court in the early decades of the nineteenth century. In the final section, I briefly turn to the figure of John Brown who, in linking the vision of Indigenous sovereignty expressed by the Cherokee Nation to the sovereign individuality espoused by Henry David Thoreau and the Transcendentals, serves as a harbinger of the contests over political sovereignty that ultimately led to the US Civil War.

This chapter lingers on the very notion of territory itself as a spatial imaginary, a literary trope, and a political crucible for competing ideas of sovereignty. In particular, it examines how territory, or perhaps more precisely, territoriality, did not simply work at the behest of US empire but also served as an essential spatial register for working alongside and even against US territorial annexation, occupation, and colonization. Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States asserted an understanding of sovereignty that foregrounded dominance over a territory and its inhabitants. At the broadest scale, territory denoted the sovereign’s property (the United States), and sovereignty denoted control over territory. Settler-colonial notions of sovereignty and territory conflicted with Indigenous understandings of sovereignty that often foreground responsibility to human and other-than-human relatives within a shared space or territory rather than possession of property. This chapter’s three sections, “Terra Nullius,” “Indian Territory,” and “Black Territories,” each take up a concept of territoriality that profoundly influenced US colonial expansion at the expense of other narratives of placemaking. Each section details how narratives of territoriality forcefully shaped US politics and culture while also describing competing notions of placemaking that disrupt these dominant narratives.

This chapter compares the short-lived norm neglect regarding the 2011 no-fly zone over Libya with the longer-lasting, yet fragile, norm neglect of the Philippines and China regarding Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (SCS). In these entrenched norm disputes, norm neglect was surprising. This chapter shows that social pressure from in-group members in the Libya case and from the arbitral tribunal and domestic compliance constituencies in the SCS case facilitated claim agreement. While these audience reactions continue to uphold norm neglect in the SCS case, key audiences’ perception that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led coalition’s implementation lacked output legitimacy led to a norm impasse on Syria.

Moreover, the missing shared normative basis for the claim agreements rendered them fragile. The blurring of responsibility to protect (R2P) and protection of civilians (PoC) reduced the social strength or precision of R2P, as well as its breadth. The decrease in acceptance, and thus depth, of R2P due to the contested implementation of the no-fly zone further reduced the relative strength of R2P. In the SCS case, norm neglect is ongoing and thus the effect on norm strength remains to be seen. The increasing acceptance of the arbitral award and China’s frame rapprochement have slightly strengthened the applicability of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) norms.

Chapter 1 focuses on the revolution of 1688 in Britian, in which the ideal of liberty as independence was promised to the people as the cornerstone of a new constitution to replace James II’s allegedly despotic use of arbitrary power. After examining the Bill of Rights, in which the fundamental rights of the people are laid out, the chapter turns to consider the provenance of the underlying ideal of liberty as independence and its contrast with arbitrary power. One major source is shown to have been the discussion of civil liberty by the historians and moralists of ancient Rome, especially Cicero, Sallust, Livy and Tacitus. The influence of these sources on the development of early modern republicanism in England is traced, especially in the works of Milton and Harrington. The other major source was the discussion of the law of persons in the Digest of Roman law, in which a fundamental distinction was drawn between free persons and dependants, including slaves. The influence of this legal tradition, especially as filtered by Bracton into English common law, is traced in the strand of constitutional thinking that runs from Fortescue and Thomas Smith to Coke, Selden and their followers.

How did new forms of mass politics and culture that included and gave voice to all men and women finally develop in Britain between 1885 and 1931?

Modern slavery is an amalgam of legal concepts defined in international law united by a shared characteristic – they are all forms of unfree labour: one person deprives another person of their freedom for profit. The introduction explains how unfree labour involving migrant workers and supply chains is particularly troublesome for states to govern because these transnational vectors do not fit within the ‘default’ territorial format of legal jurisdiction and, thus, challenge traditional ideas of state sovereignty. It treats modern slavery laws, which combine international, national, and (sometimes) regional laws, as an example of transnational law and shows how, in this context, the nation state is but one among an assemblage of governance actors. It develops a multidimensional conception of jurisdiction to explore the transnational legal governance of unfree labour and to illustrate how modern slavery laws reconfigure traditional understandings of sovereignty.

This chapter explains how modern slavery figured in a revitalised vision of British global sovereignty as EU membership was under threat. The Coalition Government assembled an elite policy network and forged a bipartisan consensus in favour of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. Although primarily carceral, the act also required large corporations to disclose their efforts to rid their supply chains of slavery. Part of the Conservative government’s antislavery agenda, the Immigration Act 2016 pulled labour regulation further towards criminal law. As home secretary (2010–2016) and prime minister (2016–2019), Theresa May positioned the United Kingdom as a critical actor in the global antislavery governance network and fashioned the United Kingdom’s fight against modern slavery as a key plank in her vision of Global Britain. After May’s resignation, the pandemic, and Brexit, the Conservative government came to treat victims of modern slavery as if they were illegal migrants undeserving of human rights.

Chapter 2 discusses the systems of government and the distribution of powers under post-2011 Arab constitutions. It first examines the issue of the overconcentration of authority in the hands of the head of state (with the notable exception of the 2014 Tunisian Constitution, which provided for a genuine semi-presidential system and a fairly robust system of checks and balances [at least on paper]). A special focus is placed on the emergency regimes: Despite some attempts to prevent abuses, the new constitutional provisions governing states of emergency continue to grant the executive branch a significant degree of discretionary power. Furthermore, the chapter shows that not only horizontal but also vertical separation of powers has remained weak. The last part of the chapter discusses the main reasons for the overconcentration of power, namely the constitutional tradition, the patriarchal family, the “top-down” constitution-making processes, and external influences. One of the major consequences of the overconcentration of authority was to undermine the principle of popular sovereignty.

Chapter 2 outlines normative challenges related to jurisdiction over data residing abroad. It illustrates how the law enforcement process involves different types of jurisdictional claim and highlights the challenges in bundling investigative measures with invasive enforcement measures. It also highlights that the traditional focus on territoriality does not meet the needs of law enforcement efforts in fighting cybercrime. Rather, basing claims of jurisdiction to enforce strictly on the location of data raises several questions in terms of the threshold of breaching sovereignty and the legality of accessing such data under international law. Further, the chapter looks at the inadequacies associated with single-factor jurisdictional tests and points to the need for multi-factor assessments. It discusses key actors being placed in a position where compliance with one state’s law necessitates violation of another’s. Last, it analyses international attempts to solve issues of transborder access to data, including the Council of Europe’s Second Additional Protocol to its Budapest Convention, the EU e-Evidence Regulation, the US CLOUD Act and the EU–US CLOUD Act agreement negotiations.

The transnational movement of peoples across the globe is one of the most bitterly contested political issues of our times, eliciting populist anger against migrants and refugees. This public outcry has muffled, however, a more dramatic process: the contemporaneous reconfiguration of territory, rights, and jurisdiction. This chapter highlights the formation of “shifting borders” that enable states to create lawless zones as well as rightless subjects. It then explores a combination of juridical and democratic possibilities for resistance and claims-making in a world of shifting borders and cosmopolitanism without illusions.

The premise of this volume is that borders are shifting, and that as borders shift, rights and democratic legitimacy ought to shift with them. For good reasons, the focus of this discussion is on sovereign states and their borders. However, sovereign borders do not exhaust the types of boundaries that shape and circumscribe human freedom. In this chapter, the focus is on the private geographies that shape our lives. These private geographies – and here special economic zones are discussed – are both embedded in the sovereign states system and also help to consolidate its structure. Private geographies, which are characterized by private sources of capital and property-ownership, rely on public actors and institutions to thrive. Private economic enclaves also help funnel capital and trade rights around restrictive sovereign borders. These private geographies are of special interest because they reveal how states and capital cooperate in monopolizing land and carving up the earth, acting in ways that consolidate each other’s power. Therefore, private borders and public properties call into question the public–private divide and reveal how power over land is determined in the global age, often in ways that evade democratic control.

In the last decade, states have fixated on policing their borders beyond their territorial limits. This practice, which has been called “shifting borders,” undermines state legitimacy, because the latter depends on how states exercise their power, who they exercise it over, and also on where they exercise it. As the chapter shows, shifting borders generates a tension among rights, territory, and people, where it seems that we can have any two, but not all three. This chapter examines three responses to this tension. First, Sovereigntism seeks to stabilize the relation of people and territory. Second, Democratic Cosmopolitanism tolerates shifts in territory, as long as people and rights remain. Finally, the Watershed Model keeps borders in their place, but it accepts changes in the people, as it decouples democratic governance and rights from a particular national identity. It is argued that, in the long run, this model best handles the challenges in times of planetary crises, such as global poverty and climate change. For the Watershed Model, like the grass-roots movements of indigenous peoples and transnational migrant activists, can redefine territory, allow for human mobility, and resist state overreach in border control.

What is territoriality, if we consider it from a maritime, rather than landed perspective? And how should borders be reconsidered, if we assume that the nonsovereign space of world seas is constitutive of politics, rather than exceptional to it? To answer this question, this chapter adopts a processual approach to international legal theory and outlines a vast trajectory. Sources from antiquity display an imagination of maritime spaces as an exteriority in relations to politics. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, classical international lawyers formulated an international law of the sea that sought global applicability. This was what is called here “the first internalization” of the sea. A second internalization is currently underway, in which a central tenet of the first, freedom of movement at sea, is now being questioned. It is argued in this chapter that if we are to understand territoriality, we must reject the premise of universal territoriality and understand it (also) from the position of nonterritoriality which is offered to us by the sea. In other words, the two internalizations are crucial for a processual understanding of territoriality. The chapter concludes with reflections on how traces of exteriority, beyond both internalizations, can be utilized for the purpose of political action.

This chapter lays the theoretical foundation for the book by disentangling the myriad discourses and interpretations of digital sovereignty from the perspective of the Global South and emerging power alliances. It argues that BRICS countries symbolize the “rise of the rest” in an increasingly multipolar world, their digital policies critical to the future shape of global internet, and digital governance. In this book, the idea of digital sovereignty itself is viewed as a site of power contestation and knowledge production. Specifically, the chapter identify seven major perspectives on digital sovereignty in a complex discursive field: state digital sovereignty, supranational digital sovereignty, network digital sovereignty, corporate digital sovereignty, personal digital sovereignty, postcolonial digital sovereignty, and commons digital sovereignty. The chapter highlights the affinities and overlaps as well as tensions and contradictions between these perspectives on digital sovereignty with brief illustrative examples from BRICS countries and beyond. While a state-centric perspective on digital sovereignty is traditionally more salient especially in BRICS contexts, increasing public concern over user privacy, state surveillance, corporate abuse, and digital colonialism has given ascendance to an array of alternative perspectives on digital sovereignty that emphasize individual autonomy, indigenous rights, community well-being, and sustainability.

Chapter 5 tackles the question of the applicability of belligerent reprisals in non-international armed conflict. After assessing the merits and difficulties associated with previous reflections on the topic, it devises a new methodology to approach the issue. Then, it puts the notion of belligerent reprisals in relation with the two features of inequality of status between States and non-State armed groups, and equality of rights and obligations for parties to non-international armed conflicts. A careful reading of the travaux préparatoires of Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions upholds an interpretation that links belligerent reprisals with the latter principle, and that places reciprocity at the basis of both the applicability and the purpose of the measure in non-international armed conflicts. The chapter concludes with the impact of this formalization on such key questions as the requirement of imputability to a State of the original IHL violation and the actual features of the principle of equality. It suggests that the focus be shifted to the idea of equilibrium of rights and obligations, and that belligerent reprisals be seen as a key enabler of it.