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Beyond knowledge versus belief: The contents of mental-state representations and their underlying computations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Mika Asaba Open the ORCID record for Mika Asaba [Opens in a new window] ,
Aaron Chuey  and
Hyowon Gweon Open the ORCID record for Hyowon Gweon [Opens in a new window]
Mika Asaba
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA94305, USA. masaba@stanford.edu; chuey@stanford.edu; hyo@stanford.eduhttps://sll.stanford.edu
Aaron Chuey
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA94305, USA. masaba@stanford.edu; chuey@stanford.edu; hyo@stanford.eduhttps://sll.stanford.edu
Hyowon Gweon
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Stanford University, Stanford, CA94305, USA. masaba@stanford.edu; chuey@stanford.edu; hyo@stanford.eduhttps://sll.stanford.edu
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Abstract

Moving beyond distinguishing knowledge and beliefs, we propose two lines of inquiry for the next generation of theory of mind (ToM) research: (1) characterizing the contents of different mental-state representations and (2) formalizing the computations that generate such contents. Studying how children reason about what others think of the self provides an illuminating window into the richness and flexibility of human social cognition.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e141
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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