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Two distinct concepts of knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Christina Starmans Open the ORCID record for Christina Starmans [Opens in a new window]
Christina Starmans*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, OntarioM5S 3G3, Canada. christina.starmans@utoronto.ca
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Abstract

The central claim in the target article is that representations of knowledge are more basic than representations of beliefs. However, the authors are blending together two distinct concepts of knowledge: “awareness” and “propositional knowledge.” Distinguishing these two concepts of knowledge clarifies how the developmental and comparative data fit within the philosophical literature.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e171
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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