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The distinctive character of knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Jennifer Nagel Open the ORCID record for Jennifer Nagel [Opens in a new window]
Jennifer Nagel*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Toronto, CanadaM5R 2M8. jennifer.nagel@utoronto.ca; http://individual.utoronto.ca/jnagel/
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Abstract

Because knowledge entails true belief, it can be hard to explain why a given action is naturally seen as driven by one of these states as opposed to the other. A simpler and more radical characterization of knowledge helps to solve this problem while also shedding some light on what is special about social learning.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e163
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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