Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-p9bg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T05:10:49.597Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Knowledge, belief, and moral psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

John Mikhail Open the ORCID record for John Mikhail [Opens in a new window]
John Mikhail*
Affiliation:
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, DC, 20001, USA. john.mikhail@law.georgetown.edu; https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/john-mikhail/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Phillips et al. make a strong case that knowledge representations should play a larger role in cognitive science. Their arguments are reinforced by comparable efforts to place moral knowledge, rather than moral beliefs, at the heart of a naturalistic moral psychology. Conscience, Kant's synthetic a priori, and knowledge attributions in the law all point in a similar direction.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e161
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Barrett, H. C., Bolyanatz, A., Crittenden, A. N., Fessler, D. M. T., Fitzpatrick, S., Gurven, M., … Laurence, S. (2016). Small-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment. PNAS, 113(17), 4688–4693.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
de Waal, F. (2006). Primates and philosophers: How morality evolved. Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fessler, D. M. T., Barrett, H. C., Kanovksy, M., Stich, S., Holbrook, C., Henrich, J., … Laurence, S. (2015). Moral parochialism and contextual contingency across seven societies. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 282, 1–6.Google ScholarPubMed
Hamlin, J. K. (2013). Moral judgment and action in preverbal infants and toddlers: Evidence for an innate moral core. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22(3), 186–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Holmes, O. W. Jr. (1991/1881). The common law. New York: Dover.Google Scholar
Kagan, J. and Lamb, S. (Eds.) (1987). The emergence of morality in young children. University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Lorenz, K. (1941). Kant's doctrine of the a priori in light of contemporary biology. In Ruse, M. (Ed.), Philosophy after Darwin: Classic and contemporary readings (pp. 231–247). Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Mikhail, J. (2000). Rawls's linguistic analogy: A study of the “generative grammar” model of moral theory described by John Rawls in “A theory of justice.” Cornell University PhD.Google Scholar
Mikhail, J. (2007). Universal moral grammar: Theory, evidence and the future. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(4), 143–152.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mikhail, J. (2011). Elements of moral cognition: Rawls’ linguistic analogy and the cognitive science of moral and legal judgement. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mikhail, J. (2014). Any animal whatever? Harmful battery and its elements as building blocks of moral cognition. Ethics, 124(4), 750–786.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nichols, S. (2004). Sentimental rules: On the natural foundations of moral judgment. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phillips, J. & Knobe, J. (2018). The psychological representation of modality. Mind & Language, 33, 65–94.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Phillips, J., Morris, A., & Cushman, F. (2019). How we know what not to think. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 23(12), 1026–1040.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Piazza, J. & Sousa, P. (2016). When injustice is at stake, moral judgments are not parochial. Proceedings of the Royal Society B, 283, 20152037.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pizzaro, D. & Bloom, P. (2003). The intelligence of the moral intuitions: Comment on Haidt. Psychological Review, 110, 193–198.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Potts, T. (1980). Conscience in medieval philosophy. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryle, G. (1958). On forgetting the difference between right and wrong. In Meldon, A. I. (Ed.), Essays in moral philosophy (pp. 147–159). University of Washington Press.Google Scholar
Saxe, R. (2016). Moral status of accidents. PNAS, 113, 4555–4557.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Spelke, E., Lee, S. A., & Izard, V. (2010). Beyond core knowledge: Natural geometry. Cognitive Science, 34(5), 863–884.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Wolff, R. P. (1973). The autonomy of reason: A commentary on Kant's groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. New York: Harper.Google Scholar