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Teleology first: Goals before knowledge and belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Tobias Schlicht Open the ORCID record for Tobias Schlicht [Opens in a new window] ,
Johannes L. Brandl ,
Frank Esken ,
Hans-Johann Glock ,
Albert Newen ,
Josef Perner ,
Franziska Poprawe ,
Eva Schmidt ,
Anna Strasser  and
Julia Wolf
Tobias Schlicht
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, GA3/29, 44780Bochum, Germanytobias.schlicht@rub.de, www.rub.de/philosophy/situatedcognitionalbert.newen@rub.de, Julia.Wolf-n8i@ruhr-uni-bochum.de
Johannes L. Brandl
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy KGW, University of Salzburg, A-5020Salzburg, Austriajohannes.brandl@sbg.ac.at, http://www.johannesbrandl.com
Frank Esken
Affiliation:
University of Europe for Applied Sciences, 58636Iserlohn, Germanyfrank.esken@ue-germany.com
Hans-Johann Glock
Affiliation:
Philosophisches Seminar, Universität Zürich, CH-8044Zürich, Switzerlandglock@philos.uzh.ch, https://www.isle.uzh.ch/en.htmlfranziska.poprawe@philos.uzh.ch, https://www.philosophie.uzh.ch/de/seminar/people/research/theory_glock/poprawe.html Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Language Evolution (ISLE), University of Zurich, CH-8044Zurich, Switzerland
Albert Newen
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, GA3/29, 44780Bochum, Germanytobias.schlicht@rub.de, www.rub.de/philosophy/situatedcognitionalbert.newen@rub.de, Julia.Wolf-n8i@ruhr-uni-bochum.de
Josef Perner
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience, 5020Salzburg, Austriajosef.perner@sbg.ac.at, https://ccns.sbg.ac.at/people/perner/
Franziska Poprawe
Affiliation:
Philosophisches Seminar, Universität Zürich, CH-8044Zürich, Switzerlandglock@philos.uzh.ch, https://www.isle.uzh.ch/en.htmlfranziska.poprawe@philos.uzh.ch, https://www.philosophie.uzh.ch/de/seminar/people/research/theory_glock/poprawe.html
Eva Schmidt
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy and Political Science, TU Dortmund, 44227 Dortmund, Germanyeva.schmidt@tu-dortmund.de
Anna Strasser
Affiliation:
Independent Researcher, 10245Berlin, Germanyannakatharinastrasser@gmail.comhttps://www.denkwerkstatt.berlin/ANNA-STRASSER/
Julia Wolf
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, GA3/29, 44780Bochum, Germanytobias.schlicht@rub.de, www.rub.de/philosophy/situatedcognitionalbert.newen@rub.de, Julia.Wolf-n8i@ruhr-uni-bochum.de
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Abstract

Comparing knowledge with belief can go wrong in two dimensions: If the authors employ a wider notion of knowledge, then they do not compare like with like because they assume a narrow notion of belief. If they employ only a narrow notion of knowledge, then their claim is not supported by the evidence. Finally, we sketch a superior teleological view.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e169
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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