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Representing knowledge, belief, and everything in between: Representational complexity in humans and other apes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Kresimir Durdevic  and
Christopher Krupenye Open the ORCID record for Christopher Krupenye [Opens in a new window]
Kresimir Durdevic
Affiliation:
School of Psychology & Neuroscience, University of St Andrews, St AndrewsKY16 9JP, UKkd96@st-andrews.ac.uk
Christopher Krupenye
Affiliation:
Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD21218krupenye@jhu.eduhttp://christopherkrupenye.weebly.com/ Department of Psychology, Durham University, DurhamDH1 3LE, UK.
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Abstract

Building on Phillips and colleagues' case for the primacy of knowledge, we advocate for attention to diversity in mentalizing constructs within, as well as between, knowledge and belief. Ultimately, as great apes and other animals show, the development and evolution of theory of mind may reflect a much greater range of incremental elaborations of representational or computational complexity.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e150
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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