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Intersubjectivity and social learning: Representation of beliefs enables the accumulation of cultural knowledge
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 November 2021
Abstract
I accept the main thesis of the article according to which representation of knowledge is more basic than representation of belief. But I question the authors’ contention that humans' unique capacity to represent belief does not underwrite the capacity for the accumulation of cultural knowledge.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Knowledge before belief
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Author response
Actual knowledge